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Abstract 
The desire for continuous improvement in safety performance has lead the process 
industry to a situation where the main contribution to accident causation is the actions of 
people rather than equipment failure. Models of human behaviour and accident 
causation, and risk assessment techniques aim to improve safety by reducing human 
error rates. These models require appropriate data and this thesis examines sources of 
information that could be used to provide accurate data for use in human factors studies. 
Accident reporting systems are widely used by the process industry to record events 
resulting in loss. A survey of the systems used by companies has been carried out. This 
found that some of the information recorded in accident reports was relevant to human 
factors studies although it was generally limited to details of the behaviour of people "at 
the sharp end." Little consideration had been given to the actions of people working away 
from the plant or of the factors that affect human performance. 
Near miss reporting systems are now used by most companies in the process industry to 
increase the number of incidents from which they can learn about their safety 
performance. Most systems lack maturity and at present the provision of data for use in 
human factors studies is poor. This thesis describes studies carried out to determine the 
potential of near miss reporting systems to provide appropriate data. It was found that 
people find it difficult to determine what events and consequences might have happened 
because there is a lack of evidence. Simple risk assessment based on what people do, the 
hazards involved and overall unit objectives has been used to provide the required 
evidence. This has resulted in more effective human factors assessment. Near miss 
reporting has great potential to provide data for use in human factors studies but it should 
be considered as a living risk assessment exercise rather than an extension to accident 
reporting. 
Investigation allows an in-depth analysis of incidents to be carried out. A review of the 
techniques developed to aid investigations has shown that most guide investigators to 
uncover and record root causes. A study of actual incident investigation reports has 
shown that human factors problems are considered in reasonable detail although formal 
techniques are rarely used. Only major accident inquiries, however, are able or willing to 
identify management and cultural failures so that changes can be made that will lead to 
wide-ranging improvement to overall safety performance. 
Companies operating continuous process require people to work shifts. Log books and 
handover reports are used to pass on important information about past and future 
activities. A survey of log books and handover reports was carried out. The contents 
included; information about routine and non-routine tasks, descriptions of problems 
experienced, and records of human errors and unreported incidents. These could provide 
much data useful for use in human factors studies and may actually provide a mechanism 
for improved incident reporting. 
Systems currently used in the process industry to report and record events have been 
examined. Although companies in the process industry rarely use these sources of 
information in assessing human factors these existing systems have all been shown to 




1.1 Human Factors and Industrial Safety. 
People have the ability to think, adapt to situations and solve problems and, despite 
great advances in technology, they remain indispensable in the design, manufacture, 
installation, operation and maintenance of process plants. Unfortunately people are 
not precise instruments or machines. They perform tasks in an inconsistent fashion 
and in some cases this means operations are performed outside the acceptable limits 
of the system. In these cases failures can occur and these can lead to accidents. 
The process industry is characterised by expensive plant, and hazardous materials, 
products and conditions. The potential for loss can be huge. Appendix 1 is a summary 
of studies that have been conducted to determine the causes of accidents. The results 
consistently show that the human contribution to loss, in all industries, is large. In this 
respect the process industry is no exception. 
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1.1.1 What is at Stake? 
Major disasters such as the Piper Alpha oil platform explosion, the capsize of the 
Herald of Free Enterprise ferry and the Clapham Junction train crash cause much 
public concern because of the large loss of life. Such events occur too frequently, 
however, less serious accidents occur far more frequently and overall the losses 
involved are far more significant, although not always apparent. 
According to the statistics published by the Health and Safety Commission [HSC 
1993] 249 people were killed at work in the United Kingdom in the 12 months 1 April 
1992 to 31 March 1993. In addition 16,526 employees received non-fatal injuries and 
138,267 received injuries which resulted in their absence from work for at least three 
days. The figures also show that it is not just employees who are affected by industrial 
accidents. In the same 12 months 121 members of the public were killed, and a further 
10,402 received non-fatal injuries in industrial accidents. These figures indicate the 
terrible human cost of poor safety. They are also probably a large underestimate. 
Although the year in question had the best safety record ever the HSC suggest that up 
to 2/3  of injurious accidents are never reported. 
Injury and death are not the only consequences of industrial accidents. Between 1960 
and 1990 the 100 largest losses experienced by companies in the process industry 
caused $5.25 billion worth of property damage (in 1990 prices) [Hancock 1991]. The 
actual cost to companies is probably much higher. The HSE estimate that the cost of 
uninsured losses, which include sick pay, repairs, lost production, investigation costs, 
loss of goodwill and corporate image, hiring and training of replacement staff, is 
between 6 and 27 times the cost of insured losses which include company liability 
claims, damage to buildings and vehicles and business interruption [HSE 1993a]. 
Despite the hazardous nature of the process industry most companies do have 
reasonable, or even good, safety records. History, however, has shown that a low 
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accident rate, even over many years, is no guarantee that a major accident will not 
occur [HSE 19911. 
1.1.2 What Can be Done? 
Public awareness of the danger from industrial accidents dates to the late 1800s 
[Thompson 1987]. Numerous explosions occurred involving boiler pressure vessels 
used in steam trains and ships, and to power machines in factories. However the 
mechanisms of failure were not well understood, accidents were considered as acts of 
God and little preventative action was taken. Gradually knowledge increased and 
codes of practice were developed to improve safety. During the second World War 
studies of military electronic systems found that at any time 2/3  were unavailable 
because they were being repaired. This situation was considered to be unacceptable 
and reliability engineering emerged as a method of identifying the causes of failure to 
show where improvements could be made. Later still, when nuclear power was being 
considered, it was realised that the consequences of any major accident could be 
terrible. The nuclear industry developed risk assessment techniques that allowed them 
to predict how safe systems were likely to be. 
The process industry itself has changed much over the years. After the second World 
War there was rapid expansion, advances were made in technology and the industry 
became very competitive. This led to enormous increases in plant size and process 
complexity which introduced rigorous conditions such as high pressure, temperature 
and flow rates, and increased storage and process hold-up of hazardous materials 
[IChemE 19771. 
Codes of practice, reliability engineering and risk assessment were all developed to 
reduce equipment failure rates. They have been successful, however pressure from the 
public, governments, insurance companies and indeed company managers who have 
realised that accidents can be very costly events, has required continual improvement. 
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As equipment safety has improved it has become apparent that significant further 
safety improvements are only possible if the human involvement in accidents is 
addressed. 
In the past human factors have been dealt with through instruction and discipline. This 
was because it was assumed that human errors that caused accidents occurred because 
people were either careless or chose to work in unsafe manner. Although this may be 
true in a small minority of cases, most of the time people try to do their best. However 
everyone makes errors sometimes and only if this fact is accepted can action be taken 
to improve safety by reducing the probability and consequence of error. This requires 
an understanding of human behaviour and accident causation which allows the risks 
to be identified. 
1.2 The Contents of This Thesis. 
The main problem with human factors assessment is a general lack of appropriate 
data. This thesis examines potential sources of data. It is based on a review of safety 
and human factors literature, discussions with company safety personnel and human 
factors specialists, knowledge acquired through attendance of training courses and 
conferences, visits to onshore process sites and an extended study of an offshore oil 
production platform. 
1.2.1 Chapter 2. Background to Human Factors Theory. 
Understanding human behaviour would be straightforward if it was like any other 
component in a system. Actions would be directly related to input information so they 
could be predicted with confidence with no knowledge of how information processing 
was carried out. Human behaviour is not like this. People are able to think and make 
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decisions about what they are going to do and how they are going to do it based on the 
information they perceive and have stored in their memory. 
Models have been developed that explain certain aspects of human behaviour. No one 
model provides a universal method of predicting behaviour but they all suggest that 
human behaviour is heavily influenced by the situations and circumstances under 
which tasks are performed. 
The role of human error in accident causation has also been examined and models 
have been developed. These generally suggest that although human error is a major 
component in most accidents it comes at a late stage in the sequence of events that 
lead to loss. The primary cause of human error, and hence accidents, is poor safety 
management and company culture. 
1.2.2 Chapter 3. Human Factors Risk Assessment. 
Quantifying risk allows engineers to determine if their plants are acceptably safe or 
decide what actions will have the greatest effect on safety improvement. Assessment 
requires the identification of hazardous events, and calculation of the probability of 
occurrence and possible consequences. Until recently the human contribution to such 
assessments has been largely overlooked. 
Techniques have been developed that allow human behaviour to be described in a way 
that ultimately provides human reliability data. Analysis is required to determine what 
people do and how they can fail. Data is then extracted from a human reliability 
database or estimated by experts. This data has to account for the conditions and 
circumstances under which tasks are performed as these have such a major influence 
on human behaviour. This suggests it would be most appropriate if data were derived 
from actual plant experience. The remainder of this thesis examines potential sources 
of such plant specific data. 
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1.2.3 Chapter 4. Accident Reporting as a Source of Human Factors 
Data. 
Most companies in the process industry have used accident reporting systems for 
many years, mainly because it has been a legal requirement. Many accidents have 
been reported and, as most accidents have a high human involvement, these reports 
must include some information that could provide data for use in human factors 
studies. 
There is no one standard reporting system so each company has developed their own. 
A survey of the systems used by companies has shown that many similarities exist. 
All use accident report forms which require questions to be answered concerning 
different aspects of each accident. The differences in these systems lay in the actual 
questions asked and guidance given about what information the responses should 
include. It is clear, however, that although the quantity of information recorded as part 
of company accident reporting systems is large, the quality of information concerning 
human factors is generally poor. It is also difficult to foresee that this situation is likely 
to change. Human factors assessment needs information about conditions and 
circumstances under which people have to work. A high rate of error or serious 
consequences of error suggests the work environment is less than adequate and 
indicates that the management and safety culture of the company has failed. This is 
very sensitive information as it can incriminate the management of the companies 
where accidents have occurred. Recording such information is something most 
companies are not prepared to do, unless forced to. 
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1.2.4 Chapter 5. Near Miss Reporting as a Source of Human Factors 
Data. 
The human factors content of accident reports may be rather limited but many 
technical failures are identified that allow positive action to be taken to improve 
safety. As safety has improved the number of accidents occurring has decreased, 
effectively reducing the opportunities available to companies to learn about their 
safety problems. As near misses occur far more frequently than accidents many 
companies have developed near miss reporting systems to increase the number of 
incident reports received. The potential of such systems to provide data useful for 
human factors studies has been examined. 
Developing near miss reporting systems is not easy. Near misses are difficult for 
people to identify because no evidence is left and the duration of any disturbance is 
limited. Even when people are able to identify them they need quite a lot of 
encouragement to complete a report. They must see a benefit in reporting the incident 
and be confident that they will not experience any recriminations because of the 
involvement they may have had in the incident. 
The human contribution to near misses includes not only the causes but also recovery. 
This suggests that near miss reporting systems may actually have a greater potential 
than accident reporting systems, to provide data for use in human factors studies. Near 
miss reports also create less interest, as no loss has occurred, so the reports can 
include hypothesis and speculation about what might and could have happened. This 
study includes the results of studies carried out to support this notion. These have 
shown that collecting information about the tasks people perform, why they do them 
and the risk involved allows accurate assessments of possible errors and likely 
consequences. Such an approach encourages the collection of information about 
human factors and provides a framework in which data can be stored. 
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1.2.5 Chapter 6. Incident Investigations as a Source of Human 
Factors Data. 
Incident reports provide a record of events that occurred and simple assessment of 
possible reasons why. Investigating incidents allows the most likely explanation of all 
circumstances that allowed an incident to occur to be determined. They are, however, 
costly to perform and usually only carried out for the most serious incidents. It is 
important that they are able to identify all the root causes of an incident so that 
appropriate action can be taken to prevent accidents and improve overall safety. 
Incident investigation techniques have been developed which provide a structured 
approach to collecting evidence, organising information collected and analysing 
events to determine root causes. What is not clear, however, is how often such 
techniques are used and how successful they are at providing human factors data. 
A selection of major accident inquiries have been examined to determine how they 
were conducted and what the findings were. None of these appear to have used any of 
the formal methods developed. They all, however, seemed to follow a standard format 
that identified; fatal errors, the factors that made errors more likely, other contributory 
factors that explained why the accidents proved so disastrous, previous incidents that 
showed a lack of safety awareness and ability to learn from mistakes and management 
failures. Wide ranging recommendations were made aimed at improving overall 
safety for the whole industry. If all incident investigations were carried out in such a 
manner the potential to provide data for use in human factors studies would be 
considerable. 
Company incident investigation reports are generally confidential, however, some 
have been obtained for this study. Again there is little evidence to suggest that formal 
techniques were used during the investigations apart from the occasional case where 
safety consultants have been commissioned. The investigation reports, however, seem 
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to be successful at uncovering technical failures. Human and management failures do 
not seem to be covered so well. This suggests that most company incident 
investigations may not provide much information which is useful for providing data 
for use in human factors studies. 
1.2.6 Chapter 7. Information Used at Handover as a Source of 
Human Factors Data. 
Logs books and handover reports are widely used for communicating important 
information between people finishing their shifts and their relief. They generally 
include information about tasks performed, conditions of operation and difficulties 
experienced. This suggests they would be a useful source of data for use in human 
factors studies. 
A study was performed on an offshore oil production platform. This found that a huge 
amount of information was being recorded. Much was duplicated, representing a 
waste of time for the people writing them and suggesting a need for improved 
communication. Much of the contents, however, included information about success 
and failure events, routine and non-routine tasks carried out, timing and duration of 
events, and situations where people are exposed to hazards. This study showed that 
these records had the potential to provide much useful data for use in human factors 
studies. It also suggests that there may be better ways of organising incident and other 
reporting systems. 
1.2.7 Chapter 8. Conclusions. 
All the above sources of information could be used to provide data useful for human 
factors studies. The systems used by most companies, however, require development 
which should be driven by a clear understanding of human factors theory, accident 
causation and risk assessment. 
Chapter 2. 
Literature Survey Part 1. 
Background to Human Factors Theory. 
2.1 Introduction. 
A review of safety literature clearly shows that human error, or some form of impaired 
human performance [Price 1993], is a major contributor to most accidents in all 
industries [Gertman 19941. Many studies have been performed to determine the 
actual contribution. Unfortunately there is no accepted taxonomy, so that it is often 
difficult to compare different analyses [Lees 19801. It is clear, however, that the effect 
on safety and reliability is far greater than many people realise [Dhillon 1990]. 
Appendix 1 lists a collection of accident and incident statistics. They show that people 
influence systems in many different ways, according to their role in the organisation, 
and that their failures have many different consequences. They also suggest that 
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human failure is not random but caused, or at least made more likely or serious, by the 
conditions and situations people have to work in. 
This chapter is a summary of the current theories about human behaviour, the causes 
of human error and how these lead to accidents and the way behaviour is controlled 
through appropriate safety management and culture to prevent accidents. 
2.2 Why Do People Make Errors? 
For most activities there is only one, or very few, correct ways of completing them 
and many ways to do them wrong. Luckily, human behaviour is not purely random so 
the probability of error is far less than the opportunity [Reason 1990a]. 
Theories have been developed that allow human behaviour to be modelled, and the 
chance of error predicted. Most theories include three elements: 
mechanisms governing human behaviour, 
the nature of the task and environmental circumstances, 
the nature of the people concerned. 
2.2.1 Mechanisms Governing Performance. 
To understand why people make errors it is useful to know how they actually perform 
the tasks required of them. This is probably the most difficult part of this study to 
summarise as no single model has been developed which explains all the observed 
behaviour of humans. Below is a summary of some of the models that have been 
developed. An obvious feature of this summary will be the disparity between different 
models, each aiming to describe different aspects of human behaviour. 
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Humans Considered as Just Another Component. 
It would be very convenient if we could describe humans as "black boxes." 
Information is received and acted upon, as shown in Figure 2.1. For this model it does 
not matter what happens between the arrival of the information and the initiation of 
the action [CCPS 1994]. 
Information I 	I Black-box I 	I 	Action 
Figure 2.1 Human "Black-box" behavior. 
[Holinagel 1992] describes this as a "stimuli-organism-response" (S-O-R) model. 
Similar models form the basis for a number of psychological theories. Figure 2.2 
expands the black box into an "organism" that processes information in stages before 
giving a response. Such models are useful starting points when modelling human 
behaviour but give us little information about how processing is carried out and why 
errors are made. 
Stimulus [__ .Processing  More  Response JPr.J 	I Still More I 	I IPrnrnccnaI_ 
Storage 
(Memory) 
Figure 2.2 Human Processing Mechanism 
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Cognition 
Cognition may be defined as the mental processes that control human behaviour. For 
purposeful behaviour, a person needs to understand what they are trying to achieve 
and to assess a method to realise their goals [Hoilna gel 1993]. This involves a 
combination of cognitive processes (capabilities, competencies, and skills related to 
knowledge and its use in control) and a knowledge base (beliefs and attitudes). These 
are also influenced, from within, by the state of the person's mind at the time, and, 
from outside, by information concerning the particular circumstances present 
[Dougherty 1993]. 
Knowledge 	 Situational Signs 
Base -,.(Influence from outside) 




k State of Mind 
	
\. 	(Influence from within) 
Mood 
Emotions 
Figure 2.3 Model of Cognition 
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Explaining the Knowledge Base. 
To understand further the workings of the knowledge base, it has been described as a 





Long Term I 	 I Working  I 	I Procedural 
Memory Cognitive I Memory  I Cognitive I Memory 
Processor 	I I Processor I 
Performance 
Figure 2.4 Human Information Processing System 
Long Term Memory is assumed to be a permanent store of individual items of 
factual knowledge which decays very slowly. It is arranged in a hierarchy so that 
related information is linked. This means that all information stored about a subject 
can be recalled to the required level of detail. 
Figure 2.5 shows an example of how long term memory may be arranged. Details are 
recorded about a person called John. He lives in Edinburgh, is a Chemical Engineer 
and plays football. If we wanted to visit him we have more information about where 
he lives. If we want to know more about the sport he plays we have some knowledge 
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about football that is not specific to John. We do not know any thing about chemical 
engineering but that does not cause us any problem. We know there is more to know 
and would have to find a source of information if it was important. 
Figure 2.5 The Hierarchical nature of long term memory 
Working Memory is a temporary store of "conscious" information coming from 
senses of long term memory. It has a limited capacity, generally assumed to be less 
than 10 unrelated items, and this explains much of human behaviour associated with 
information overload [Wickens 1987]. 
Figure 2.6 is a representation of the working memory. It consists of a central executive 
which keeps close control of a verbal sub-system, which processes letters, digits and 
words stored in phonetic and acoustic forms, and a spatial sub-system, which 
processes analogue, spatial and pictorial information. The sub-systems are of a similar 
structure. Both include a "passive store," which is constantly updated with new 
information, and an "active rehearsal" process, which allows information in the 
passive store to be repeated so that enough time is available for it to be remembered. 
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Figure 2.6 Components of the Working Memory 
Procedural Memory is like the long term memory but, rather than storing knowledge 
about facts, principles and relations, it stores knowledge about how to do things such 
as solving mathematical problems, answering questions, programming a computer or 
riding a bicycle [Kyllonen and Alluisi 1987]. It takes the form "if-then" as shown in 
Figure 2.7. 
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If 	 Then 
Clauses about whether aI 	 Match the 	 I That set of I 
set of actions in 	information in I actions are 
procedural memory can 	 the working I 	I attempted 
be applied 	I memory 	I I 
Figure 2.7 Procedural Memory 
This model shows that learning how to do something is different to remembering 
individual pieces of information. Knowledge is required, not only about the actions to 
be performed, but also the conditions under which they are appropriate. It is used to 
explain why learning new procedures or rules requires time and practice but once 
mastered is remembered indefinitely. 
Cognitive Processes. 
Human behaviour is controlled by a number of processes. A cue for action is provided 
by the perception of information, this is processed and decisions are made. This 
process is facilitated by the ability to focus attention and take short cuts. 
Perception is best described as a component in a closed-loop system as shown in 
Figure 2.8 [Foley and Moray 1987]. At first a rough estimate is made of the 
information being perceived allowing a quick assessment of the situation. If the 
information does not appear to make sense, or an action taken has an unexpected 
effect, the next iteration will increase the accuracy. This may provide more time to 
take in information or involve the action of "taking a closer look." 
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Figure 2.8 Perception 
Conscious perception 
Processing of perceived information is required before decisions about actions to be 
taken can be made. A number of models have been developed to try to explain how 
this occurs. Most suggest that specialised processors handle different types of 
information and can operate independently, to a greater or lesser extent. A central 
executive acts as a controller or information exchange mechanism. Each processor 
works relatively slowly but operating in parallel allows reasonable performance. The 
working memory is used to compare the patterns of processors to those stored in the 
long term memory. A perfect match is not expected at first but further processing time 
is used if required. 
Decision making identifies possible courses of action, based on the perceived 
information that has been processed. Possible consequences of each possible action 
along with likelihood are considered to select the best option [Gertman 1994]. 
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Decision making is another function carried out in the working memory. It has to 
compete for resources with other cognitive processes and limited capacity can cause 
problems. 
Information tends to be chosen according to its salience rather than its reliability. 
Cues that are easily noticed because they are big, bright or come along first take 
priority. It easier to recognise positive cues such as a warning light coming on, rather 
the absence of a cue, where an indicator light goes off, even though they may give the 
same information, such as an equipment malfunction. 
People tend to assume all cues have equal reliability. They overestimate the 
probabilities of rare events, underestimate the frequent ones. Once a decision has been 
made people tend to concentrate on confirmation whilst ignoring information that 
suggests they were wrong [Dorner 19901. This may improve their motivation but 
leads to potentially dangerous over-confidence. 
Action is taken according to the decisions made. The possibilities include: 
• an immediate action, 
• information being remembered by transferring it to the long term memory, 
• information is forgotten, it is lost altogether over time, 
• current information used during a delayed response. 
Any action is executed by a process of coordinated muscular control. This occurs 
independently of the selection process but there is generally some feedback which 
goes through the normal information processing [Wickens 19871. 
The quality of action depends on the quality of stimuli. Expected stimuli reduce 
uncertainty and allow quick and accurate responses. If the response is closely related 
to the stimuli, e.g. if an instrument dial moving clockwise requires a clockwise turn of 
a control knob, the response is easier and quicker [Wickens 19871. 
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Attention is a function of the working memory that allows efforts to be concentrated 
by filtering out unwanted stimuli. It is considered to be a limited pool of resources that 
is distributed between various cognitive processes as shown in Figure 2.9. The 
filtering is rarely perfect so some irrelevant information may "break through" 
depending on the complexity and number of tasks being performed. 
Attention 
Resources 
Short Term 	 Ar 
Sensory Store v 
[1 I Decision and 	Response 
E 	 Perception 	response selection ' Execution 
YI 
Working 





Figure 2.9 Attention Resources 
It is relatively easy to focus attention on a single task. A switch to another task can 
take time with a large amount of "break through" during the transition. Attention on 
more than one task is possible and improves with practice. Problems occur where 
similarities in tasks lead to interference. Over time, however, certain aspects become 
automated, redundant information is ignored and attention is focused to the parts of 
the tasks where it is needed the most. 
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Short Cuts allow people to overcome the limitations of working memory, increase 
the speed of processing and reduce mental energy used [Battinan and Kiumb 19911. 
To achieve this the brain tends to assume that the situations being encountered are the 
same as those of previous experience. Rather than collecting all the available 
information, familiar cues are taken and the gaps are filled with stored information. A 
selection of possible responses are considered and one is chosen. As this is based on a 
limited amount of information it may not be the best available but this simplification 
process significantly reduces the effort required. 
The tendency for people to use short cuts can be utilised. Information is more easily 
interpreted if it is presented in an integrated form [Wickens 1987] whilst the chance of 
incorrect recognition can be minimised if differences between cues are maximised 
and similarities eliminated wherever possible. 
Information is most easily remembered if it is perceived in both sub-systems of the 
working memory, i.e. is presented verbally and spatially [Wickens 1987], whilst it is 
more easily recalled when in a similar situation to that when it was first experienced 
[Kyllonen and Alluisi 19871. 
2.2.2 The Nature of the Task and Environmental Circumstances. 
Tasks are performed to fulfil certain requirements of the system a person is working 
in. Performance is governed by how well a person's abilities match those required by 
the task and the opportunities people have to act properly. This is affected by 
resources available and any constraints imposed. 
Tasks are rarely performed in isolation and to analyse them as such would be too 
simplistic [Holinagel 19911. A number of tasks may be performed in parallel, the 
finish of one task and start of another may overlap and some tasks are effectively a 
component of another. 
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Task Demands. 
Different tasks place different physical and mental demands on people. If a task can 
be classified, according to its demands, assessment is possible that allows a job to be 
made easier or to suggest selection criteria for people who will do the work. 
Physical demands usually involve the consideration of a person's strength or size. 
They generally mean that a person is either capable or incapable of performing a 
particular task. People can be selected according to the requirements, however, a task 
requiring unusual physical characteristics probably needs redesigning. 
Mental demands are less easily defined but obviously more important where human 
error is concerned. Various classification schemes have been developed. They 
generally require a task to be analysed in terms of the requirements for: detecting, 
observing, monitoring and collecting information; interpreting, diagnosing and 
recognising situations then checking to ensure accuracy; formulating and assessing 
alternative plans and choosing the most appropriate; communicating, liaising and 
negotiating with others [Embrey et al 1994a]. 
The effect of technology is worth further consideration. The advances made in recent 
years have increased the complexity of systems. This can place severe demands on the 
people who have to use them. It is vital that new systems are designed with the human 
user's capabilities, limitations and requirements in mind [Malone 1990]. 
Factors That Influence Human Performance. 
Humans can make errors at any time but certain factors about the task or work 
environment make them far more likely [Williams 1988]. Classification usually 
focuses on factors such as: unfamiliarity and inexperience of the person performing 
the task; lack of time or information; perceived risk less than the actual risk, resulting 
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in lack of appropriate consideration for safety; physical ability, mental stimulation 
and the pace of work; disruption to work patterns. 
Arousal and Stress. 
The human body is very sensitive to certain stimulants. While a level of arousal is 
required to maintain performance, adverse circumstances cause stress and seriously 
degrade performance. The problem is that this degradation occurs gradually and, 
although this means that humans rarely fail totally, it does make degradation hard to 
detect [Ridley 1990]. 
Two basic theories have been suggested to explain effects on performance [Brown 
1990]. 
Stress Theory: stress reduces the capacity of an individual to meet the demands of 
their tasks [Brown 1990]. Stress can be caused by two forms of "stressor": 
environmental stressors: extremes of temperature, noise, vibration, bodily injury, 
hunger etc. causing physiological as well as psychological effect. 
• psychological stressors: threat, inability to achieve valued goals, conflict, physical 
or social isolation, intense periods of mental activity or excitement, or dramatic 
changes in life style such as retirement, redundancy, marriage. 
Arousal or Alertness Theory: efficiency rises to a peak as arousal increases but 
declines when arousal is too high. If plotted it forms an inverted 'U' as shown in 
Figure 2.10. 




Figure 2.10 Arousal or Alertness Theory. 
It is tempting to combine the stress and arousal theories, suggesting they show two 
sides of the same story. This should be avoided as stress has purely negative 
connotations whereas reasonable levels of arousal promote wellbeing and only at 
excessive levels result in behavioural problems [Brown 1990]. 
Emergency situations involve high level of stress brought about by uncertainty about 
the situation combined with little indication about what action alternatives are 
available [Wilhelsen 1994]. These combine with an extreme lack of time, mortal' 
danger, overload or under-load of information, complex situations, lack of equipment 
and resources that make the chances, and consequences, of error, very great. 
Job Characteristics. 
People are involved at all stages of an operation. Customers, visitors, suppliers and 
members of the public can influence the way a company operates [DNV 19931 but 
obviously it is the employees who are the most significant. The influence can be 
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positive and negative because of each individual's strengths and weaknesses [HSE 
19911 but the actual impact depends on their function within the company. 
Operators monitor and control processes under normal conditions and have to 
diagnose and recover undesired situations [Anderson and Burns 19881. Their errors 
tend to initiate accidents. Once an accident sequence starts, however, they can 
terminate it if they act correctly. Of course, they can also make the situation worse 
[Kirwin 19901. 
Maintenance personnel are involved in preventative and corrective work aimed at 
keeping equipment in good, safe, working condition. These operations include a high 
human involvement. The consequence of error is usually the unavailability of 
equipment, either immediately or at some later time. 
Manufacturing and construction personnel can cause equipment or building failure 
at some time during the life of the plant through poor workmanship [Dhillon 19891. 
Supervisors are required to "instruct, inform, motivate, coach and lead the employees 
in their charge" [DNV 1993]. Their failures lead to the failures of others [Kletz 1993]. 
Managers are ultimately responsible for safety. They create company policy, set 
standards, select personnel and cultivate an appropriate culture. Their failures can 
have severe and wide-ranging consequences. 
2.2.3 The Nature of the Individual. 
The final factor to consider about why people make errors is the nature of the 
individual. Every person is affected by different aspects of their job. This results from 
their education, upbringing, intelligence, physical and mental capabilities, 
qualifications, personality traits and experience. These affect how individuals are able 
to tackle tasks and how they are able to work with others [Lee et al 1988]. 
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The nature of the individual can be classified according to their "cognitive skills and 
abilities;" the mental resources available to them to solve problems, make decisions 
and respond, and their "personal attributes" determining how they deal with situations 
through their ability to be flexible, impartial, optimistic, proactive and determined 
[Buys and Clark 19781. 
Disabilities affect individuals' ability to perform tasks. They result in defects to the 
senses. They can be naturally occurring with genetic causes or brought on by disease 
with temporary or permanent consequences. 
2.3 The Causes of Accidents and Incidents. 
This chapter has established that people make errors and there are factors that make 
them more likely. The remainder of the chapter describes the role of errors in incident 
causation and how they result in accidents. 
An incident is an event that causes, or has the potential to cause, loss. It represents 
a situation where a hazard is introduced into a system or the control of a hazard is lost. 
If that hazard is able to interact with a body or substance the result will be harm or 
loss and the event is an accident. A reaction occurs if there is contact with, or 
exposure to a substance with an energy source above the threshold limit of the body or 
structure [DNV 19931. The source of energy can be chemical, thermal, acoustic, 
mechanical, electrical or ionising radiation. 
The bulk of Section 2.3 will be taken up by a summary of accident causation models 
that allow the causes of accidents to be analysed so that the human contribution can be 
identified. Before this, it is useful to describe some of the basic concepts of accident 
causation as most of the models are based on some or all of them. 
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2.3.1 The Basic Concepts of Accident Causation. 
Unsafe or substandard acts are behaviours that could result in people making 
contact with, or being exposed to, hazards. These typically involve failure to follow 
safety procedures, defeating safety systems or not using appropriate protective 
equipment and clothing [Gravelling et a! 19871. 
Unsafe or substandard conditions are conditions which could result in an accident. 
They are generally associated with unnecessary hazards being present or inadequate 
control of necessary hazards. 
Immediate or direct causes of accidents immediately precede the loss involved in 
an accident. They are usually associated with the unsafe, or substandard, acts and 
conditions. 
Basic or root cause of accidents are the reasons which explain how the immediate or 
direct causes were allowed to occur. They are either associated with personal factors 
where people lacked ability, knowledge or motivation, or job factors where the work 
involved poor methods, equipment or organisation. 
Active failures occur within the duration of an incident and have an immediate, 
adverse effect. They are usually associated with the failure of people or equipment 
that are actually situated on the plant. 
Latent failures are decisions or actions which lie dormant in a system for a long time. 
They are generally associated with the people whose work is not directly related with 
plant operation such as maintenance, construction, and management. 
2.3.2 Accident Causation Models. 
A large number of accident causation models have been developed. They all tend to 
build on the basic concepts summarised above, but the terms used vary. Each has been 
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developed for a different purpose but it would seem reasonable to assume that no one 
model gives the complete picture about accident causation and human involvement. 
The Domino Theory. 
Figure 2.11 shows one of the earliest accident models [Ridley 1990]. It was developed 
by Heinrich in 1931 and shows how accidents result from a series of events happening 
in a particular order. 
Events are represented chronologically as a row of dominoes that will fall in 
sequence, from left to right, if any one is pushed. However if any "domino" to the 
right of the initiator is removed the sequence stops. Heinrich suggests that best results 
are gained by removing the event C domino through the prevention of unsafe acts. 
Event A 	Event B 	Event C 	Accident 	Effect 
Social Fault of Unsafe acttl or 
environment 	person 	condition 	 consequence 
Figure 2.11 The Domino Theory 
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The model has a number of limitations, especially the assumption that events in an 
accident occur in sequence [CCPS 19921, but it is simple and useful and has formed 
the basis for other, more sophisticated models. 
Industrial Loss Control Institute (ILCI) Loss Causation Model. 
Figure 2.12 shows a development of Heinrich's Domino model. It maintains the idea 
of events occurring in sequence but the definitions of each have been modified to take 
account of more modern ideas of accident causation. 
The first step, lack of control, deals with latent failures. The basic and immediate 
causes are as described in the basic concepts in Section 2.3.1. ILCI suggest that once 
an incident has occurred the degree of loss experienced is determined mainly by 
fortuitous circumstances. The only possible alternative remaining is the minimisation 
of loss through appropriate accident response systems. 
Lack of 
Control 







I Incident  I I 	Loss 
Inadequate: Personal I I 'Substandard 'Contact with People program. Factors ' acts and t energy, Property 
program Task Factors 
conditions substance or I I Product 
standards. 
people 
I I Environment I 
compliance Service 
to standard. 
Figure 2.12 ILCI Loss Causation 
The Aetiology of Accidents in Complex Systems. 
Figure 2.13 shows another causation model developed on the domino theory principle 
[Reason 1990a]. It concentrates on the role of human actions in accidents to include 
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the latent failures, caused by the management of a company and any external 
pressures from the political climate, how these result in situations that affect the way 
people work, and then the unsafe acts that occur. In this model, however, there is one 
last hurdle before an accident actually occurs. These are described as "defences." 
They include methods of protection, detection, warning, recovery, containment and 
escape that either prevent or reduce losses by alerting people to the danger and 
providing ways to return the system to a safe state. 






















Figure 2.13 The Aetiology of Accidents 
The Sociotechnical Pyramid. 
Figure 2.14 shows a model developed by Technica (1989) from a study of the causes 
of pipework failures [Bellamy and Geyer 1992]. Instead of dominoes it uses layers in 
a pyramid to represent the sequence of events but the idea is much the same. 
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Accident I 	Level 
ngineering 	 Design of soflware and 
Reliability \ 1 	 hardware 
Reliability 	\ 2 Factors influencing operator performance 
Information dissemination ommunication and 
Feedback Control 3 and feedback 
Setting and monitoring of Organisation and 	I 
Management 4 standards, priorities and 
targets 
Management, regulations, 
System Climate economic pressure, public 
opinion, technical know how 
Figure 2.14 The Sociotechnical Pyramid 
General Model of an Incident Scenario. 
Figure 2.15 shows another pyramid model developed for the process industry. There 
is a sequence of undesirable events which are either inherently unsafe or part of a 
chain that lead to inherently unsafe events. At each stage there is a recovery 
opportunity. Failures of these opportunities also have immediate and direct causes 
[Wells et al 19921. 
The model was developed to emphasise the role of the operators and appropriate 
management action in recovering from dangerous situations. This particular area is 
neglected in most of the domino based models although they are included in Reason's 
model as defences. 
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Harm to Personnel, Business, 
Property or Environment. 
Significant Release 	Failure to Mitigate/Prevent 
of Material 	I I Escalation of Events 
Dangerous 	Failure to Recover 
Disturbance to Plant I I the Situation 
Plant in Hazardous 
	
Failure to Control the 
Condition 
	
Situation (in emergency) 
Hazardous Deviation 
of Plant 
Plant in Disturbed 	Failure to Control 
Condition the Situation 
4 	4 
I 	 Immediate Causes of Failure or Disturbance 
I 	 Root cause of Failure or Disturbance 	 I 
Figure 2.15 General Model of an Incident scenario 
Multi-Causation Theory. 
The incident models mentioned so far have considered an incident as a series of 
events occurring in sequence. Figure 2.16 represents the Multi-Causation Theory 
where causes combine in a random fashion, rather than in any particular sequence, to 
result in an accident. 
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Event A 
Event B I 	I Accident 
Event C 
Figure 2.16 Multi-Causation Theory. 
The events represented here are most likely to be unsafe acts and/or mechanical 
hazards but this theory has been developed further in other accident models. 
Van der Schaaf's Incident Model 
Figure 2.17 shows a development of the multi-causation theory of how incidents 
develop [van der Schaaf 1992]. It is also a useful way of defining the terms 
"Incident". "Accident" and "Near miss". 
The focus of the model is the way in which causes can act on each other, 
independently and in parallel to produce an incident. However the chance of an 
accident depends not just on the causes but also the ability to defend against 
dangerous situations and recover from incidents. 
	










Situation ~ Defences?,> 	Miss 
No 	Ies 




Figure 2.17 Incident Model 
Accident Causation Sequence. System-induced Error Approach. 
Figure 2.18 shows a model of the system-induced error approach. It shows that human 
errors do not just occur randomly but have many causes. Accidents result if the 
system does not provide for errors [CCPS 1994]. 
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Figure 2.18 System-Induced Error Approach 
2.4 Safety Management and Culture. 
Section 2.2 of this chapter has shown that although everybody fails at some time, 
there are reasons for this. Understanding these reasons gives us a method of 
controlling the chance of error. Section 2.3 has shown that human failures do not 
automatically result in accidents; not only are the chances of error affected by certain 
factors, so are the chances of injury, damage and other losses. 
Management is ultimately responsible for all aspects of operation within a company. 
Where safety is concerned they should ensure that the policies they set minimise the 
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chance of errors and accidents. However policies alone cannot change human 
behaviour. An appropriate safety culture is required that ensures people do work 
safely, evolve to changing environments and learn from mistakes. 
2.4.1 Safety Management. 
Although managers and other administrators are rarely, if ever, in the position to 
jeopardise a system's safety directly [Reason 19931 their basic role is to organise 
people in a way that enables them to cooperate in achieving the common goals of the 
organisation [Kume 19921 and as such have a large indirect influence. 
A major problem is that managers of industrial plants tend to have technical 
backgrounds and are generally sceptical about human sciences [Lee 19941. This can 
result in accidents caused by human error being blamed on operators, and other 
personnel "at the sharp end" even though studies suggest that for most safety 
problems management is 85% responsible [DNV 19931. This does not divorce the 
workforce from responsibility for safety but highlights the need for strong leadership 
from management [Roughton 1993]. 
Successful safety management is a matter of business survival [Larken 1994] and 
needs to be an integral part of the day to day management [Roughton 1993] covering 
all stages of the project life cycle [Williams 1994a]. This means it must influence the 
decision-making of senior management, the organisation and supervision of line 
management and the implementation of detailed procedures by operators [Larken 
1994]. 
Safety Management Systems. 
The problem for management is that safety can not be managed directly. For this 
reason a management system is required that creates the conditions for promoting 
safety [Murley 19901. The aim is to influence the behaviour of those people in an 
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organisation who can predict, prevent and control hazards [Hale et al 19911. To 
achieve this management must focus on the actual risks associated with the operation 
[Larken 1994] whilst overcoming the external pressures exerted by commercial, legal 
and political constraints which can distort priorities [van Steen and Brascamp 1995]. 
Figure 2.19 shows an example of how a safety management system could be 
developed [HSE 19911. A proactive approach is required that is flexible enough to 
cover all possible situations, and adaptable to allow for change within the organisation 















Feedback loop to 
improve performance 
Figure 2.19 Successful Safety Management. 
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Policy should achieve control over both people and technology to exploit the 
strengths of employees whilst minimising the influence of human limitations and 
fallibility [HSE 19911. It involves setting realistic targets and providing adequate 
resources [Careil 1991]. It is best achieved through inputs from experienced members 
of all departments ensuring full participation from all employees [Bentley et al 19951. 
Organising is the communication of the policies to all members of the organisation. It 
is achieved by managers accepting their responsibilities and securing the commitment 
of their employees. 
Planning and implementing requires an appropriate use of, inevitably limited, 
resources [Reason 19931, so that a proactive system allows risks to be reduced to 
levels "as low as reasonably practicable" with emphasis on continual improvement 
[Beight 19931. 
Measuring performance is a line management responsibility involving continuous 
proactive and reactive monitoring. 
Auditing involves a regular review, and constant development of safety management 
policies. It is based on sample indications of management performance, carried out 
relatively infrequently by people remote from the organisation concerned. 
Reviewing safety management performance is the process of making judgements 
about how well the system is performing and deciding what action is required to 
overcome any problems. It is a vital component of a system requiring management to 
be critical of their own policies. 
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2.4.2 Safety Culture. 
The establishment of a safety culture "is perhaps the most important action an 
organisation can take to improve plant safety" [Murley 19901. The first problem, 
however, is defining what it is. A number of definitions have been suggested: 
• "that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organisations and individuals 
which establishes that, as an overriding priority, safety issues receive the attention 
warranted by their significance" [Reason 1993]. 
"the safety culture is recognised by a prevailing state of mind focusing on safety" 
[Murley 19901, 
• "a collection of beliefs, norms, attitudes, roles and practices" [Toft 1994], 
• a product of individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, competence, and 
patterns of behaviour that determine the commitment to, and the style and 
proficiency of, an organisation's safety management [Lee 19941, 
"a constructed system of meanings through which a given people understands the 
hazards of the world" [Ludborzs 19951 
A good safety culture results in safe behaviour becoming natural, obvious and 
unquestionable to every person within an organisation and reduces the chance of 
people taking risks and ignoring rules [Ludborzs 19951. It improves morale and 
motivation by promoting employee growth and development. It can be broken into the 
five elements that spell OSCAR [DNV 1993]: 
Opportunities for growth, independent action, creative effort and honest mistakes 
make people feel they are important to the organisation they work in. The best way to 
do this is to empower people to influence their jobs using their own creativity, thus 
creating interest [Sarkis 1993]. It increases an employee's responsibility and 
accountability but must be accompanied by good management support [Hale et al 
1991]. 
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Stimulation for constant improvement by maintaining high standards and setting 
good examples is required. Management commitment must be visible and continuous 
[Sarkis 1993] to ensure employees understand the importance of excellence in the 
work they do without taking short cuts or breaking rules, and always doing their best 
to work safely and efficiently [Murley 19901. 
Counselling rather than giving orders is the best way of communicating details 
about job objectives, standards, performance and improvement. It allows employees 
to input information about how things are actually done so that the most effective 
methods are chosen. 
Assistance in the form of training, coaching and instruction, communication, job 
rotation and time for participating in pertinent development activities is required if the 
importance of safe and efficient operation is to be understood by all. 
Recognition of the part people play in good safety requires positive appraisal whilst 
problems identified during culture assessments need to be passed on to the employees 
who can actually make the changes required. 
The Types of Safety Culture. 
Three cultural factors contributing to the development of a strong safety culture have 
been identified [Reason 19931: 
Commitment: the company seeks to be an industry leader rather than simply 
content to stay one step ahead of regulators. Resources (people and money) are 
allocated for repair or for reforming the organisation. 
Competence: the organisation is technically competent to achieve safety goals. It 
has an adequate safety information system and responds to safety related 
information. 
Cognisance: no amount of commitment or competence is any good without 
understanding the hazards endangering operation. 
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2.4.3 How Can Management and Culture Fail? 
Even the best run organisations will experience a significant number of influential 
decisions that will subsequently prove to be wrong. The result is that opportunities to 
reduce risk and improve company culture are not taken. This has to be considered as 
an inevitable part of decision making but it is important that such errors are detected 
and recovered before serious consequences are realised [Reason 1990b]. 
Management can fail in many ways. Poor communication means that important 
information is not exchanged between, and problems are not reported to, the people 
who can take appropriate action. Decisions are made without a sound technical basis 
according to information provided by experts. The management structure does not 
clearly define responsibilities and commercial priorities reduce the resources available 
for safety improvements. 
Managers often misinterpret safety feedback to protect themselves from bad news. 
They highlight the various engineering safety devices and safe operating practices that 
they have implemented and blame poor safety results on their employees carelessness 
and incompetence [Reason 1990b]. 
Management's efforts at improving safety culture often have negative effects. 
Motivational campaigns, with prizes for improved safety can simply result in fewer 
accidents being reported with no real improvement in safety being made. Fear -
inducing propaganda highlighting hazards in the workplace actually increase people's 
tolerance to risk [CCPS 19941 whilst the threat of discipline for not following rules, 
which can be effective if backed up by good policing, tends to motivate people to 
avoid getting caught whilst those who are caught react very negatively and 
aggressively [DNV 19931. 
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2.5 Conclusions. 
This chapter is a brief summary of theories proposed that account for human 
behaviour and its place in accident causation and industrial safety. It highlights why 
human factors need careful consideration for all organisations involved in risky 
operations. 
Human behaviour can be described as a component in a system but although this 
simplistic approach identifies certain behaviours it does not explain why they occur. 
Cognition theory models explain how the human brain stores and acts upon 
information. Behaviour is limited by the capacity of the working memory. This leads 
to economy in perception, processing and decision making by inferring and assuming 
certain details and directing attention to where it is most needed. 
Understanding human behaviour allows some control. Tasks can be developed to 
maximise performance and minimise error, the environment can be manipulated and 
appropriate people can be selected. 
Models are available that explain how failures lead to accidents. They are useful at 
highlighting the human involvement and the situations leading to loss. The models 
use the concepts of sequential "dominoes", multi-causation and defences to a varying 
extent but, as with all models, no single one can explain every situation. 
The final part of the chapter highlights the role of safety management and culture, and 
their influence on human behaviour in the workplace. Ultimately management is 
responsible for all aspects of business, including safety, but it can not impose a 
culture. This has to be facilitated and allowed to develop. 
Chapter 3. 
Literature Survey Part 2. 
Human Factors Risk Assessment. 
3.1 Introduction. 
The standard way of improving safety in industry is to assess the risks associated with 
a particular operation and then determine how they can be reduced, if reduction is 
required. As human activity is so significant in the causes of accidents it seems 
appropriate that a large emphasis is placed on the human influence on risk. Although 
risk assessment techniques have been available for many years, the inclusion of 
human factors in risk assessment is one area where little progress has been made. 
The theory summarised in Chapter 2 shows that the chance and consequences of 
human error can be predicted and reduced. If industrial safety is to be improved 
techniques are required that allow the theory to be implemented. 
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Engineers tend to favour reliability and risk assessments that produce numerical 
results. Human reliability, however, is difficult to measure quantitatively and this 
seriously affects the value of any quantified risk assessment. Techniques have been 
developed aimed at providing more substantial data. It seems, however, that the 
qualitative techniques used to allow quantification of risks are actually more useful for 
improving safety than the numbers produced. 
3.2 Quantifying Risk. 
Risk assessment does not have to give a numerical answer to be of use for improving 
safety. However even if you are not interested in the numbers, or simply do not 
believe them when you get them, the steps taken to quantify risk are useful. They 
provide a framework into which the information you have can be incorporated and the 
techniques used often include methods of identifying and reducing risk. 
3.2.1 Quantified Risk Assessment (QRA). 
QRA is a technique that has been developed to help companies control the risk of 
their operations. It provides a formal and systematic approach to identifying 
potentially hazardous events, and estimating the likelihood and consequences of 
accidents developing from these events [Shell 1990]. 
The method starts with a set of hazardous events. For each of these a calculation is 
made of the likelihood of the event occurring and the probability of possible 
consequences. 
Identifying Hazardous Events. 
This stage of the analysis is usually performed by a team of people experienced in the 
design and operation of the actual, or similar, plant being considered. The most well- 
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known method is Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) assessment. A team, with a 
leader, consider the design of a system to determine the likely consequence of 
component, including human, failure. This is generally carried out at the design stage 
of new plant or modifications, so extra safety systems can be included as required. It 
is a useful technique although it does tend to come rather late in the design process so 
that any major modifications required are extremely expensive. Gathering a suitable 
cross-section of people is essential as the quality of the results depends entirely on the 
experience and knowledge of the team. This can make HAZOP studies difficult and 
expensive to organise [Kletz ]991a]. 
Calculating the Probability of an Event Occurring. 
It is unusual to have sufficient historical data to give a direct estimate of the 
probability that a particular complex event will occur. To overcome this Fault Trees 
are used. The event is broken down into its simple component events. An example is 
shown in Figure 3.1. Starting from the top event, in this case a deluge system failing 
to operate when required, the tree works down through a set of individual failures that 
combine to cause it [Kirwin 1992a]. 
The Fault Tree links individual events by "OR" and "AND" gates to show how 
failures combine to cause a hazardous situation. At this stage the tree can be used as a 
qualitative assessment of how reliable the system is likely to be, "AND" gates show 
the level redundancy in the system, "OR" gates indicate the possibility of common 
cause failures. To calculate the likelihood of the top event the probability of failure of 
each component is added to the tree and the calculation is carried out using normal 
statistical methods. 
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Figure 3.1 Example of a Fault Tree 
Calculating Probability of Consequences. 
From each hazardous event there are likely to be a number possible consequences. As 
with the likelihood of an event, the consequences are realised via a combination of 
component events. These are represented on Event Trees. 
Figure 3.2 is an example of an Event Tree for the release of a flammable gas [Shell 
19901. The tree starts at the top with the hazardous event and works down to a set of 
consequences. Each node on the tree represents an opportunity for the incident to 
escalate, indicated by a "Yes". Any scenario with no possible recovery is carried 
through to a consequence at the bottom of the tree, in this example these are shown in 
Table 3.1. To quantify the chance of each consequence the probability of each 
escalation event is included in the tree. 
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Figure 3.2 Example of an Event Tree 
1 9 2, 4 Limited consequences. 
3, 5 Explosion of gas cloud. 
6 Limited fire damage. 
7,8 Significant fire damage. 
9, 10 Major damage and escalation. 
Table 3.1. Consequences for Example Shown in Figure 3.2. 
Summary 
Quantifying risk is often the wish of engineers who would like to be able to 
demonstrate, beyond reasonable doubt, that their plants are safe. To achieve this the 
sources of risk must be identified, the probability that a high risk situation will occur 
must be calculated, and the probability of possible consequences must also be 
calculated. In the process industry the three tools most widely used in risk assessment 
are HAZOP, Fault Trees and Event Trees. 
QRA not only requires tools, it also needs data. Most QRA studies have concentrated 
on hardware failures and equipment reliability. Human factors can have a great 
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influence to the risk associated with a plant. This can be a negative effect due to 
human errors, and positive where the consequences of hazardous events are mitigated 
through human intervention. To incorporate human factors into QRA requires 
information about human activity and types of failure, and human reliability data. 
3.3 Incorporating Human Factors Into QRA. 
Despite advancements in technology all industrial plant systems involve some human 
interaction. As hardware reliability improves human factors need greater 
consideration and a systematic approach is required to incorporate this into QRA 
[Anderson and Burns 1988]. 
The first step in an assessment is to identify what people do and how they can fail. 
Techniques such as Systematic Human Action Reliability Procedure (SHARP), IEEE 
Standard P108221D7, and Task Analysis Linked Evaluation Technique (TALENT) 
have been developed [Gertinan 1994]. The details vary but the procedures are similar. 
They all provide a framework that guides multidisciplinary teams to develop plant 
models that are used to identify human involvement in a way that can be documented 
and audited. Fault and Event Trees are used to define and identify all important human 
actions, screen them to identify the safety critical ones, and break them down into 
easily managed steps that can be represented graphically. This then allows other 
techniques to be used to quantify the impact of human actions on plant reliability. 
3.3.1 Task Analysis 
Task analysis is a qualitative procedure that allows the human involvement in all 
phases of plant construction, operation and maintenance to be identified [Swain 
19911. To achieve this tasks are broken down into a set of components including the 
ultimate goal of the task, environmental factors that constrain and direct the actions of 
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individuals and the actual actions performed to achieve the goal [Stammers et al 
1990]. 
The format varies but the information is usually collected from interviews with 
workers, observation of tasks being performed or interrogation of data sources such as 
incident reports, written procedures, and performance and training records [Swain 
1991]. 
Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA) 
HTA is probably the most widely used form of task analysis. A graphical 
representation, as shown in Figure 3.3, is used to describe the task in terms of a set of 
"operations" required to be performed to a set "plan" to achieve the specified "goal". 
Each operation can be redescribed into a set of sub-operations which have their own 




Figure 3.3 Hierarchial Task Analysis 
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Other Formats of Task Analysis [PAON 19931. 
• Tabular task analysis follows on from hierarchical task analysis. It takes a 
particular task step or operation and considers specific aspects such as who is doing 
the operations, what displays are used, what feedback is given, and what errors 
could occur. 
• Link Analysis is a diagrammatic representation of the nature, frequency and 
importance of links between sources of information used during the operation of a 
system. The most frequent use is for ergonomic appraisal of controls and display 
locations in control room. 
Verbal protocol requires commentary from a person as they perform a task. They 
describe the processes they follow as they solve problems. 
Critical incident technique involves interviews of personnel who have 
experienced incidents and near misses in the past. 
• Walk through involves a person demonstrating how they would complete a task 
by walking the route that they would normally follow and indicating the operations 
they would perform. 
Talk through involves a person describing the operations they would perform to 
complete a task. 
Time line analysis is used to determine either how quickly a task needs to be done 
or how long a goal will take to be achieved. 
3.3.2 Task Taxonomy. 
Taxonomies have been developed that allow a task to be described according to the 
cognitive activities involved. 
Skill, Rule, Knowledge (SRK) Behaviour. 
The most well-known taxonomy of human behaviour is the SRK approach. Tasks are 
classified into one of the following categories and these are used to suggest the types 
of errors that are likely to occur. 
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Skill-based activity: a situation requiring highly practised and essentially 
"automatic" behaviour. 
Rule-based activity: a situation which deviates from normal but can be dealt with 
by applying rules stored in memory or otherwise available. 
Knowledge-based activity: a situation for which no useful rules are available. The 
person must diagnose the situation using problem solving skills based on their 
knowledge of the system. 
Generic Error Modelling System (GEMS). 
GEMS uses the SRK taxonomy to define two types of errors and identifies factors that 
make them more likely. 
Slips and lapses occur during skill based behaviour. The intention of the person is 
correct, they choose the correct actions but do not perform them correctly. Error is 
more likely if a person performs several similar tasks regularly or the environment in 
which they work is unforgiving. 
Mistakes occur during rule and knowledge based behaviour. The intention of the 
person is incorrect so that they perform inappropriate actions correctly. Error occurs 
because people oversimplify the situation, do not assess the situation fully or assume 
the situation is the same as has been experienced previously. 
3.3.3 Error Analysis. 
Once the human activities performed on a plant are understood the next stage of QRA 
is to determine how failures can occur. Three techniques are summarised below that 
guide individuals and teams to produce an assessment of error potential. This 
information is used to determine how system failures can be prevented and for 
calculating human reliability. 
P ~e3l 
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Human HAZOP, 
Human HAZOP follows the same approach as the traditional HAZOP but has been 
modified to focus on human error. A team is assembled consisting of experts in 
HAZOP techniques, task analysis, ergonomics, human reliability, operations and 
engineering. A step by step analysis is performed to determine how the performance 
of tasks could fail. Guide words are used describing some types of errors that can 
occur. Each is considered to determine the likely consequences. 
The guide words used in human HAZOP are [Kirwin 1992a]: 
not done repeated less than 
sooner than more than later than 
as well as mis-ordered other than 
part of 
Potential Human Error Cause Analysis (PHECA). 
PHECA is a technique used to evaluate the error potential of task steps indicating the 
likely causes of errors and the aspects of the system that have the most influence on 
performance. 
Each task step, as determined from task analysis, is classified according to its task 
type, the type of action to be performed and likely error types determined by 
performing a Human HAZOP study. A computer program then determines 
operational and organisational factors that are most likely to affect the performance of 
the task. The actual plant is then assessed to determine if these factors are likely to be 
present. This allows appropriate improvements to be made. 
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Systematic Human Error Reduction and Prediction Approach 
(SHERPA). 
SHERPA is a computerised question-and-answer routine which identifies likely errors 
for each step of a task being considered. It allows an assessment of whether the error 
can be recovered immediately, at a later stage or not at all. It is based on a set of 
underlying error mechanisms that include failure to consider special circumstances, 
taking short cuts, bad habits taking over, information not received or misinterpreted, 
incorrect assumptions about the situation, forgetting individual actions, losing place 
in a sequence, lack of precision in physical activity, and disorientation [Kirwin 
1992a]. 
The output is a qualitative summary indicating errors that could occur, reasons for 
these errors, possible recovery mechanisms and a set of recommendations on how 
procedures, training and equipment could be improved. 
Summary. 
Task analysis is the basic tool used when determining what people do on a plant. It is 
useful for developing procedures and training, and is the starting point for 
incorporating human factors into risk and safety assessments. 
Taxonomies have been developed that attempt to link what people do with the 
cognitive processes involved and suggest what types of errors are likely to occur. 
Practical application is difficult but they have been invaluable in developing error 
analysis techniques. 
The error analysis techniques examined are all similar in that they take the results 
from task analysis and then guide assessors to determine which errors are most likely 
to occur. Despite the use of computers in two of the techniques the results still rely 
heavily on the knowledge and experience of the assessors and can result in 
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inappropriate suggestions for systems improvements if human factors experts are not 
involved. To ensure error analysis is conducted such that useful conclusion can be 
drawn, and appropriate human reliability calculations can be performed, the analysts 
need accurate information about what people actually do on the plant, the types of 
conditions they work under, the types of errors they make and the consequences. 
3.4 Human Error Quantification. 
Section 3.3 described qualitative techniques for assessing the human involvement in 
tasks, to predict possible errors and likely consequences. To be able to include these 
details in QRA human error rates and human reliability must be quantified. 
The basic equation used to determine the probability of error is [Green et al 19911: 
Human error probability = 
number of occurrences 
number of opportunities for error to occur 
In theory historical data could be used to calculate the probability. In practice data of 
suitable quality is scarce. A number of techniques have been developed that allow 
limited amounts of historical data to be used to predict human reliability data for a 
wider range of situations and circumstances. Some are based on probability databases, 
others rely on expert judgement. 
3.4.1 Techniques Using Human Error Data Bases. 
These techniques use a database of generic human reliability data. Methods are used 
to modify this data to match a model of the actual situation being analysed. 
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Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP). 
THERP is a widely used technique for assessing simple skill or rule-based tasks. It is 
based on types of errors committed rather than psychological mechanisms and this 
makes it less suitable for assessing knowledge based tasks which, by definition, are 
not simple and hence error types are difficult to predict [HRA 19931. 
The method starts with a task analysis. From this Event Trees are developed to 
identify possible human errors. For each task step a Human Error Probability (HEP) is 
assigned from the data base. The database contains reliability data for a very large 
number of task types which are described precisely. To account for difference 
between the description in the data base and the actual conditions on the plant, each 
HEP is modified by multiplying by a modification factor. Modification factors are 
calculated by assessing the impact of various Performance Shaping Factors (PSFs). 
Details of this process are also contained in the data base. [Swain and Guttinann 
1983]. 
THERP also includes a technique for calculating the degree of dependence between 
tasks and possibilities for error recovery [Camino 1986]. This allows the assessment 
to model closely the actual situations a person may find themselves in. Dependency 
between tasks means that conditions that effect one task step can have a knock-on 
effect to others whilst, on a positive note, when people do make errors they can also 
detect and correct them. Once a HEP has been assigned to each task step they are 
combined to give a HEP for the whole task. 
The data has come from a large number of varied sources, many of which are 
unspecified [HRA 1993]. The technique has been developed for the nuclear industry 
but has been used in other process industries. It covers many different task types 
[Wright 19941 but it is questionable whether it can be used for tasks that are not 
explicitly described [Samdal et al 1992]. 
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Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART). 
HEART is popular for calculating human reliability as it is relatively quick and simple 
to use [Green et al 1991]. It follows a similar method to THERP. Again HEPs are 
assigned and they are modified to show how the actual conditions of work affect 
human performance. In HEART, however, there are far fewer classifications and the 
data base has been developed from a literature search of publications on the subject of 
ergonomics and human performance. 
There are eight task classifications based on task complexity, frequency of 
performance, type of operation, level of supervision and procedural support. Each of 
these has an associated HER There are 17 Error Producing Conditions (EPCs) which 
are conditions that, if present, increase the chance of error. They are based on the time 
available to complete a task, ergonomic features of the system, the cognitive load 
placed on a person and the chance of misunderstandings due to poor information or 
ambiguities. Each of these has a factor associated which indicates the maximum effect 
on the HEP. More than one EPC can have an effect and the technique includes a 
method of weighting them to indicate their relative influence on human performance. 
Empirical Technique for Operator Errors Estimate (TESEO). 
TESEO has been developed as a simple method of assessing control room tasks in the 
process industry [Samdal et at 1992]. It is applicable only to quick actions taking less 
than one minute to perform. The probability of error is calculated by multiplying five 
factors, the values for which are obtained from data tables. The data have been 
collected from published literature [Vestrucci 1992]. 
Pe K1 K2 K3 K4K5 
1e = operators failure probability. 
K1 : Complexity of action. 




Experience and training. 
Operators emotion. (Gravity of the situation). 
Man-machine interface. 
Human Cognitive Reliability Correlation (HCR). 
HCR is based on the idea that the probability of success at performing a required 
function is primarily dependent on the time available. Three different curves are 
proposed for skill-, rule- and knowledge-based behaviour. 
Human error rates derived using HCR are extremely sensitive to the estimates of 
available time. For use in QRA the curves have to be calibrated, using a simulator, and 
assessed by experts to determine actual error probabilities. The technique does not 
include any guidance about how to model situations involving more than one action 
[HIM 19931. 
Operator Action Tree (OAT). 
OAT has been developed for assessing diagnosis and decision errors that are likely to 
occur during an accident at a nuclear power plant [Miller and Swain 1987]. It 
describes the statistical performance of a group of operators responding to situations 
based on the assumption that human response to events involves three activities of 
perception, diagnosis, and response as shown in Figure 3.4. 













Figure 3.4 Operator Action Tree 
The analysis involves identifying the tasks required to return a plant to safety. The 
probability of error depends on the time available to complete each of the three 
activities. 
Maintenance Personnel Performance Simulation (MAPPS). 
MAPPS has been developed for analysing maintenance activities at nuclear power 
plants [Gertinan 1994]. It involves a task analysis and an assessment of crew abilities 
and experience. A computer is used to simulate the tasks and the maintenance crew 
using model algorithms and Monte Carlo techniques. The output is a set of success 
probabilities, the time a task will take to complete, parts of the task where a person 
may be overloaded, the amount of time a person may be idle and the level of stress 
that the person is likely to experience based on a comparison between task 
requirements and a person's ability [Miller and Swain 1987]. 
Summary. 
Human error quantification using human reliability data bases requires accurate 
sources of data and methods of modifying the data to account for the differences 
between the conditions under which the data were collected and the actual conditions 
present when a task is being performed. 
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The databases that have been developed do allow reasonable attempts at calculating 
human error probabilities. However each is fairly constrained in its application 
because the sources of data are limited and validation of assessments covering 
situations outside these has not been possible. In general the techniques allow 
comparisons between situations under consideration but, unless plant specific data for 
human reliability, including the effects of error producing conditions, is available, 
absolute reliability figures can not be relied upon. 
3.4.2 Expert Judgement. 
Where appropriate data is not available methods have been developed to allow experts 
in ergonomics, human reliability assessment, task analysis, safety assessment, 
operations, and process engineering to use their judgement to determine approximate 
probability data. 
An impartial group leader guides the team, with the help of prompt sheets, to ensure 
all factors are considered and that bias does not affect the results. 
In its basic form experts consider a particular situation and estimate the probability of 
success or failure. There is little control about how the assessment is carried out or of 
documentation that allows assessments to be audited. To overcome these problems 
more sophisticated techniques have been developed. 
Absolute Probability Judgement (APJ). 
APJ requires a group of experts to reach a consensus about the properties of each task 
being assessed. Error rates are then assigned from a set of generic data. A "facilitator" 
has an important role of ensuring biases are eliminated. APJ can give good results but 
the requirement for a group of experts and the time taken means it can be expensive to 
perform. 
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Success Likelihood Index Method (SLIM). 
SLIM is a computer software package that allows experts to construct a model of 
error probabilities. The aim is to use the judgement in a systematic way to overcome 
the problems associated with a lack of appropriate data. 
SLIM includes a set of "Performance Influencing Factors" (PIFs) that affect the 
likelihood of error. The important ones for the situation in question are identified and 
rated according to their positive or negative effect [Kirwin 1990]. The characteristics 
of the tasks being analysed are also assessed. These are combined with the PIF 
weighting to give a "Success Likelihood Index" for each. Actual error probabilities 
are assigned by calibrating the index values with known error probabilities and a 
model is developed that best fits the data. 
This technique allows quantification for all types of tasks and errors. It is useful as it 
can increase the value of scarce data. It can be audited and allows sensitivity analysis 
[HRA 19931. 
Socio-Technical Assessment of Human Reliability (STAHR). 
STAHR uses influence diagrams, as shown in Figure 3.5, to represent the factors that 
affect the probability of human error. Experts assign conditional probabilities with 
weighting to each to determine failure probabilities based on the dependency between 
events [Gertrnan 1994]. 
Chapter 3. Human Factors Risk Assessment 
	 61 
N (4 
Occurrence of A is 
	
Occurrence of A is 	Occurrence of A is 
conditional upon influenced by B and C. B is influenced by B and C. B 
occurrence of B 
	
not influenced by C. 	also influenced by C. 
Figure 3.5 Influence Diagram 
MANagement of safety systems Assessment Guidelines in the 
Evaluation of Risk (MANAGER). 
MANAGER does not provide human reliability data but assesses the management of a 
company and its influence on human performance [Williams 1991]. It is based on a 
set of questions to be answered by personnel at all levels in the company. The output 
is a qualitative document which is reviewed by experts who compare them with the 
industry norms to give a score. This score is used as a modification factor to allow the 
use of generic reliability data. 
Human System (HSYS). 
HSYS is a technique developed for investigating human performance problems in 
complex operational settings. It uses a model of human performance based on a series 
of five sequential stages: 
• input detection, 
• understanding of input meaning, 
• action selection, 
• action planning, 
• action execution. 
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A set of questions guide the analyst to identify the factors that affect performance at 
each of these stages [Gertman 19911. 
Confusion Matrix 
This technique focuses on event mis-diagnosis due to similarities in situations that 
may be confused. A matrix is constructed with similar, but not identical, sequences of 
events represented on each axis. Analysts review the similarities and rank the 
possibility of confusion. Probabilities, based on simulator data or other sources, are 
assigned and then modified to account for the quality of control room design and 
operator training. 
Two matrices are constructed, one for the early stage of the accident sequence, and 
one for a later stage. This allows for changes in the similarity between events during 
the accident sequence to be considered. The result is an estimate of the probability of 
mis-diagnosis between the two events [Green et al 1991]. 
Summary 
Techniques that exploit the judgement of experts have been developed to overcome 
the problems associated with a lack of appropriate reliability data. They aim to 
combine information about generic and specific situations to complete an overall 
picture of human reliability on a particular plant. The structured techniques also 
provide a method by which the results can be audited. 
In addition to providing numerical data the techniques also allow factors that 
influence human reliability to be included in the assessment. The need for site specific 
data is reduced although still desirable. 
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3.5 Conclusions. 
QRA is a very useful technique for evaluating and selecting methods of managing risk 
[Ardent 1990]. It does, however, require an accurate model of the plant being assessed 
[Anderson and Burns 1988] based on a comprehensive evaluation of all possible 
failures [Kirwin 1992b]. For the human involvement, however, there is generally a 
lack of "readily available, truly believable, comprehensive" human reliability data 
[Williams 19891. This, combined with "the human inability to conceive every possible 
events", limits the use of QRA [French et al 19901. 
Databases have been developed in which human reliability data are collected. As 
human behaviour is so heavily influenced by the conditions tasks are performed 
under, techniques are required to modify the data to account for the differences 
between the source of data and the system being analysed. 
Expert judgement is also used to provide data. The aim is to either provide actual data 
derived from judgement and experience, or to extend the use of scarce data to areas 
where no data exists. Techniques have been developed that allow experts to reach 
consensus in a documented way that can be audited. 
The most useful data, however, will always be that derived from the actual experience 
of the plant system being assessed. This ensures the data represents the actual tasks 
performed and the working conditions. The remainder of this thesis is concerned with 
the methods available for providing such site-specific data for use in qualitative and 
quantitative risk assessment. 
Chapter 4. 
Accident Reporting Systems as Sources of 
Human Factors Data, 
4.1 Introduction. 
For the purposes of this chapter an accident is defined as an undesirable event 
resulting in loss. Loss in this case includes: 
• injury to people, 
• damage to plant, equipment and materials, 
• harm to the environment, 
• lost production. 
An accident report is a permanent record of a sequence of events, consequences 
experienced and probable causes. From Appendix 1 it is clear that the causes of many 
accidents include human error. If this human contribution is recorded, accident 
reporting systems should be able to provide useful human factors data. 
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Chapter 2 described the mechanisms that control human behaviour and how failure or 
error can occur. Accident causation models explain how human errors result in 
accidents through the loss of control of a hazard, the lack of suitable barriers allowing 
contact with an item that can not withstand it, and failure to recover from a hazardous 
situation. It is the management and culture of a company, however, that ultimately 
influence all aspects of their business including safety and human factors. 
Chapter 3 described what human factors data are required to carry out risk 
assessment. The human involvement includes the failures that caused hazardous 
events and the actions that contributed to the consequences. 
4.1.1 Why Are Accidents Reported? 
Accident reporting systems are widely used throughout industry and this suggests that 
there should be a huge potential to provide human factors data. Companies are 
generally reluctant to share information about the accidents they experience and so 
each can only access data from their own reporting system. As most companies in the 
process industry have a reasonably good safety record the number of accident reports 
available to provide data for use in human factors studies is limited. 
The main driving force for companies to develop accident reporting systems has been 
the conformance with health and safety law. This generally specifies a minimum 
amount of information that must be recorded about the most serious accidents. Most 
companies have developed their reporting systems beyond the minimum required by 
law. For some this has been driven by other organisations, such as insurance 
companies and external auditors, who require more detailed information about 
accidents. Most companies, however, are aware that the cost of all accidents is high 
and it is worthwhile to report even the minor ones if something can be learned to 
prevent their recurrence. 
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Although most accident reporting systems used by companies in the process industry 
exceed the minimum requirements the inescapable fact is that recording injury events 
is the primary purpose and the collection of human factors data has a very low 
priority. Modifications could be made to increase the provision of data concerning 
human factors, however, it may not be in the interest of companies to do this if it 
affects their liabilities. Any company will be understandably loathe to record 
information that may incriminate them in any investigation carried out by regulators, 
insurance companies and law courts considering compensation claims. These 
problems may mean that accident reports will never be able to provide much useful 
human factors data. 
4.1.2 How Are Accident Reporting Systems Developed? 
There is no one standard accident reporting system therefore most companies in the 
process industry have developed their own. Some guidance is available, however, so 
similarities exist between the different systems. This guidance includes: 
• the legal requirements, 
• guidance from the safety literature, 
• specifications included as part of audit systems, 
• human factor theory as summarised in chapter 2. 
The Influence of the Regulatory System. 
In the UK the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) is the main authority to whom 
accidents in the workplace are reported. Most companies are covered under the 
"Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrence Regulations" (RIDDOR). 
Industries not covered by RIDDOR include the offshore oil industry and work 
controlled under the "Explosives Act." 
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The HSE requires notification from an employer, about accidents occurring as part of 
work activity that result in fatality, accidents resulting in lost time of greater than 3 
days, certain major injuries, dangerous occurrences and diseases that are specified in 
the procedures. 
The reporting procedure is contained in "The Guide to RIDDOR" [HSE 19861. It 
specifies that the following details should be recorded: 
type of incident, 
personal details of the person making the report including the nature of their 
business, 
date, time and place of accident, 
personal details of the injured party including job title, and nature of the injury 
sustained, 
• type of accident (selected from a list), 
• agents involved in the accident (selected from a list), 
• a description of the accident explaining what happened and how, and what the 
injured person was doing. 
RIDDOR also covers the occurrence of disease associated with work. Similar details 
are to be recorded although the description is likely to be less precise. The cause of 
disease is unlikely to be entirely obvious so details of the work carried out "which 
may be relevant to the onset of the disease," such as the suspected agent, are requested 
along with "any other relevant information." 
The aim of the regulations is to ensure that all companies keep a minimum amount of 
information about health and safety for at least 3 years in a form that allows easy 
access if required. 
The regulatory reports are mainly aimed at recording the most serious accidents so 
that the authorities can enforce health and safety law. The design of the forms and the 
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published guidance notes do not appear to cover anything about how human factors 
are involved in accidents and it seems unlikely that much data will be available from 
these reports. 
As companies must develop systems that conform to at least the minimum 
requirement of the regulations it is no surprise that a number of accident report forms 
used by companies are based on the forms that are issued with the regulations. The 
regulations, however, specify only a minimum standard and companies are expected 
to develop more sophisticated systems that promote improvements in safety. 
Guidance From the Safety Literature. 
Most safety textbooks ([King  19901, [Ridley 1990], [Lees 1980]) acknowledge the 
importance of reporting accidents as a way of improving safety. Unfortunately the 
details about how to develop effective reporting systems are generally rather scarce 
although some useful guidance is available. 
Van der Schaaf [van der Schaaf 1991a] suggests that any incident reporting system 
should aim only to learn about companies' safety performance, to get an insight into 
how it actually functions, and to provide information such that an investigation will 
result in a detailed description of what happened during, and the events leading up to, 
the accident in question. The Oil Industry Advisory Committee [OJAC 1992] specify 
that the procedures, relating to an accident reporting system, should identify: 
• what counts as an accident (or incident) to be recorded, 
• what information is to be gathered, 
• how the information is to be stored and retrieved, 
• how it is to be analysed so that conclusions can be drawn and action taken. 
The HSE suggest the following information should be collected when completing an 
accident report [HSE 1991]: 
Chapter 4. Accident Reporting 	 69 
details of employees involved, 
description of the circumstances, including the time, place and conditions, 
other details such as actions leading to the accident, the direct causes of injury or 
damage, immediate causes of the events and underlying "root" causes, 
details of the outcome including severity of injuries and damage and the 
effectiveness of the management response, 
was the accident preventable? 
Shillito [Shillito 19931 suggests there are two types of accident reporting systems. 
Some have negative purposes. Accidents are recorded but considered to be caused by 
failures of people to follow rules or to behave sensibly. Managers can then blame the 
people who directly operate the plant so that disciplinary action can be taken, 
insurance paperwork can be satisfied and the company's liability can be reduced. 
Some have positive purposes. They aim to improve safety by identifying root causes 
so that constructive lessons can be learnt. 
The guidance included in safety literature is useful for companies when developing 
reporting systems but the human involvement in accidents seems to be covered at a 
very superficial level. 
Audit Systems. 
Audits are used by companies as part of a regular review of the achievements of their 
safety management system by measuring the compliance against a set of performance 
indicators. Some include an assessment of accident reporting. 
One of the most widely used audit system is the International Safety Rating System 
(ISRS) [Dennis 1993]. It includes guidance on how accident reporting should be 
approached based on the ILCI Loss Causation Model as shown in chapter 2. Human 
involvement in accidents is considered as a combination of basic causes (personal and 
job factors) and immediate causes (substandard acts and conditions). Although more 
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advanced than the guidance in safety literature, this is a fairly basic approach to 
human factors. 
Many companies have used ISRS when designing their accident reporting systems. It 
is useful to have such a model but, as with all safety management systems, 
compliance with a standard does not guarantee safety and an audit system should be 
only one of a number of loss prevention tools used. 
4.1.3 Summary. 
Accidents have been defined as any event that results in a loss. The human 
involvement in these events includes errors that cause a hazardous event and the 
action taken that contributed to the loss. For accident reports to be useful in providing 
human factors data they must include information about the types of errors made and 
the conditions and circumstances that affected behaviour. 
Accident reporting systems are widely used in the process industry, mainly because 
their use is a legal requirement. However most systems exceed the minimum 
requirements set by regulators and, although there is no industry standard procedure, 
some guidance is available. The standard safety text books explain that accident 
reporting provides a useful way of improving safety if the lessons are learnt about 
failures experienced, although they give little information about how this can actually 
be achieved. Audit systems suggest certain aspects of accident causation should be 
included in reporting systems although compliance with such specific requirements 
does little to improve overall safety management and culture problems. 
The information available to companies when developing their accident reporting 
systems may encourage them to consider the wider issues associated with accident 
causation. None, however, include details about human factors and the provision of 
data for use in safety studies. In fact the entire requirements of accident reporting 
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systems may limit the potential to provide data, as conflicts are likely to arise that 
prevent deficiencies in management and culture from being recorded. 
4.2 A Survey of Accident Reporting Systems. 
To determine what human factors data may actually be available from company 
accident reports a survey was carried out of accident reporting systems used by 
companies operating in the process industry. The initial results of this survey were 
published in 1994 in the Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industry [Brazier 
19941. This paper was a summary of the reporting systems of 13 companies, since 
then a further 8 have been included. The businesses covered in the survey were: 
• oil exploration and production, 
• oil refining, 
• chemical and petrochemical processing, 
• nuclear power generation. 
All the systems surveyed were based on accident report forms on which the details of 
accidents are recorded. Copies of each form were collected along with the 
documentation or procedures that explain how the reporting system works. 
4.2.1 Accident Report Forms. 
Some of the companies had developed a single form on which all accidents were to be 
reported. These were entitled either "Accident Report Form" or "Incident Report 
Form." Others used more than one, each dedicated to a particular type of accident. 
With no industry standard different approaches are inevitable. It does mean, however, 
that each company must clearly define the terms used to describe accidents. Once 
again there are no standard definitions. For some companies accidents were 
considered to be only those events that caused injury. For others, even a near miss 
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indicated a breakdown in the company's safety system and was considered to be an 
accident. This situation makes comparison between systems difficult and can lead to 
confusion. 
The reporting systems surveyed were designed to record the accidents listed below. 
Some systems covered them all, others were more selective or only concerned with 
certain types over a particular severity. 
• personal injuries, 
• occupational disease, 
• property damage, 
• material loss, 
• process interruption, 
• leaks of flammable or poisonous substances, 
• fire or explosion, 
• dangerous occurrences, 
• environmental harm. 
Where more than one report form is used it has to be clear which accidents are 
reported on each form. Some separate injury and non-injury accidents. Others report 
all accidents on a single form except for those of special interest, such as toxic leaks 
or fires, which are reported separately. In this thesis near misses are considered 
separately from accidents although this distinction is not recognised by all companies. 
4.2.2 Report Form Contents. 
Section 4.2.1 described which accidents were covered by the reporting systems 
surveyed. This section looks at the contents of the report forms to determine what 
information, about each accident reported, should be recorded. All the report forms 
surveyed were different but all included questions that fit into six basic categories: 
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• personal details of people involved in the accident, 
• a description of the accident, 
• the causes of the accident, 
• the consequences of the accident, 
• action required to improve safety, 
• people's opinions and other comments. 
Each of these categories is covered separately below. The level of questioning varied 
greatly between systems. Some included only a simple question to cover the category 
and so the detail of the reply was very dependent on what the person completing the 
report thought was important. Others asked more precise questions or suggested what 
information the reply should include. The most clearly defined questions were those 
that included multiple choice responses. 
Each category has been examined on every report form collected. This summary 
covers all the questions asked and all the suggestions about what information should 
be recorded. This should represent the maximum potential, of current accident 
reporting systems, to collect information that may provide human factors data. 
Personal Details of the People Involved. 
It is important to identify all the people involved in an accident. It allows a full 
assessment of the events taking place during the accident and people can be contacted 
to make statements if required. It also ensures that all injuries are recorded. 
Some of the personal details recorded concerned a person's work history, both on the 
day of the accident and over their whole career. The aim was to identify when factors 
such as fatigue, poor training and experience contribute to accidents. This information 
may be useful for identifying the impact of certain performance-influencing factors, 
as defined in chapter 2, on human performance. 
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In practice the number of people involved in an accident can be quite large and the 
involvement of many will not be obvious. This fact seems to have been neglected by 
the reporting systems surveyed as they tended to focus on details of injured people 
with only brief reference to anyone else who may have been involved. 
The information collected about people injured in an accident included: 
full name, home address, personnel number, sex, nationality and date of birth. 
the department they work in, 
• the name of the company they work for, company address, phone number and 
nature of business (where contract employees are covered by the accident reporting 
system), 
• occupation and length of time working in that occupation, 
• the length of time working for the present company, 
• the number of days since having time off work, 
• the length of shift worked on the day of the accident. 
Some systems had been developed so that reports could be delivered anonymously or 
a guarantee that the identity of the person reporting an accident would not appear on 
the actual report. This was mainly aimed at near miss reporting but it may encourage 
the reporting of some accidents. A company would normally prefer to know the 
person's identity to help the investigation and in practice it is difficult to keep reports 
truly anonymous. 
The only other people identified clearly on most reports were those who witnessed the 
accident. Their names were usually recorded along with details such as home address 
or the name of the company they work for so that they can be contacted if required. 
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Description of the Accident. 
This section was used to record the important events and conditions that were 
involved in the accident. It was usually an account supplied by the person whose 
personal details are included on the report form. The description was either a 
statement written by that person or a summary, written by their supervisor, based on a 
written or verbal statement. On most report forms this section was titled "A brief 
description of the accident." Guidance was sometimes given about what the contents 
should include. Some report forms included more detailed questions. 
The contents of the accident description included information about: 
• date and time of occurrence, 
• location of the accident, 
• how the loss occurred, 
• accident-causing object, 
• nature of work being done, 
• tasks being performed, 
• equipment being used, 
• protective clothing being worn. 
For report forms covering injury the accident description tended to focus on the events 
that actually caused the injury. Where other losses were included the focus was 
extended to cover the events that caused damage. This emphasis on loss suggests that 
the information about all events associated with the accident may not be covered. 
Some of the report forms required details of all the events that occurred before, during 
and after the accident. These included all failures, of equipment and people, that took 
the plant from a safe state into one where the control of a hazard was lost. However 
identifying all significant events is likely to be difficult because they may have 
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occurred a long time before the accident or at some remote location. Some report 
forms required details of any unusual conditions, even if their involvement in the 
accident was unclear. These included unusual operations, maintenance or construction 
activity, and disruptions to normal work schedules. The types of questions asked to 
identify such situations included: 
details of all work permits issued, 
what jobs had been assigned and who assigned them, 
the experience of the person at performing the tasks and whether they were part of 
their job description, 
• who was supervising the work, where they were and what they were doing at the 
time of the accident, 
what procedures had been issued, 
details of protective equipment being used and any other special requirements. 
This information shows how work was organised, assigned and supervised. It 
identifies the existence, or otherwise, of safe systems of work and indicates whether 
the people involved knew about them. It also shows how the hazards involved were 
understood. 
Accident Consequences. 
All accidents result in loss and this is helpful as, unlike near-misses, little judgement 
is required to determine if a reportable event has occurred. The reporting systems 
surveyed all included details of losses experienced including injury, property damage, 
environmental harm or lost production. Although for most the main focus was on 
injury. 
The details about injuries usually included the type of injury experienced and the parts 
of the body affected. The severity of the injury was usually indicated by the treatment 
required and length of time a person was off work. Further details were often 
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requested concerning what activity the person was performing at the time of the 
accident, what object or substance caused the injury and how that was able to happen. 
The descriptions of injuries on some report forms used multiple choice questions, the 
details of which are included in appendix 2. These are quite effective for describing 
the injury. They are not so effective for describing how the injury occurred. 
Consequences other than injury should be included in accident reporting systems. Not 
only do they cost companies a great deal of money, they also provide useful hard 
evidence of the events that occurred. It is important that details are recorded quickly 
and accurately. The desire to return the site of an accident to normal can mean 
important information is lost. 
Often non-injury losses were only reported as part of the general accident description. 
Some accident report forms included a separate section for the description, others 
actually used a separate form. The descriptions of property damage were generally 
based on the value of the loss, or the cost of replacement or repair. For the release of a 
substance, or a fire, the description of loss was usually based on the duration of the 
accident, the area affected and the cost of the clean up. 
An accident report should form a permanent record of all the consequences 
experienced. Analysis of this record can be used to determine the actual threshold 
limit of exposure to a hazard of the items that were harmed. They show how the 
effects of hazards spread and react with items in the vicinity. This information is 
required for accurate risk assessment and may highlight where knowledge about 
hazards is deficient. 
Accident Causes. 
Most accident reporting systems aim to improve safety by preventing the recurrence 
of accidents. This is achieved by identifying the causes of accidents so they can be 
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removed. Most accident report forms included a question along the lines of "What 
were the causes of the accident?" 
At this stage an accident report changes from an essentially factual account of what 
happened to a more subjective appraisal of why things happened. This part of the 
accident report was usually completed by the supervisor of a person involved in an 
accident. 
Most of the report forms required assessments of direct causes, root causes and 
contributory factors. There is little evidence, however, of any rigorous use of accident 
causation models other than the ILCI model, included in ISRS, used by three of the 
companies. This suggests the quality of the responses will depend greatly on the 
training and expertise of the people completing them. 
The direct, or immediate causes of the accident were generally considered to be 
unsafe, or substandard, acts, suggesting the person involved in the accident did not 
follow a safe system of work, and unsafe, or substandard, conditions where there was 
a failure to control a hazard. An extensive list of multiple choice answers was usually 
provided. 
Although it is important to identify direct causes of accidents, they should already 
have been well documented in the accident description. The value of this section of an 
accident report is limited to any benefits gained from classifying failures. 
The root, or basic, causes of accidents were generally described as personal factors, 
where people did not have the required knowledge, skill or training to perform the job 
they were asked to, and job factors where a safe system of work was not available 
because of a lack of adequate procedures, organisation or equipment. Again these 
were often accompanied by a list of multiple choice answers although the lists tended 
to be rather short. 
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This is a useful classification of failures in that it takes the blame away from the 
people involved. It is not clear, however, how this helps without the use of models that 
clearly show how an accident is the result of a combination of events including direct 
causes, root causes and lack of control due to management failures. 
Contributory factors are generally situations concerning the organisation of work and 
the working environment that made an accident likely or the consequences more 
serious. They are not just associated with the events directly related to the accident 
being reported but are situations that may have contributed to many accidents. This is 
an area that should be developed as it can provide lots of information about 
conditions, management and culture. In the report forms surveyed little guidance was 
given about what the responses to these questions should include. 
Action to be Taken Following an Accident. 
Once the causes of an accident have been identified action can be taken to prevent 
recurrence. The accident report usually included details of required action as this is so 
closely related to the causes. 
Sometimes action can be taken immediately to prevent an escalation of the accident 
already experienced, by removing a hazard, or protecting against further loss. This 
action should be completed as soon as possible so that the plant is returned to a safe 
state. Such action, however, is likely to disturb the scene of an accident and affect any 
evidence. It is important that any action taken soon after the accident is recorded 
accurately. There is also likely to be pressure to return the plant to normal production 
as soon as possible. This may require a lot of "quick fixes" that, if undocumented, 
may actually compromise the plant's long term safety. 
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Details of immediate action taken after an accident do not tell us much about how 
accidents occur but it does illustrate the effectiveness of the emergency response and 
how well people understand the hazards on the plant. 
Further analysis of the accident may result in recommendations about more 
permanent changes. These will normally be processed through the normal 
modification channels of design, engineering and construction. Many of the accident 
report forms surveyed included sections that allowed any required actions to be 
recorded with details about who was responsible for the implementation and a target 
date for completion. 
In theory the long term actions should be aimed at improving management and culture 
of the company. Such a global view did not seem to be included in most accident 
reporting systems. The emphasis remained on the prevention of a particular accident 
from recurring by implementing technical changes. 
Peoples' Opinions. 
The sections on report forms for describing accidents, including the consequences, 
require a factual report of what actually happened from the people involved. A small 
number of the report forms surveyed also asked for those peoples' opinions about 
what happened. This seems a sensible inclusion, as long as it is clearly separate from 
the factual account, as they have the most knowledge about the accident and will 
definitely have an opinion that they will want to tell people about. 
Most of the report forms surveyed included the opinions of more senior people in the 
company such as: 
• supervisor, 
• section head, the head of department, 
• plant manager, 
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• area manager, 
• safety officers, 
• safety engineer, 
• safety representative. 
Usually the accident report was passed around a number of these people, and space 
was provided for their comments. The aim is to utilise the experience and knowledge 
of these people to improve the quality of the report. It is also a useful way of passing 
on information about accidents throughout the company. 
To be effective each person must take their responsibility seriously. They should 
include details they feel have been omitted and comment on how their actions 
contributed to the accident. 
In practice the accident report forms did not make it clear what senior members of the 
company were supposed to contribute. Most of the responses tended to be a simple 
assessment of the quality of the report and no extra information about possible causes 
or recommended action were included. 
4.2.3 Summary. 
Since publication the report of this accident reporting systems survey has caused a fair 
amount of interest. It has been referenced in an MSc project [Harding 1994] and 
European Process Safety Centre report [Bardsley et al 1995], both of which have used 
it as a good indication of the contents of accident reporting systems in the process 
industry. 
The results of the survey suggest that accident reporting systems do have the potential 
to provide human factors data. In particular, information is recorded about people 
involved in accidents, descriptions of the events before and during the accident, the 
consequences of the accident including all loses, the direct and root causes of the 
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accident, the actions taken following an accident to prevent further loss and improve 
safety and the opinions of people with any relevant knowledge about what they think 
was significant. 
In practice most of the reporting systems fall well short of their potential. There is 
little indication of any of the reporting systems being developed with human factors in 
mind. In particular, the people who were considered to be involved in an accident 
were limited to injured parties or people who had made errors that were the direct 
cause of loss, the events of interest revolve around those that directly caused loss, the 
consequences of accidents were focused on injury which discourages the reporting of 
other losses, and the root causes of accidents were given relatively little attention and 
generally were chosen from a limited number of possibilities listed. The possible 
action taken following an accident indicates the limited scope of most accident 
reporting systems as system changes are not encouraged. This is further driven by 
senior members of staff being asked to comment on the failures of people identified as 
contributing to the direct causes of an accident rather than commenting on the failures 
they were involved in through a poor promotion of good safety by the departments 
under their control. 
4.3 Keeping Records. 
The last important detail to be considered about the use of accident reporting for 
providing human factors data is how records were kept. This will determine how to 
access data when required. 
All the company accident reporting systems surveyed used paper report forms to 
record the details of the accident. They were printed with the questions to be asked as 
specified in the companies reporting procedure. These are easy to pass around the 
company to all the people who need to write on them. Over time, however, the 
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number of reports will be large and searching for data will be difficult, unreliable and 
time consuming. 
Many companies had developed computer databases onto which details from accident 
reports were entered. This allows easy searching of the records and simple analysis of 
trends. The accident report forms had been developed to fit in with the data bases and 
this will affect the information that is available. Any inflexibility of the computer 
system will limit the use of the data available. 
4.3.1 Answering the Questions. 
The format of questions and answers will affect the information that is recorded, and 
the way it can be stored and retrieved. There will always be a compromise between 
the need for flexibility, to include lots of information, against the convenience of 
collecting information in a regular form that is easily analysed. Three distinct 
methods of answering questions have been identified. 
Free Text Description. 
This is the most obvious way to describe any accident and all the forms had some 
questions requiring free text answers. It allows total flexibility but is very difficult to 
standardise the answers thus the quality of the reports will be variable. The only limit 
to the amount of information recorded was the space provided on the form although 
some report forms specified a maximum number of words to be used giving an 
indication of what detail was required. Most of the forms allowed extra sheets of 
paper to be attached, if required, but this does rather defeat the purpose of having a 
concise report of the accident. 
Free text answers will allow the most information to be collected but makes storing 
information and analysing data very difficult. 
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Multiple Choice Questions. 
The use of multiple choice questions varied greatly between companies, although 
most had some. The main reasons for using them was to allow easy storage on 
computer. 
Multiple choice questions allow standardised reports to be completed. It is very 
difficult, however, to describe every accident this way as no list of questions or 
answers can ever be considered as complete. It is very useful for analysing trends and 
lots of pretty graphs and charts can be drawn but the actual information available for 
assessing safety, including human factors, is severely limited. 
Appendix 2 contains all the multiple choice questions and answers used on the 
accident report forms examined as part of the accident reporting system survey. 
Key Words. 
Some report forms included a separate list of suggested words and phrases with 
abbreviated codes to be used where appropriate to help standardise the free text 
descriptions on the accident reports whilst keeping the flexibility to include increased 
detail when required. This also keeps the size of the form smaller as long lists of 
multiple choice answers do not have to be included. It can, however, make the reports 
rather difficult to read. 
4.3.2 Summary. 
All the accident reporting systems surveyed use paper report forms onto which people 
write answers to the questions asked. This immediately creates a problem of storing 
and retrieving any human factors data that may be available. 
Free text descriptions of accidents allow the most information to be recorded and 
maximise the amount of human factors data available if people have been trained in 
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the theories of accident causation and human factors. The information can only be 
retrieved, however, by searching through large stacks of paper. Multiple choice 
questions have been developed to allow information to be stored on computer data 
bases although at present the systems used are rather restrictive. Key words allow 
some standardisation of free text descriptions but are not very user-friendly for people 
writing and reading the reports. 
The most likely solution to these problems would be to develop computer based 
reporting systems that would allow all the appropriate information to be entered 
directly into a data base. This would require a certain amount of investment from 
companies to provide the hardware, develop the software and train people to use it. 
The nature of accidents means that no one standardised set of questions is likely to 
cover all possibilities. Better results would be available if people were trained in the 
art of completing accident reports so that they were aware of the significant details 
concerning accident causation and human factors. With well-designed "intelligent" 
systems the potential to provide data for human factors studies could be increased. 
4.4 Conclusions. 
Accident reporting systems are widely used in the process industry and as most 
accidents involve human actions and errors it would seem likely that these systems 
could provide a great deal of data for use in human factors studies. The actual amount 
of data available, however, is limited by the lack of accidents experienced by most 
companies and a reluctance by most companies to share information, made worse by 
the lack of a standardised accident reporting system. 
Accident reporting systems have the potential to record much information that could 
be used to provide data for use in human factors studies. It seems unlikely, however, 
that this potential will ever be reached. The true root causes of most accidents lie with 
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the management of a company. Most are unwilling to record their failures as they are 
likely to incriminate themselves. The current accident reporting systems can provide 
some useful data but the amount and the quality is limited. 
Chapter 5. 
Near Miss Reporting Systems as a Source 
of Human Factors Data, 
5.1 Introduction. 
For the purposes of this chapter a near miss is defined as any situation in which an 
ongoing sequence of events was prevented from developing further thus 
preventing the occurrence of potentially serious consequences [van der Schaaf 
1991b]. In other words a near miss is a situation where potential consequences were 
greater than those realised. This includes situations where no loss was experienced, a 
minor loss could have been worse or different types of losses could have been 
experienced. 
A near miss report is a permanent record of what actually happened and an 
assessment of what could have happened, if the circumstances were slightly different, 
including the likely consequences. One of the biggest hurdles to overcome is the 
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identification of near misses as there is, by definition, no evidence that an incident 
actually took place. 
Most accident causation models show a close relationship between the causes of 
accidents and near misses. This suggests that the potential of these reporting systems 
for providing human factors data should be similar. In fact more data may be available 
from reports as they should include details about positive human behaviour, in the 
form of the recovery actions that were taken that successfully prevent accidents. 
5.1.1 Why Are Near Misses Reported? 
Near miss reporting is a recent addition to most company safety systems. In the past 
great reliance was placed on accident rates to indicate a company's safety 
performance. The general reduction in accident rates to a point where they are no 
longer statistically relevant, although obviously a desirable situation, severely limits 
the amount of information available to a company about its safety performance. The 
aim of including near miss reports in company safety systems is to increase the 
amount of information available. 
Many studies have shown that the rate of near miss occurrence is significantly greater 
than that of accidents. The results are often shown as pyramids or triangles. Figure 5.1 
shows the results of a study conducted by Tye and Person of almost 1,000,000 
accidents in British industry [HSE 19911. They showed that a significantly greater 
number of less serious events occurred than more serious events. However all the 
events occurred because of a failure to control hazards and hence the potential 
consequences of the less serious events were greater than those actually experienced. 
Chapter 5 Near Miss Reporting 
	
NOR 
fatal or serious injury 
injury with 3 days lost time 
first aid injuries 
property damage accidents 
near-misses, no injury/damage 
Figure 5.1 Incident Triangle showing the ratio of near misses to accidents 
There are further advantages to reporting near misses. Accidents tend to be 
accompanied by much "excitement" that results in unhelpful interference and 
emotional behaviour preventing clear thinking. Accidents are important to many 
people, including those who have been injured, the industry regulators and insurance 
companies, all of whom want certain information that the company may not wish to 
divulge. There is generally less interest in near misses so the reports can include a 
wider range of details including speculation and theories that may be reasonable and 
useful but not necessarily proven. As the difference between a near miss and an 
accident is generally "luck" there may be far more to gain from concentrating on the 
investigation of near misses compared with what would be lost if accidents were 
never investigated [Metzgar 19901. 
5.1.2 How Are Near Miss Reporting Systems Developed? 
Like accident reporting there is no standard near miss reporting system. Guidance is 
also especially scarce, although details of some studies have been published. 
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The Influence of the Regulatory System. 
In the UK certain near misses, described as "dangerous occurrences" are covered by 
RIDDOR. The guide to the regulations includes a list of reportable occurrences that 
have a "high potential to cause death or serious injury (even though they do not cause 
death or injury every time), but which happen relatively infrequently" [HSE 1986]. 
According to the definition of an accident used in this thesis, however, most of the 
occurrences would usually be classified as accidents, rather than near misses, as they 
generally involve property damage and other losses. 
Guidance From the Safety Literature. 
The general impression one gets from reading safety text books is that near miss 
reporting is considered to be a useful, if not essential, method of improving safety. 
However although plenty of examples are available about situations where near miss 
reports would be especially useful [Haines and Kian 1991] these is no clear advice on 
how near miss reporting systems should be developed and implemented. 
The main problem with near miss reporting is the high probability of under-reporting. 
Sometimes this is because people fail to see the benefit of reporting or fear reprisals. 
Often it is because people are simply not aware of near misses occurring because they 
only last a short time and leave no evidence [Carter and Menckel 1985]. These 
problems can be overcome by training people to identify relevant events, ensuring the 
company culture is such that open, encouraging honest communication and cross-
referencing other sources of information such as maintenance reports and operations 
records to ensure all near misses are actually reported [HSE 19911. 
Near misses have been identified as a good source of human factors data [Chappell 
1994]. The data is especially useful as it is derived from actual operation of a plant. 
This means there is no requirements for modifying data, to model actual plant 
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conditions, or carry out validation exercises to ensure the model is correct, as there is 
with data derived from human reliability theory, expert judgement or generic data 
bases. Care is required, however, especially where statistical data is being extracted as 
the chance an event will be reported is different to its actual rate of occurrence. 
Certain situations are more likely to result in reports than others which can lead to 
very misleading bias [Chappell 19941. 
Published Studies of Near Miss Reporting. 
One of the most comprehensive studies of near miss reporting was carried out at 
Eindhoven University [van der Schaaf 1992]. The first conclusion was that "hardly 
anything had been reported in the open literature on this subject." To overcome the 
lack of information a meeting was arranged where company experiences were 
discussed. The conclusions from the meeting resulted in a list of recommendations for 
companies developing near miss reporting systems. 
Near miss reporting systems were also surveyed for their coverage of human factors. 
It was found that existing systems generally lacked any theoretical background or 
models of human behaviour. A new system was developed focusing on the provision 
of human factors data. It was found to be very successful as error types and their 
causes were found to be far easier to identify than with most reporting systems 
[Taylor and Lucas 19911. 
Another study looked at specific problems of developing and maintaining near miss 
reporting systems [Ives 1991]. The main conclusion was that implementation is very 
difficult and failure is common, especially if managers misuse the system by using 
reports to apportion blame and measure safety performance so that the incentive for 
the workforce to volunteer reports is lost. 
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5.1.3 Near Miss Reporting Systems Currently Used in the Process 
Industry. 
The companies who provided details of their accident reporting systems for the 
survey in Chapter 4 were also asked to provide details of any near miss reporting 
system they used. It was clear that for most companies near miss reporting was a 
relatively new concept and very much in the development stage. 
No standard reporting system exists but two distinct types of reporting system 
appeared to have been used, one involved modifying an accident reporting system to 
cover near misses, the other involved developing a dedicated near miss reporting 
system [Brazier and Skilling 1995]. 
Modified Accident Reporting Systems. 
Modifying an existing accident reporting system has a number of attractions. A new 
system does not have to be developed or maintained, people do not need to know how 
to complete another form or have them available, so paperwork does not appear to 
increase, and the link between near misses and accidents may be more apparent. The 
problem is that different approaches are required to get full benefit from both systems. 
An accident report needs to contain information that may be required if an 
investigation is necessary or if certain liabilities have to be acknowledged. Near miss 
reports do not have to fulfil all these requirements and so much of an accident report 
form is irrelevant. 
Dedicated Near Miss Reporting Systems. 
Developing a dedicated near miss reporting system is likely to provide extra and more 
useful information. Most systems use a simple report form asking for a brief 
description of the event and what prevented it from becoming an accident. Reports are 
analysed to determine if any immediate action is required. Details are often stored on 
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a data base and over time any situations that develop affecting safety can be identified 
and worrying trends can be monitored. The forms have to be readily available, and 
quick and simple to complete. 
5.1.4 Summary. 
A near miss is an event where the potential consequences were greater than those 
realised. The main reason companies have started reporting them is because they 
occur far more frequently than accidents. Near misses still represent system failures 
and as such involve the human factors associated with accidents. Reporting them may 
actually be more successful at providing human factors data than accident reports as 
there is less interest in the events. This allows more freedom for the reports to include 
speculation about what might have happened and why. 
In the process industry there is no legal requirement to report near misses although it 
is considered to be desirable in much of the safety literature. There is, however, little 
guidance available about how to develop near miss reporting systems, in particular 
how to overcome the problem of under-reporting. A number of studies have been 
conducted looking at the systems currently used by companies. The main conclusions 
were that a model of accident causation and human behaviour significantly improves 
the quality of near miss reports but there are major cultural barriers to overcome, 
especially if managers misuse the system. 
A brief survey of company near miss reporting systems found that there were two 
basic approaches. Some companies have simply modified their accident reporting 
systems to include near misses. This avoids the need to develop a new system. Other 
companies have developed dedicated near miss reporting systems and these seem to 
perform better because they allow a different approach to be used. This would seem 
necessary because a near miss report must explain what could have happened and 
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why, whereas accident reports have to describe what events actually took place and 
how they were able to occur. 
5.2 Studying Near Miss Reporting. 
Successful near miss reporting systems rely entirely on an appropriate company 
culture and workforce acceptance. These can take years to develop and so 
experimenting with new reporting systems is not easy. The remainder of this chapter 
describes four studies carried out to determine the potential of near miss reporting 
systems for providing human factors data. This is essentially a theoretical study, 
backed up by plant evaluations aimed at showing the ideas have, at least, face validity. 
Most of these results were presented at the International Systems Safety Conference 
in Albuquerque New Mexico in 1996 [Brazier and Skilling 19961. 
5.2.1 Study 1. Classifying Accident Potential. 
To be able to report near misses people must be able to identify events which have the 
potential to cause loss. Of the reporting systems examined for this part of the study, 
nine included a section requiring a record of accident potential. The potential assigned 
is generally used to determine the level of investigation required [Brazier 1994]. 
Three of these had a simple tick box allowing an indication of potential severity, or 
chance of recurrence, as either high, medium or low. Four used matrices with a 
severity scale on one axis and potential population along the other. The intersections 
gave an accident potential score. One used an equation where accident potential was 
calculated by multiplying scores assigned for frequency of exposure to the hazard, 
severity of possible damage, maximum possible loss and probability of exposure. One 
included a number of questions requiring a free text description of the accident 
potential (this was part of the study described in Section 5.2.2). 
Chapter 5 Near Miss Reporting 
	
95 
Scoring systems used by companies have been examined and the safety literature has 
been consulted to determine what criteria can be used to assign appropriate "accident 
potential scores" [Brazier and Black 1995a]. This study has shown that there are two 
main components to any score, the severity of a potential accident and the probability 
of its occurrence. 
Potential Loss. 
The potential loss of an incident depends on the severity and extent of loss that may 
be experienced. For most companies the most significant loss is injury although when 
considering accident potential all losses should be considered. 
Below are examples of proposed criteria that could be used to assign the potential loss 
of an incident. For each a scale is included for the severity and extent of the potential 
loss. A score can be assigned according to which is the dominant factor in the loss, 
severity or extent, or as a function of the two. 
Injuries: the severity in this example is based on a commonly used accident 
classification and the extent is determined by the number of people who may be 
injured. The severity could be based on the type of injury, part of the body affected or 
the type of treatment required. 
Severity Minor injury Lost time I 	Permanent I 	Fatality injury disability 
Rating Lowest 	 Highest 
Population 1 person 2 people 5 people I 	More than 5 
people 
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Production disruption: in this example the potential severity is determined by the 
actual effects to production rates and quality and the extent is determined by the 
length of the disruption. 
Increased Products off- Production Production 
Severity production specification reduced stopped 
costs 
Rating Lowest 	 Highest 
Duration 1 day 1 week 1 month 6 months 
Property damage: in this example the severity is based on the types of items 
damaged and the extent is determined by the area affected. The severity could be 
based on the value of damage or cost of repair. 
Severity Superficial I 	Equipment I Plant damage I 	Structural damage damage J damage 
Rating Lowest 	 Highest 
Area Confined to I 	Damage to I 	Plant wide I 	Off-site one unit adjacent units damage damage 
Environmental damage: in this example the severity is based on the time taken to 
return the damaged environment to its previous condition and the extent is based on 
the area affected. Other severity classifications are available based on the type of 
material released whilst the extent could be described according to the type of 
environment affected, such as whether it was a nature reserve, residential area or 
wasteland. 
No clean-up 1 week clean 1 month Long-term or 
Severity operation up operation. clean up permanent 
required operation. damage. 
Rating Lowest 	 Highest 
Plant area On-site are Site Large off-site 
Magnitude affected. affected, perimeter area affected. 
affected 
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Probability of Occurrence. 
The second component of the accident potential score is an assessment of the chance 
of exposure to a hazardous situations or the chance of similar accidents occurring 
because of certain root causes [Woods 19901. Four types of root cause have been 
identified. A scale of the risk influence is shown and explained below. 
Effect of 
System latent Human 
Frequency complexity failures failure 
. situation shown by during involved in 
occurs incident incident incident 
to Always present Unexplained Impossible to Situation with 
interactions achieve safe no known 
state. solution 
Not always but Explainable but Difficult to Situation not 
often unexpected achieve safe planned for 
interactions state 
Rare but Previously Failure of safety Plan existed but 
foreseen known systems. incomplete. 
interactions 
Exceptional/ No system Reduced Complete plan 
unforeseen interactions redundancy of existed but 
safety systems complicated 
• Frequency situation occurs: this suggests the risk is associated with the 
probability that people, plant or equipment are exposed to a hazardous situation. 
• System complexity: complex systems include many linked sub-systems. This 
increases the chance of small failures combining to form big failures. If many 
unexpected situations are uncovered by an incident the risk of recurrence of a 
similar incident is greater. 
• Latent failures: incidents provide a good opportunity to identify previously 
unnoticed latent failures. If many latent failures are uncovered during an incident it 
suggests there are many hidden problems within the system. The chance of further 
accidents occurring is greater. 
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Human factors: this accounts for the human involvement in the incident. Few 
complications and known solutions to problems allow simple skill or rule based 
behaviour and suggest that human factors and their contribution to risk will be low. 
If the situation was not planned for, no solutions to problems were available or they 
were impossible to perform and it suggests a major problem where human factors 
are concerned. This means the human factor contribution to risk is greater. 
Summary. 
This study has examined the use of accident potential assessments. It has shown that a 
full assessment of accident potential should include the severity and extent of 
potential loss and the probability such an event will occur. These ideas have been 
developed into a set of risk evaluation criteria. 
The criteria developed would allow a consistent assessment of accident potential and 
have been developed by considering the direct and root causes of accidents. This 
should increase the awareness within a company of safety problems highlighted by 
near misses. Such an approach should ensure near miss reporting systems result in 
many high quality reports that could provide much data for use in human factors 
studies. 
5.2.2 Study 2. Determining Accident Potential in Practice. 
This study was carried out to see how easy it is for people to suggest reasonable 
scenarios that explain how a near miss could have achieved its accident potential. 
A company with a good safety record and well established accident reporting systems 
was approached. They were asked to modify their report form to include an extra 
section covering accident potential. This was approved and the section added is shown 
in Figure 5.2. 
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EVALUATION OF LOSS POTENTIAL 
Do you think the consequences of this accident could have been potentially worse YES/NO 
If yes, what additional injuries could have been caused?: 
What additional property damage could have been caused?: 
What factors prevent this accident from realising its potential?: 
Figure 5.2 Section added to accident report form (80% of actual size) 
The questions asked were simple with adequate space available for free text answers. 
The aim was to encourage the person reporting the accident to think about what they 
had experienced and to suggest what might have happened, if the circumstances had 
been different, and why it did not. 
The following guidance was also provided to be included in the accident reporting 
system procedures. 
Injuries: what population could have been present and hence exposed to the risk? 
How serious could the injuries have been? 
Property Damage: what could have been damaged and how seriously? What 
would the result have been? 
Recovery: was it pure luck that it was not worse? Did someone take avoiding 
action or was safety equipment being used? 
The answers to these questions are obviously the subjective opinion of the person 
reporting the accident. There was a risk that unreasonable scenarios may be 
suggested. As in many companies, however, the accident reporting procedure 
included a review of each report by senior members of the safety and management 
departments. This was considered to be a reasonable control mechanism to prevent 
this occurring. 
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Results. 
In a period of approximately 18 months 35 accidents were reported, of these 29 were 
considered to have had a greater potential to cause loss than that realised. The results 
of the study are shown in Appendix 3 and summarised in Figure 5.1. The responses to 
the questions about accident potential were all sensible and it was clear that each had 
been considered carefully. 
Reason Potential was Action taken to 
Number of Accidents not Realized prevent recurrence 
Potential was worse 29 Luck 16 Improve 4 
than realised housekeeping 
Injury could have been 29 Awareness of 10 Redesign task! 22 
worse than experienced employees instructions! 
equipment 
Damage could have 3 Safety equipment 3 Install/issue 5 
been worse being used warnings 
Table 5.1 Summary of Accident Potential Results. 
The results clearly show that the loss potential of most accidents was believed to be 
greater than the actual consequences experienced. The responses generally 
highlighted that the actual injuries experienced in the accident could have been more 
serious. However only a small number of the reports extended the analysis to consider 
the potential for further losses. 
The fact that actual loss is less than the potential simply because of luck is probably 
not a surprise. What is more interesting is that, whereas only four of the accident 
repots cited a fault of an individual as one of the causes, 13 of the accidents were 
prevented from realising their potential because the people involved performed 
successful recovery actions or had taken appropriate precautions before starting work. 
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It is a sign of the quality of the accident reporting system of the company in question 
that the actions taken to prevent recurrence of accidents were so constructive. For 
most redesign of some part of the system was suggested, a clear indication that an 
individual was not considered to be at fault. In a few cases the action taken was 
limited to erecting warning notices because a suitable solution was not readily 
available. This was a temporary response until a more permanent change could be 
implemented. What is not clear, however, is how latent failures are handled and this 
suggests a problem with developing near miss and accident reporting systems. 
Summary. 
In this study over 80% of the accidents reported had a greater accident potential than 
the loss experienced. For most companies this is where the near miss aspect of an 
accident report would stop. In this case people were asked further questions. It 
appears that people found it relatively easy to suggest that the actual injuries 
experienced in an accident could have been worse. Few responses to the questions, 
however, included assessments of other injuries and property damage that could have 
occurred. This is obviously a potential problem for reporting near misses where no 
loss has been experienced at all. 
The results of this study clearly show that rather than individuals causing most 
accidents they actually play a major role in recovering them. Of course it is the human 
ability to adapt to situations that makes their presence still necessary on most 
industrial sites despite the advances in technology in recent years. Near miss reports 
should be able to show how employees assess risks whilst carrying out their work, 
sense and perceive incidents, and act to limit consequences. This could provide data 
covering errors and recovery for use in human factors studies. 
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5.2.3 Study 3. Interaction With Hazards. 
Accidents occur because control of a hazard is lost and an undesirable exposure or 
contact occurs. To be effective, a near miss reporting system must be able to identify 
events that allow these to occur. To be of use for providing human factors data the 
human involvement must be identified. This must all be based on credible scenarios 
backed up by some type of evidence. These aims were investigated during the 
following study carried out at a petrochemical plant [Embrey et al 1994] 
The first step was to develop an inventory of all tasks carried out on a unit, with a 
significant human involvement. This was achieved by reviewing operating manuals 
and other available documentation, and discussing with operators what their job 
entailed. A method of criticality assessment was then developed that could be used to 
identify loss potential in the event of a failure to carry out a task correctly. 
The criticality assessment was based on the chance of: 
• exposure to hazards due to the area in which a task is performed, 
• contact with a hazard due to the nature of the task, 
• frequency with which the task is performed, 
• the individual's familiarity with the task. 
Classification Systems Developed. 
For each of these a classification scheme was developed that identified critical 
components of each task. This allowed potential consequences to be assessed with 
attention focused on how human involvement influenced risk. 
Exposure to Hazards concerned the location in which a person must be to perform a 
particular task. This determined their potential exposure to hazards in the event of a 
failure. This may or may not have been associated with the actual task they were 
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performing. On the plant in question there was an area classification system that was 
ideal for this part of the criticality assessment and was shown in Table 5.2. The major 
impact on human factors is the requirement to use Personal Protection Equipment 
(PPE). Failure to use the PPE required suggests problems in risk perception, culture 
and management whereas wearing PPE can cause problems of movement, poor 
communication and impaired sight [Ridley 1990]. 
Safe Plant Purple area Red area 
Outside plant Any area on the High noise The presence of major 
perimeter or plant where areas where hazards such as caustic, 
inside standard PPE of hearing catalyst powder, high 
buildings safety boots, protection temperature and pressure 
where PPE is overalls, hard and must be worn required additional 
not required. safety glasses are protection of goggles and 
required rubber gloves 
Table 5.2 Classifying Potential for Exposure to Hazards 
Contact With Hazards was determined by the hazardous properties of substances, 
and process conditions, associated with a task. The classification of the hazard was 
carried out by assessing the toxicity and flammability of all substances that could have 
been present at the start of the task. At this stage it was important to consider all 
possible hazards that could have been present at some time, rather than the normal 
ones, as previous errors may have resulted in equipment being left in an inappropriate 
condition. 
Table 5.3 shows the classification system used for this part of the assessment. The 
most useful sources of information were found to be the COSHH assessments and 
Piping and Instrument (P&I) diagrams. 
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Low Hazard Medium Hazard High Hazard 
Substances with no toxic A substance not Substances of particular 
or flammable properties considered to be low or toxicity or flammability 
kept at near atmospheric high hazard 
conditions 
Table 5.3 Nature of Hazards. 
The risk involved in a task was related to the hazards present and the number of 
potential contact opportunities. A list of possible contact modes was developed, they 
were: 
direct contact because barriers did not exist or had to be removed, 
dismantling or reassembling equipment, 
modifying plant or process, 
task that affected control system, 
task that affected safety systems, 
isolations or de-isolations. 
Task Frequency is an important component in determining the risk associated with a 
hazardous task. A log scale seemed to be the most appropriate classification as shown 
in Figure 5.3 with the line representing the relationship between risk and the 
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Figure 5.3 Frequency of Task Performance 
Task Familiarity accounted for the fact that a combination of shift work and 
infrequent tasks could mean that an individuals experience of a task may not be 
closely related to the frequency a task is actually performed. A good example is a task 
performed as part of an emergency response. A particular emergency may never occur 
but people should be familiar with the procedures as a quick and accurate response is 
required. This is achieved through training and regular exercises. Table 5.4 is the 
classification system developed. 
Routine Task Familiar Task Unfamiliar Task Exceptional Task 
Carried out very Well known and Part of normal Not part of 
regularly so that no longer novel. operation but normal operation. 
procedures are not Operator has good infrequently Procedures 
required and little knowledge of performed so that followed closely 
thought is procedure procedures are throughout. 
involved. contents. consulted. 
Table 5.4 Familiarity of Task. 
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Results. 
For the unit in question, 31 tasks with significant human involvement were identified. 
Analysis of the tasks was relatively straightforward and relied on readily available 
information. This suggests incidents would easily be classified according to their 
accident potential and the human factors involved. The development of the task 
inventory proved to be a useful method of collecting and recording information. It 
would be especially useful when analysing incidents as discrepancies between the 
experience of the incident and the information in the inventory would suggest where 
knowledge was deficient. 
The tasks analysed were all associated with normal plant operation. Information about 
unusual operations was not readily available. As many accidents occur during times 
of unusual operation, this suggests more consideration is required in that area. 
Summary. 
Risk assessment uses a combination of facts and assumptions to determine the safety 
of certain situations. This study has shown how near miss reporting could be viewed 
as a similar process. An event occurs about which facts are known or can be found. 
Assumptions are then made to determine what might have happened and what the 
consequences would have been. If a task inventory were developed for a particular 
plant it could provide the evidence required to back up the assessments made in near 
miss reports. The reports would then be used to prove any facts and verify any 
assumptions included within the inventory. Over time the inventory would build into a 
useful source of data built up from actual experience that could be used in human 
factors studies. 
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5.2.4 Study 4. Unit Objectives. 
The study of interactions with hazards in Section 5.2.3 was able to identify the direct 
causes of accidents to allow analysis of near misses and to determine loss potential. It 
was only successful, however, for the assessment of tasks associated with normal 
operation. Also omitted was analysis of how and where latent failures enter systems. 
A further study was carried out, on an offshore oil production platform, to develop a 
methodology to overcome these deficiencies [Brazier and Black 1995b]. 
Again the first step of this study was to develop a task inventory. In this case it was 
based on an assessment of plant goals and methods by which they were achieved. 
Each unit on the plant was examined to determine what contribution it made to the 
overall plant goal. This included the following details: 
• major items of equipment, 
• main processes involved, 
• process conditions required, 
• measure of performance, 
• control systems, 
• the links between units. 
Plant personnel were required to perform certain tasks to ensure each unit realized its 
objective. These tasks can be described broadly as: 
• start-up, 
• controlling operation, 
• maximising performance, 
• ensuring safety, 
• shut-down. 
Failure to achieve any of the unit objectives could have had the following outcomes: 
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an immediate effect resulting from the loss of control of a hazard, 
a long term effect allowing a latent failure to enter the system, 
knock-on effects where a failure affects a wider area than where it actually 
occurred, 
recovery, where the system was returned to a safe state with no effect. 
The System Studied. 
The overall objective of the plant in question was "Safe, efficient and profitable oil 
and gas recovery." One unit, Water Injection, was studied in detail to develop the task 
inventory. The objective of this unit was to "Provide very clean water at the required 
pressure and rate." 
Sea water has a number of properties that make it unsuitable for injecting directly into 
an oil reservoir. The Water Injection Unit purified the water before pumping it. The 
unit was best described by the simplified diagram shown in Figure 5.4. 
Source water pumps passed sea water to heat exchangers to increase its temperature, 
making later processes more efficient. The filters removed suspended solids which 
could block rock pores in the reservoir, seriously disrupting production.. The 
deaeration towers used vacuum and injected chemicals to remove dissolved oxygen 
which would cause corrosion. Chemicals were injected to kill bacteria which cause 
corrosion and fouling. The condition of the water was carefully controlled to prevent 
the build up of calcite scale. The booster and injection pumps provided water at a high 
flow rate and pressure for injection into the well. 
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To Vacuum Pumps 	Injection Pumps 
Source Water Pumps 	 Booster Pumps 	 To Injectior 
Figure 5.4 Water Injection Unit 
It became clear that although a unit handling water may initially be considered to be 
reasonably safe, the objectives of the unit introduced a number of hazards. In addition 
to the general hazard of a potentially flammable or explosive atmosphere in the well 
head area, there were the hazards associated with chemicals and rotating equipment, 
vacuum and high pressure. Operator performance could also be affected by high noise 
levels, cramped conditions and exposure to extreme weather. 
A task inventory was developed based on what operators have to do to meet the unit 
objectives. It included actions performed to operate the unit continuously, routine jobs 
required to ensure operation was reliable and some tasks aimed at checking the 
performance of the unit. The tasks included: 
changing pumps in and out of service and mechanical isolations, 
opening and closing injection wells, 
setting filter backwash timings, 
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• connecting and disconnecting chemical tanks, 
• cleaning filters, 
• controlling injection pump recycle, 
• setting chemical dosing rates, 
• general unit walk about and completion of reading and status sheets. 
From all this information the possible outcomes of failure to perform these tasks 
correctly were determined. 
Results. 
In this case a task inventory was developed to show how personnel ensured the unit 
operated as required. The task goals were assessed to determine the likely effects of 
failures. The information recorded in the inventory allowed a full assessment of 
incidents to be carried out to determine the actual consequences, where they were not 
obvious or visible, and the potential consequences if recovery had not been possible. 
Immediate effects were mainly concerned with contact with hazards such as 
chemicals, high pressure, vacuum, and rotating equipment that can cause injury or 
damage. The effects could have been realised if appropriate precautions were not 
taken where interaction with these hazards was required. Failure to perform most of 
the tasks efficiently could have had an immediate effect on production. 
Long term effects were concerned with the operation of the unit in an inappropriate 
state. They included: 
• Operating the unit with high concentrations of dissolved oxygen or bacteria would 
lead to corrosion conditions. The result would have been damage to equipment, 
lost production due to extra maintenance being required and the cost of premature 
replacement of equipment. It could have also lead to the unexpected loss of 
containment of hazards. 
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• Failure to remove suspended solids results in blockage of rock pores decreasing 
production. The situation could be reversed but this required the use of explosives 
and chemicals. These operations introduced greater levels of risk to plant 
operation. 
• Scale and bacteria growth in equipment causes fouling which affects production 
and increased the requirement for maintenance. Some forms of fouling were also 
toxic. The result was an increase in hazards associated with certain tasks. 
Knock-on effects are concerned with disturbances spreading to affect other units. 
They include: 
The heat exchangers not only heated the injection water, they also cooled 
equipment on other units. Losing control of water flow could have had widespread 
consequences over the whole plant. 
• The water was drawn from the sea below the platform. Divers often worked in the 
intake area. Failure to perform correct pump isolations could have had serious 
consequences for the divers. 
• The layout of oil platforms was such that units were stacked on top of each other 
and in close proximity. On the Water Injection Unit chemical spills could have 
contaminated a number of units that were situated below. 
Recovery from incidents was possible through some of the routine tasks performed. 
These included the operators routine unit walk about and the routine monitoring of 
equipment and process conditions. In addition the control system on the unit included 
a number of alarms and trips that alerted the operators to problems, or automatically 
shut down equipment possibly starting stand-by items where they were available. 
Summary. 
This study has developed the idea of a near miss reporting system using a task 
inventory based on unit objectives to ensure the potential consequences of all possible 
activities on that unit are covered. It has shown how assessing the potential 
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consequences of failure can include the long term and knock on effects. These are 
very important to consider as they introduce latent failures into systems. 
5.3 Conclusions. 
Near miss reporting has a great potential to provide data for use in human factors 
studies based on actual operations because the events occur frequently and they 
involve a large human influence in their causation and mitigation. Many companies 
have developed reporting systems but most have taken a rather simplistic approach 
and have major problems with people unable to complete reports because they can not 
identify near misses when they occur and unwilling to complete reports because they 
fear recriminations or do not see the benefit. 
This thesis concludes that near miss reporting is best considered as a living risk 
assessment exercise. A simple task inventory would be developed first. This would 
highlight critical areas and provide evidence to backup assumptions and observations 
made in reports. The reports would then be used to prove the facts included in the 
inventory and verify assumptions. Over time the inventory would become a great 
source of data concerning the operation of a plant that could provide much data for 
use in human factors studies. 
Chapter 6. 
Incident Investigations as a Source of 
Human Factors Data. 
6.1 Introduction. 
An incident is an event or situation that causes, or has the potential to cause, loss. 
This includes all accidents and near misses. Investigation is a method that allows an 
incident to be described and assessed so that causes can be identified and 
appropriate preventative strategies can be determined. 
Accident prevention is a management function and the occurrence of any incident is a 
symptom of management failure [Ferry 1988]. Incident investigation has an 
important reactive purpose, so that lessons can be learnt, and proactive purpose, so 
that future design and operation can be improved [CCPS 1992]. 
Investigation is both a science and an art ([Ferry  19881 and [CCPS 1992]). It 
demands special techniques and disciplines and relies on a background of experience 
and "acquired intuition" [Ferry 1988]. It benefits from a structured approach that 
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incorporates accident causation theory in a way that ensures all the causes of an 
incident are identified, practical recommendations are made, and appropriate action is 
taken [CCPS 1992]. Such an approach should identify all direct and indirect causes. 
Regulations concerning the quality of incident investigation tend to be vague. To 
comply with them requires a minimum of effort. Even where companies go beyond 
the requirements, many investigations fail to result in improved safety [Hendrick and 
Benner 19871. This represents a wasted opportunity to learn from some very 
expensive mistakes. 
6.1.1 Practical Aspects of Incident Investigation. 
The first priority at an incident scene is to make it safe. Once this has been achieved 
the investigation can commence. Evidence can disappear quickly and efforts should 
be made to preserve and protect it. 
The first task is to identify what evidence can actually be collected. A list of people 
who may have been involved should be compiled. The scene should be surveyed for 
damage and movement of items. This can be recorded on sketches and photographs. 
Copies of records, written and those stored on computers or other data storage 
devices, should be collected that may explain what was happening at the time of the 
incident. 
Many different people are likely to have information that is useful to the investigation. 
They can rarely be forced to pass this information on so they should be treated 
carefully and helped through interviews [DNV 19931. Although witnesses should be 
interviewed separately they should have the opportunity to be accompanied by a 
safety representative if they wish [Ridley 19901. 
Investigation findings should be based on the evidence collected, as far as is possible 
[King 1990]. All the facts uncovered should be recorded, even if their role in the 
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incident is unclear, in case further conclusions can be drawn at a later date [Kletz 
19881. Hypothesis, however, is a key component in incident investigation. It is 
important to identify what assumptions have been made and where more than one 
possible explanation exists they should be included [King 1990]. 
6.1.2 Providing Human Factors Data. 
The information above describes how investigations should be conducted. It does not 
give any indication about the likely human factors content of any investigation report. 
If an incident is considered serious enough to warrant a full investigation it would 
seem reasonable that this would be a good opportunity to identify human factors 
issues. Paradies suggests, however, that this is not always the case because of the way 
investigations are carried out [Paradies 1991]. In particular the following problems 
are experienced: 
investigators have had little or no human factors or incident investigation training, 
there is no company guidance concerning the responsibility and authority of the 
investigator, 
• there is no common understanding of the goal of the investigation, 
• the focus of investigations is limited by failing to consider multiple causes, 
• the focus remains on identifying guilty parties so they can be punished rather than 
finding true causes of problems. 
In addition investigations are often carried out, or at least led, by company mangers. 
There is some doubt that they are able to appreciate the part they play in accident 
investigation and lack "the integrity to face the fact that their decisions can be 
responsible for situations workers have to face years later" [Metzgar 1990]. 
To overcome these problems investigation techniques have been developed that 
enable personnel to perform more insightful investigation, without excessive training, 
that allow them to pinpoint more accurately root causes of human performance 
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problems [Paradies et al 1992]. Despite these efforts it has been found that the 
available techniques are not widely used, mainly because little guidance exists to help 
investigators choose the most appropriate accident model and investigation 
methodology for their requirements [Benner 1985]. 
This chapter is a study of how incident investigations are, or could be, carried out to 
identify what data may be provided for use in human factors studies. It starts with a 
survey of investigation techniques that have been developed and then examines the 
results of actual incident investigations. 
6.2 Incident Investigation Techniques. 
Appendix 4 describes some techniques that have been developed to aid the 
investigation of incidents. They seem to fall into three basic categories: procedures 
that guide people to conduct investigations in an efficient and productive manner, 
techniques that allow information resulting from an investigation to be organised to 
aid analysis, and analysis techniques that allow the causes of incidents to be 
determined. 
6.2.1 Incident Investigation Procedures. 
The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) methodology and the ILCI technique 
both cover the practicalities of incident investigation. The aim is to maximise the 
usefulness of the information collected, minimise the effort required and ensure the 
quality of investigations is consistent. 
The NRC methodology has been developed specifically for the investigation of 
incidents involving human error. The basic assumption is that operators are rarely 
totally at fault and there are "many contributory or causal factors that can be corrected 
to reduce the probability of human error." The findings from investigations carried out 
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using this methodology suggest that inadequate procedures, communication, training 
and equipment labelling are the most significant contributors to incidents [West et al 
1991]. Little mention is made of management and organisational failures indicating 
that this methodology alone does little to aid the identification of the root causes of 
incidents and human error. 
The ILCI technique is based on the ILCI Loss Causation Model described in Chapter 
2. The instructions focus primarily on the practical aspects of gathering information 
and evidence through examination of the accident scene and interviewing witnesses. 
Human error is not covered explicitly and little guidance is given concerning root 
cause identification. 
6.2.2 Techniques for Organising Information. 
Events and Causal Factors (E&CF) charting and Sequentially Timed Event Plotting 
(STEP) both provide mechanisms by which information, uncovered during an 
incident investigation, can be organised and graphically represented. For both 
techniques charts are used to show the events that took place and how they were 
linked. The first task is to define the end and beginning state of everything and 
everybody involved in the incident. Events are then added to the chart at the 
appropriate place between the start and end. The chart is only complete when all 
changes in state between the beginning and end are understood ensuring there are no 
gaps in knowledge and that events are represented in the correct part of the incident 
sequence. 
E&CF focuses on primary events which are those that led directly to a loss or 
potential loss situation. Events are assumed to occur in sequence and information 
about contributory factors is then included to show why those events took place. 
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STEP only allows information to be included on the chart as an event. Some of these 
may have occurred far in the past, such as at the design stage. The columns on the 
chart represent time and there is a row for each actor. This means events can be 
represented as they actually occurred which is likely to include many in parallel and 
overlapping. The resulting chart is a clear plot of what actually happened during the 
incident. A large proportion of the events plotted are likely to be human actions. The 
chart indicates why people did what they did and what the consequences were. 
The Causal Tree Method (CTM) is used to chart a sequence of primary events but in 
this case the analysis starts from the end state and works backwards. The events that 
had to occur to allow the primary events to occur are then incorporated. The result is a 
simplified fault tree. Each event charted is then checked to ensure that they actually 
explain how the incident took place. 
None of these techniques has been developed to produce directly a list of root causes 
and appropriate recommendations. They do, however, ensure a structured approach is 
maintained at all stages of investigation and can be used with any other technique that 
is considered appropriate. An additional feature is that the output from E&CF, STEP 
and CTM all provide a rather neat alternative to text descriptions of incidents. 
Information that may form tens of pages in a report can be included in a single 
diagram. 
6.2.3 Incident Investigation Techniques That Encourage Analysis. 
The ultimate aim of investigation is to uncover the reasons why an incident took place 
so that appropriate action can be taken to rectify any deficiencies. No technique can 
lead to miraculously improved incident investigations and the quality will always 
depend on the training and experience of the people involved. Certain techniques have 
been developed, however, that encourage investigators to consider wider issues 
involved in incidents than may at first be obvious. 
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Management Oversight and Risk Tree (MORT) uses a logic tree with AND and OR 
gates connecting branches that lead from a causal factor to the set of root causes and 
contributory factors. It was developed to provide a disciplined procedure that 
presented results in a highly visible, easily understood format. Early trials of MORT 
highlighted the role of management actions in incident causation. The use of the trees 
was considered successful because they led investigators to identify twice the number 
of contributory factors than were usual from investigations carried out following 
traditional approaches. 
Root Cause Analysis (RCA) is similar to MORT but uses a decision tree to guide 
investigators. As investigators work down the tree they have to decide at each node the 
most appropriate branch to follow. Each run through the tree results in the 
identification of one root cause. Repeat runs are carried out if a node suggests there is 
more than one appropriate branch. The tree is divided into equipment and human 
factors. The human factors section is much larger to account for the fact that most 
causal factors, even equipment problems, have their origin in human error. 
The Technique Operations Review (TOR) uses an analysis sheet of eight operational 
failures. For each there is a list of guide words and phrases that lead investigators to 
consider management oversights and omissions. Each guide word or phrase includes a 
list of others to be considered. The investigator is encouraged to consider a wide range 
of different factors but in TOR, unlike MORT and RCA, the analysis is not directed 
down a single path and can encompass causes from all aspects of operation. 
MORT, RCA and TOR should all encourage investigators to consider the root causes 
of incidents, especially the management and organisational failures. Like all multiple-
choice exercises, however, there is a finite number of possibilities. This is not a 
problem if they are simply used to promote discussion. In practice it may be tempting 
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for investigators to simply produce a list of short root cause descriptions directly from 
the tree or work sheet that may not have practical applications. 
Kletz's "layer" [Hollywell and Whittingham 19941 approach is different to the 
techniques above in that it does not include any key words or standard phrases to be 
considered during an investigation. Instead investigators are encouraged to look at 
incidents and consider prevention strategies at three different levels. This technique is 
based on a rather simplistic view of events occurring in sequence and relies more 
heavily on the knowledge of the investigators than MORT, RCA and TOR. It is, 
however, a flexible approach to incident analysis and may be easier to incorporate into 
company safety management systems than some of the other investigation techniques. 
6.2.4 Summary. 
All of the techniques described encourage discipline in incident investigation. The 
aim is to increase the amount of evidence available, improve the quality of findings 
and conclusions included in the report, ensure appropriate recommendations are made 
to improve safety, and to encourage more consistency between investigations and 
investigators. It is not clear, however, to what extent these techniques are able to 
ensure the provisions of data for use in human factors studies. The only conclusive 
proof would be from examining investigation reports. 
Incident investigation is carried out to find out, as far as possible, what happened and 
why. This should be of more value, for providing data, than just reporting incidents. 
Techniques can be useful tools for investigators to use but they are not able to control 
how investigations are actually carried out. The quality of the investigation report, and 
the data provided will always rely on the skill, experience, knowledge and 
imagination of the investigators and how individuals are able to work as a team. 
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6.3 Published Incident Investigation Reports. 
Section 6.2 has described some theoretical approaches to incident investigation. Most 
of the publications from where these were obtained lacked examples of how they 
would be used in practice. In this section actual incident investigation reports, 
published in open literature, are examined. 
The first set of reports come from major accident inquiries. The accidents concerned 
had such severe consequences that high profile action was demanded. Large resources 
were expended to ensure an accurate and fair assessment of what happened was 
produced so that appropriate action could be taken. 
The second set of reports come from the Loss Prevention Bulletin. This is a plentiful 
source of reports that are published by companies so that others can learn from their 
experiences. It may be considered as an indication of how companies handle their 
incident investigations. 
6.3.1 The Reports of Some Recent Major Accident Inquiries. 
Appendix 5 is a summary of five major accident inquiry reports published in recent 
years by UK regulatory authorities. Although there is no indication that any particular 
method of investigation has been used it is interesting to note that a common format 
has emerged. This format has six main elements: 
identification of the "fatal" errors which led directly to the accident, 
factors that made the occurrence of these fatal errors more likely, 
system characteristics that contributed to an increased probability of the accident 
taking place, 
factors that contributed to the severity of the accident's consequences, 
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the identification of near misses and sources of information that should have 
alerted the company to the fact that they had major safety problems, 
management failures that allowed unsafe situations to develop. 
It is apparent that investigation reports compiled to such a format should provide data 
suitable for use in human factors studies. In addition each of the reports ends with an 
extensive list of recommendations aimed at not only preventing similar accidents 
from recurring but also at improving safety throughout the industry concerned. 
Fatal Errors. 
The errors, identified by the accident inquiries, that were among the direct causes of 
the accidents, and the factors that made them more likely, are listed in Table 5.1. 
Inquiry Fatal Error Factors making error more likely 
Piper Alpha Failure to secure flange leak Technician not told of change to maintenance 
tight. plan. 
Starting pump A. Operator not told of ongoing work. 
No visible clues at pump control. 
Allied Colloids Incorrect chemical Mis-classification of oxidising agent. 
segregation. Store keepers not trained in importance of 
segregation. 
Starting oxy-store, instead of Control panels adjacent and similar. 
warehouse, heating system. Oxy-store system supposed to have been 
disconnected. 
Hickson & Applying heat to vessel. Desire to aid cleaning without information 
Welch about residue components. 
Failing to control heating. Operators unaware of control system 
inadequacies. 
Clapham Incorrect rewiring. Habitual errors due to poor training and 
Junction supervision over many years. 
Uncharacteristic errors caused by fatigue. 
Herald of free Leaving bow doors open. Asst. Bosun asleep and missed tannoy call. 
Enterprise 
Leaving port with doors Master required to be on bridge before 
open. departure where there is no indication door 
condition. 
Table 5.1 Summary of Fatal Errors Identified in Inquiry Reports. 
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The inquiry reports make no attempt to hide the identity of people whose failures 
caused major losses but they do show that most occurred because of reasons beyond 
the individuals' control such as poor communication of plant conditions, inadequate 
training, lack of information about system deficiencies, situations involving 
competing priorities and the stress of work that led people to make uncharacteristic 
errors. 
Contributory Factors. 
The characteristics of the system that contributed to the accident probability and 
severity of consequences are listed in Table 5.2. 
Inquiry Contributory Factors. 
Increasing probability Increasing severity 
Piper "Pump B" failed because of hydrate Fire water pumps on manual control 
Alpha formation caused by unusual whenever divers working. 
operating conditions. This prompted The scale of the accident beyond that 
the Operator to deisolate and start ever envisaged. No adequate 
"Pump A" evacuation plan available. 
Allied Logistics department responsible for One of two fire doors always left open 
Colloids store but personnel training did not effectively halving fire resistance of 
cover chemical hazardous properties. oxy-store. 
No sprinklers or fire water. 
Hickson & Vessel used for many years without Position and design of buildings led to 
Welch cleaning. Operation changed and people being trapped. 
cleaning then required. 
Clapham Supervision and testing of signalling Old carriage design increased forces 
Junction rewiring not carried out as required to the passengers were subjected to in 
ensure safety. crash. 
Herald of Ship not designed for Zeebrugge Unstable design of ship increased 
free requiring draught adjustments for speed of capsize and reduced chance of 
Enterprise 
loading, escape. 
No method available for ensuring ship 
had safe draught when leaving port. 
No indication of bow door condition 
on ship's bridge.  
Table 5.2 Contributory Factors 
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The inquiries have identified the events preceding the accident that forced people into 
performing unsafe acts and the reasons why the resulting situations could not be 
recovered before great loss was experienced. 
Failure to Take Opportunities to Improve Safety. 
Each of the inquiries were able to identify that the companies' management should 
have known they had safety problems. The information they overlooked and reasons 
why are listed in Table 5.3. 
Inquiry Near Misses and Other Management failures 
Information 
Piper Previous incidents highlighting Policies were set but never checked to 
Alpha potential problems with handover ensure they had the desired affect on 
procedures, permits-to-work, fire improving safety. 
fighting capabilities and evacuation of The was no ownership of safety 
platforms. problems. 
Allied Need for segregation of chemicals People given responsibilities they were 
Colloids involved well known for many years. unqualified to perform. 
A similar incident had been No clear safety policy. 
experienced on the site. No individual responsibility for safety. 
Hickson Explosive properties of chemicals Reorganisation of the company led to 
& Welch involved well known for many years. problems within the management. 
A similar incident had been Management slow to react to safety 
experienced at another of the problems highlighted to them. 
company's sites. 
Clapham Similar incidents had highlighted Reorganisation caused many problems. 
Junction problems with design, testing and Management failed to communicate 
training within the company's safe methods of work. 
signalling department. 
individual had overall responsibility 
for projects. 
Criticality not considered when 
organising work. 
Herald of Tannoy calls missed on many Profitability was the main focus for 
free occasions, management. 
Enterprise Previous incidents where the Failed to issue reasonable instructions. 
company's ships had left port with their Did not listen to qualified staff's safety 
bow doors open. concerns. 
Failed to consider implications of 
changing work patterns. 
Table 5.3 Failure to Take Opportunities to Improve Safety. 
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In each case the accidents came as a complete surprise to the company management 
as they felt they had good control of safety. The inquiries have shown that if the 
managers had looked for safety problems they would have found them and then action 
could have been taken to prevent these accidents. 
Recommendations. 
The recommendations made in the inquiry reports are summarised in Table 5.4. 















Improve emergency response V 
Monitor safety performance V V V V 
Minimize hazards v 
Improved leadership in an 
emergency 
V 
Improve permits-to-work and 
safe systems of work 
V V 
Improve understanding of 
hazards 
V V 
Improve safety policies V 
Improve methods of company 
reorganisation 
V V V 
Include safety when setting 
priorities  
V V 
Improve employee training V V 
Individuals and management 
to take responsibility  
V V V 
Improve building design  
Reduce pressure of work on 
employees 
V V 
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Inquiry Recommendations Piper Allied Hickson Clapham Herald of 
Alpha Colloids & Welch Junction Free 
Enterprise 
Learn and communicate V V 
lessons from incidents 
Specific hardware V 
modifications 
Table 5.4 Inquiry Recommendations. 
Most of the recommendations made were common to more than one of the inquiry 
reports. Few technical problems were tackled and instead they concentrated on 
changes to systems, organisation and management. This is the type of approach most 
human factors theory suggests is the most effective way of improving safety. If all 
incidents were investigated in a similar way companies would collect much data that 
could be used in human factors studies. 
6.3.2 The Loss Prevention Bulletin (LPB). 
The Loss Prevention Bulletin is published six times per year by the IChemE. 
Companies are invited to submit incident investigation reports that they think may be 
useful to others. Before publication the reports are made anonymous. 
18 incident investigation reports were reviewed from a selection of eight issues of the 
LPB. These were examined to determine how they covered the human factors issues. 
Table 5.5 shows which of the reports included information about: 
human errors, 
factors that made errors more likely, 
contributory factors increasing the likelihood or consequence of accidents, 
• sources of information that should have warned companies of possible safety 
problems, 
• management failures. 








R a 44 
No. LPB Issue I Article Title U U 
117 / Accident when fitting a new operating 
mechanism to a live valve 
2 
117 / Acid line break 
117 / An accident due to a poor vent system 
119 / Explosion in large spray dryer V 
119/ Chemical burn injury 
6 
120 / Chlorine combustion incident  
122 / Packed column fire I' V 
8 
122 / Chemical exposure kills 5 people V V 
' 
122 / Analysis of failure of two CO2 regenerator V i' V 
towers 
10 
122 / Monomer stability near miss V 
11 
123 / Rupture of a liquid nitrogen storage vessel V V 
12 




125 / Catastrophic failure of a liquid CO2 storage V 
vessel 
14 
126/ Acrylic acid runaway 
15126 I Explosion of substation due to inadequately V 
tightened pump seal 
16 
126 / Oil mill explosion V V 
17 
128 / High pressure rupture V V V V V 
18 
128 / Major detergent spill V V V 
Table 5.5 Investigation Reports From the LPB. 
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The lack of ticks in Table 5.5 suggests that the human factors content of the reports 
published in the LPB is considerably less than that of major accident inquiry reports. 
This is confirmed by the fact that most of the recommendations made in the reports 
are of a technical nature. If the LPB is a true reflection of the quality of company 
incident investigation it would suggest that most would not be able to use their 
investigation reports to provide data for use in human factors studies. It seems likely, 
however, that the changes made to reports to make them anonymous involves 
removing much of the useful detail. It may also be more a reflection of the views of 
LPB editorial team concerning accident causation than those of operating companies. 
6.3.3 Summary. 
All the major accident inquiry reports clearly described human errors that had directly 
caused the accidents and identified who had committed them. This did not mean those 
people were being blamed as in every case conditions and circumstances were 
identified that made those errors more likely or even inevitable. This information 
would be useful for identifying human error types and the factors that influence 
human reliability. Only half the LPB reports examined included any mention of 
human errors and only half of those included information about why the errors had 
occurred. 
All the major accident inquiry reports included detailed information about events 
leading up to the accident and why the consequences realised were so severe. Such 
information would be useful when considering accident causation. Less than half the 
LPB reports included details about such factors. 
All the major inquiry reports identified previous incidents and other sources of 
information that should have warned companies they had safety problems. The 
reports also listed multiple management failures that explained why the warnings 
were not listened to or acted upon. This information would give a good insight into 
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the root causes of accidents and how a company deals with their safety issues. Less 
than a third of the LPB reports included details about how a company should have 
known they had safety problems and only one specific management failure is 
described. 
The recommendations made in the major accident inquiry reports were aimed at 
system, organisation and management improvements. They were relevant to all 
organisations. The recommendations in the LPB reports tended to focus on technical 
details so their relevance was limited to companies who used the same materials, 
equipment or processes. 
If companies are able to investigate their incidents in a similar fashion to major 
accident inquiries they should be able to collect much data useful to human factors 
studies. If they really conduct them in the fashion indicated by the reports included in 
the LPB the amount of data available will be much less. It seems most likely that 
company incident investigation reports will be of a quality somewhere between these 
two extremes. 
6.4 Company Incident Investigation Reports. 
This has been the most difficult section in this thesis to write because most companies 
are loathe to distribute their incident investigation reports to external organisations. 
Four companies did agree to contribute a small selection of their investigation reports. 
Some of their personnel were also interviewed. Although this can not be considered 
as a representative sample of how incident investigations are carried out throughout 
the process industry it gives an indication of how actual practices may compare with 
some of the theory. 
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6.4.1 Investigation Methods Used. 
All of the companies had a basic procedure that explained who should do what during 
an investigation. There were plenty of similarities between the investigation reports 
examined. Most included a description of the incident and how the investigation was 
carried out, a list of the findings of the investigation with respect to immediate and 
direct causes, and some recommendations. The differences between the companies 
are probably more interesting. 
• One company used cause tree analysis for some their investigations where the 
causes of an incident were not entirely clear. Another company had found cause 
trees to be so useful they insisted one was included in every investigations report. 
• One report included an Events and Causal Factors chart. The incident had been 
quite serious and a consultancy company had been commissioned to produce the 
chart. 
One of the companies included a process description as a background to an 
incident. 
One of the companies included a list of conditions preceding an incident. 
One of the companies included a list, with times, of all relevant events leading up 
to and during an incident. 
• One of the companies made it clear that an investigation team could only make 
recommendations. Immediate actions to make a site safe were decided upon by the 
supervisor of the area where an incident occurred. Further recommendations 
became actions only after the senior management team had reviewed the 
investigation report. These actions could include a further investigation if it was 
felt the report was incomplete. 
• One of the companies trained their personnel in Change Analysis, Barrier Analysis 
and Events and Causal Factors charting. Although none of the report examined 
showed any evidence of the use of these techniques they would be used during the 
investigation of more serious incidents. 
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Of all the techniques available to companies to aid their incident investigations only 
Cause Tree Analysis was used regularly by the companies who contributed to this 
study, although some of the more complicated techniques were used for more serious 
incidents. Some of the companies were listing preceding conditions and events in 
their investigation reports. They may have found E&CF or STEP charts of use during 
the actual investigations. 
6.4.2 Review of Actual Reports. 
12 investigation reports were collected. Each has been examined and the details that 
may be relevant to the collection of data for use in human factors data are summarised 
below. For the words underlined the following is indicated: 
• superscript 1 a human error, 
• superscript 2 a factor that made error more likely, 
• superscript 3 a factor that made the incident more likely or consequences more 
severe, 
• superscript 4 mention of a previous incident or a source of information that should 
have warned of safety problems, 
superscript 5 a specific management failure. 
Incident 1. Defective Hand Tool Slips and Causes Cut. 
Operator chose defective tool' but had little chance of knowing it was defective 
because he was unfamiliar with the job and had to work in darkness 2. Access was 
awkward and non-defective tools did not actually work much better. The investigation 
found that a number of unreported near misses had occurred previously 4 . 
Action was taken to remove any defective tools. All others were tagged so their 
condition could be inspected regularly. A "Guide" was fitted to make the use of the 
tool easier and a light was installed at the job site. 
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Incident 2. Fall From Tank Roof, Near-Miss. 
A person went to use some equipment, it moved unexpectedly, he lost his balance and 
nearly fell. The investigation found that during the previous shift the equipment had 
been unbolted for removal. A crane was not available, the equipment was replaced to 
cover the hole at its mounting but it was not bolted down'. The permit-to-work was 
signed off but no record was made that the equipment had been left in an unsafe 
condition'. A previous incident had suggested that equipment left in an unsafe state 
should be tagged accordingly 4. No action had been taken. 
The investigation found that the company procedures did not cover the eventuality of 
equipment left in an unsafe condition  and the permit-to-work system was unclear 
about when ajob was actually finished. In addition lighting at the top of tank was poor 
so it would have been difficult for the operator to see what condition the equipment 
was in3 . 
Action was taken to implement a new procedure to cover such situations including a 
tagging system to warn of unsafe equipment. The permit-to-work system was 
reviewed. 
Incident 3. Gas Leak. 
Temporary equipment was set up and it provided a route for the leak. The 
investigation found that a procedure had been issued but not followed' because it 
would have affected other parts of the operation 2. The procedure had not been fully 
considered at the planning stage of the work  and the people on the site had been 
under pressure to minimise production down-time 2 . 
Action was taken to ensure that all tasks were considered to decide if they were 
routine or non-routine operations so that appropriate instructions could be issued, a 
single person was to take overall responsibility for each job. The planning of such 
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work had to include a safety meeting with all people involved present. Management 
was to reiterate that safety had the highest priority and no procedure was to be 
deviated from without approval. Fitting of temporary equipment was to be considered 
a plant change and the usual assessment process was to be followed. And people were 
to be trained in safety assessment. 
Incident 4. Release of Untreated Effluent to Drain. 
Operators started a process with the effluent control in manual'. The Operator on the 
previous shift had failed to log or communicate verbally the control status 2 . A similar 
incident had occurred previously from which the proposed action was to fit 
interlocks 4. This had never actually been done. 
The investigation report criticised management for failing to ensure the lessons learnt 
from incidents were implemented  and for the poor control of manual operations 5 that 
led to the breakdown of communication. 
Action was taken to fit the interlocks. Management were informed of the incident to 
highlight the need for ensuring required equipment and system changes were actually 
carried out. Operators were informed of the incident to highlight the need for 
improved logging of events. A log book auditing system was also implemented. 
Incident 5. Cut Head. 
A person descended a ladder. At the third step he crossed to a platform'. He hit his 
head on a beam. The investigation found that such a manoeuvre would have been safe 
if the beam had not been there. As the person was carrying out an electrical systems 
check the lights were out  and he had not seen the beam. 
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Moving the ladder or the beam was considered but as this task was carried out very 
infrequently it was thought to be unnecessary. Action was taken to erect a warning 
sign. 
Incident 6. Fire. 
Whilst shutting down a furnace a cloud of flammable gas built up inside the 
combustion chamber. The Operator was unable to close a manual valve  because of a 
buildup of smoke in the area. The investigation found a combination of inadequate 
procedures, equipment design and a valve failure. The action taken to cut off the fuel 
supply introduced air to the system and caused a brief fire. 
Action was taken to improve the procedure, possible equipment change was 
considered and the condition of the valve was checked. Modifications were made after 
a furnace specialist had been consulted. 
Incident 7. Operators Splashed by Corrosive Chemical. 
On opening a valve a leak occurred because of a loose flange and/or the failure of the 
valve. The Operator was wearing full safety equipment which protected him well. 
Another Operator came to help and, although only receiving a minor exposure, was 
injured3 . The investigation found that new gaskets that had been introduced fairly 
recently were not being installed correctly' because maintenance staff were not aware 
of the changed 12rocedure 2. The valves were suitable for the corrosive duty but the 
fittings were not 1 as they were not covered in the purchasing specification 2. And a.. 
similar incident had occurred previously 4 , involving different corrosive liquid. The 
only action taken had been to replace the actual valve that had failed. 
Action was taken to survey all valves and their fittings that were in a corrosive duty. 
All flange bolts were checked. And purchasing specifications were reviewed. 
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Incident 8. Damaged Equipment. 
A safety device had been overridden' during previous non-standard work that allowed 
equipment to move beyond its safety threshold. The investigation found that the 
incident occurred during the operator's meal break, his Supervisor, who although 
qualifiedlacked recent practice. 2 was covering but a handover had not been carried 
out 2 .A number of similar incidents had occurred previously 4 caused by a lack of 
training concerning handovers and the use of overrides. 
Action was taken to amend procedures so that approval was required to use the 
override. The override was modified so that it was "fail-safe." The operation of all 
similar equipment was checked. And all other potentially hazardous operations were 
reviewed. 
Incident 9. Suspected Runaway Reaction. 
One component of the reaction was not added because its loading valve had tripped 
and had not been reset' because the alarm had not been noticed. A high temperature 
was reached in the reactor because a bypass was open to fulfil the requirements for 
other parts of the process  but no extra cooling had been provided' because the 
Operator did not think it was necessary. 
The investigation found that conflicting procedures had been issued for this particular 
operation and that the Operator had made his own decision about which was the 
correct one to follow without getting confirmation from his superiors. 
Action was taken to ensure the procedures were correct and relevant. The Operator 
was told that in future in such a situation he should not make decisions alone. 
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Incident 10. Fire. 
Maintenance work introduced air into pipework' in which residual hydrocarbon 
remained. The investigation found that therisks of the job had not been fully 
considered3 and the decision to maintain production during this work was flawed 3 . 
Action was taken to implement job safety analysis and train all personnel who were 
responsible for identifying hazards. Management's responsibility to ensure all risks 
were identified and controlled was reinforced. 
Incident 11. Flammable Gas Leak. 
Problems were experienced when attempting to start a piece of equipment. A fault 
with the trip system was suspected and the parts were replaced. These parts, however, 
were of an old design and very poorly marked  and in the event the wrong parts were 
fitted'. Because the operators thought they had fixed the problem with the trip system 
they assumed there must be another fault. Their actions taken to discover the fault led 
to the gas leak. 
The investigation found that the only way of knowing if the trip systems was working 
was to perform a full function check. This was not included in the procedure  so it 
was not carried out. It also found that the conditions of work were dark and noisy, 
people had not been trained in fault finding 2, technical information was difficult to get 
and there was pressure to return the equipment to service 3 . 
Action was taken to train maintenance staff in fault finding. Technical information 
was made more readily available. And the permit-to-work system was reviewed to 
ensure it covered such operations. 
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Incident 12. Fall From Ladder. 
A person was carrying documents', he lost his balance and fell. The investigation 
found that this ladder was the only suitable access to the room  in question without 
the person entering a restricted area and people often had to carry documents and 
pieces of equipment 3 . 
Action was taken to improve access to the room. 
Summary. 
Most of the investigation reports examined included reference to at least one human 
error that was a direct cause of the incidents. Most also included information about 
factors that made error more likely. Most reports made reference to contributory 
factors, less than half included information that should have warned a company they 
had safety problems and only one included mention of specific management failures. 
6.4.3 Interviewees' Comments. 
The assessment of investigation reports gives a good indication of what data may be 
available for use in human factors studies. Some of the comments made in interviews 
may suggest some limitations. 
Most of the people interviewed felt that they were able to criticise management in 
incident reports but sometimes only to a limited extent. Comments included: 
• Incriminating details could be included if it was deserved. Speculation about 
incident causes could not be stated, as that may be taken as an admission of guilt, 
although it could be hinted at with care! 
• Management were happy to take their responsibility for incidents but seemed 
unable to actually learn. The same management failures seemed to recur regularly. 
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• Management were not prepared to comment on management failures. They felt 
their only responsibility, when reviewing investigation reports, was to approve 
what had already been said. 
As far as methods of investigation go: 
Care must be taken to avoid following only one path of events and causes. This is 
why causal trees were considered so useful. 
• The more sophisticated methods involving suggested words and phrases were of 
little use as it was difficult to fit actual incidents into the classifications. The 
classification process alone had no benefit. 
• Avoiding blame is not the same as ignoring errors and violations. If people did 
something wrong others need to know about it, then appropriate action can be 
taken to avoid such situations in the future. 
• Most incidents involved a number of root causes. Only about 10% of these were 
under the control of the individuals who were actually involved, however, this did 
mean that individuals generally had made some contribution to the causes which 
could not be ignored. 
Finally it was generally agreed that were no new causes of incidents. There are only 
three things that can fail on a plant; people, equipment and systems and a list of about 
20 causes would cover most incidents. As such, during investigations identifying 
causes is relatively straightforward, the difficult part is identifying how they interacted 
and how that led to the failures observed. 
6.5 Conclusions. 
Incidents are unwanted events and investigation is an expensive process. If it is 
decided that an incident warrants an investigation all efforts should be made to learn 
as much about what happened as possible so that the greatest potential benefits can be 
achieved. Various techniques have been developed to aid this process by ensuring that 
information is collected in an efficient manner, facts and assumptions are arranged in 
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a logical order so that they explain what happens and gaps in knowledge are 
identified, and by guiding investigators to consider root causes. 
Finding examples of actual incident investigation reports is actually quite difficult. 
This thesis has examined some major accidents inquiry reports. These accidents were 
investigated by publicly appointed bodies with great resources and power to ensure an 
accurate and fair assessment of what happened was made so that recommendations 
could be made that would have the maximum benefit for the improvement of safety 
throughout the industry concerned. There is no evidence that any particular 
investigation techniques were used but the reports examined did appear to have a 
common format. Examination of the reports showed that the format used could 
provide much data for use in human factors studies. 
This thesis also examined investigation reports published in the Loss Prevention 
Bulletin. These were not so successful at identifying the human factors involved in 
incidents and tended to concentrate on technical issues. If the LPB is a fair example of 
how companies investigate their accidents the conclusion is that they will not be able 
to collect much data for use in human factors studies. If on the other hand this is a sign 
that companies are not prepared to publish the full details of their investigation reports 
it confirms that companies can really only learn about human factors from their own 
experiences. 
Finally a study was conducted to determine how companies actually investigate 
incidents. Causal Tree analysis was the only investigation technique that was used 
with any frequency although more sophisticated methods were sometimes used for 
the more serious incidents. The investigation reports examined showed that they 
usually included information about human errors that had directly caused incidents 
and the reasons why those errors had occurred. Some reports included information 
about factors that contributed to the likelihood or severity of consequences of the 
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incident. Few references were made to the information available to companies to warn 
them that they had safety problems and although the errors committed by those at the 
sharp end of incidents were clearly identified those committed by management were 
recorded very rarely. 
Companies do not seem to be prepared to record where their management fail. The 
result is that the lessons from incidents, both within and outside a company, do not 
result in permanent improvements in safety. The failure to learn about the root causes 
of human error and accident causation mean that the same causes of incidents 
continually recur. The strength of incident investigation, over simple reporting, is that 
it has the potential to include thorough assessment of what happened and why. At the 
moment companies do not seem to be reaching this potential because they do not 
recognise, appreciate or record the root causes of the human factors and other safety 
problems they experience. 
Chapter 7. 
Information Used at Handover as a Source 
of Human Factors Data, 
7.1 Introduction. 
Handover is the process of communication that allows someone finishing work to 
pass on information about conditions and circumstances on the plant to their 
relief so that operation continues safely and efficiently, it is required whenever 
people work shifts to allow plants to operate continuously. Written logbooks and 
handover reports are used to maximise the information that can be communicated and 
it is these records that may be able to provide human factors data. 
This chapter explores the possibility of using information used at handover as a 
source of human factors data through a summary of publications documenting the 
development of handover procedures and studies where reliability data was extracted 
from logbooks, the results of a study of process company handover procedures and a 
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survey conducted on an offshore oil platform of what information people aim to 
record for use at handover and the actual contents of logbooks and handover reports. 
7.1.1 Guidance of Contents. 
Continuous operation generally involves two, or possibly three, shifts working on any 
one day meaning that a handover is required at least twice per day. The type of 
information communicated is very important to the safe and effective operation and so 
shift handover must be considered as a critical task. This has been highlighted in a 
number of accident inquiries [Adamson et al. 1995]. Despite this, little research has 
been conducted to improve handovers and guidance from the safety and human 
factors literature is scarce [Riegel 1985]. 
A study at an oil refinery [Adamson et al. 19951 examined existing handover 
procedures and, through considering communication requirements, suggested an 
improved system involving a structured logbook to aid verbal handover. In the 
logbook information about maintenance in progress, plant out of service, process 
abnormalities, safety, maintenance and technical problems, and work outstanding had 
to be recorded. Information about environmental matters, plant conditions, production 
and quality, personnel issues, external events, actions taken during the shift and 
routine activities could be included if the person writing the log considered it 
necessary. 
Other studies carried out by the nursing profession ([Baldwin and McGinnis 1994] 
and [Young et al. 1988]) make some conclusions that are useful for the process 
industry. Here written logbooks were again found to be the most useful mechanism 
for communication at handover. Information was divided into that of general interest 
to all, covered by a brief summary of activities on a ward, and specific information for 
each individual's responsibilities covered by written reports given directly to the 
relief. Historical information was recorded separately from the more recent 
Chapter 7. Information Used at Handover. 	 143 
information so that the focus at handover was on the important details of current 
status, problems and changes occurring, and significant lab and test results. 
It is interesting to note that approaches aimed at improving communication at shift 
handover are also likely to result in more extensive written records that may include 
useful human factors data. 
7.1.2 The Use of Data From Logbooks. 
No published reports have been found where human factors data has been extracted 
from information used at handover however three published papers explain how shift 
logbooks have been used in equipment reliability studies. 
Component Reliability. 
A group of companies working in offshore oil and gas production in the North Sea 
collaborated to collect equipment reliability data from operational experience to form 
a "Reliability Data Handbook" [Moss 1987]. To achieve this models were developed 
for each system, breaking them down to their constituent sub-systems and 
components. Data was collected from maintenance and operating logbooks relating to 
hours of operation and stand-by, failure events and repair time. 
It was obvious from the study that "extraction of reliability data was never envisaged 
when the record systems were introduced." In particular problems were experienced 
determining companies' component inventories, descriptions of failure and repair 
events were poor, and there appeared to be some significant differences between 
written records and personal experience. The data extraction was a difficult process 
requiring a certain amount of interpretation and expert opinion. Overall, however, the 
study was considered to be worthwhile and demonstrated that such an approach had 
potential, especially if the reliability content and accessibility of records could be 
improved. 
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Economical Operation of a Power Station. 
In another study the capacity of a power station was to be reduced and operating 
regimes had been identified that would achieve this. The aim of this study was to 
determine which was the most economical [Campbell 1987]. 
Data was extracted from shift logbooks, for the previous three years of operation, 
concerning maintenance carried out to rectify faults experienced in equipment critical 
to system reliability. This was backed up by discussion with company engineers to 
ensure an accurate assessment was made of the type of work carried out and its likely 
duration. 
Three checks were made to ensure the data elicited was appropriate for the purpose. It 
was compared with any generic data that was available for the particular items of 
equipment, it was arranged on a "Hazard plot" to show that it had an exponential 
distribution indicating random failure within reasonable confidence levels, and it was 
used to determine the reliability of the system in its current configuration to ensure the 
system model was accurate. The conclusion was that the data was generally 
applicable. 
Sensitivity analysis allowed the identification of the items which were most critical to 
system reliability and, from the study, the most appropriate operating regime could be 
chosen. 
Explaining Problems Experienced at a Power Station. 
In the third study a power station had experienced a number of reliability problems for 
some time. A study was conducted to determine how reliability could be improved. 
This involved developing a fault tree model of the system and using site specific data 
obtained from logbooks covering 29 years of operation [Galyean et al. 19891. 
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The logbooks used were all hand written hence data had to be extracted manually. It 
was classified by component type and then input to a computer database which proved 
to be a useful method of storage and manipulation. 
The reliability data was added to the fault tree. This allowed the identification of the 
major contributors to system unreliability. It was concluded that modifications made 
in recent years had improved system reliability whilst those suggested for the future 
were probably not cost effective. 
There were some concerns about the data. In particular variations in the quality of 
records were found between the individuals completing them and it was considered 
likely that the events of most interest were generally associated by a high level of 
personal stress that could lead to a lack of detail in the records. However, despite these 
concerns it was felt that the results had made a significant contribution to the 
understanding of system reliability and that the cost and effort required to collect the 
data was worthwhile. 
7.2 Review of Company Handover Policy. 
The published studies summarised above suggest that logbooks have the potential to 
provide useful reliability data. However they concentrate on equipment reliability, 
with no mention of human reliability, and highlight some potential problems. 
To determine if the handover systems actually used by companies have the potential 
to provide human factors data, a selection of policy statements and written procedures 
were obtained and studied. The findings are described below. 
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7.2.1 Who Performs Handovers? 
The information recorded in logbooks and handover reports depends on who in an 
organisation have to perform handovers. For onshore companies this is limited to 
those within the operations and maintenance departments who work shifts. This 
usually includes field operators, control room operators, maintenance technicians and 
operations and maintenance supervisors. 
Offshore operations have to be organised differently. Operations and maintenance 
personnel perform similar duties to those onshore but their work is arranged into 
"tours" of duty. Shift handovers are still required but tour handovers are also 
conducted. Platform managers, although not working shifts, do work tours so they are 
also required to complete tour handovers. 
7.2.2 How is Information Communicated and Recorded? 
Written records of information used at handover may take many forms. Some 
procedures are very prescriptive and clearly specify what must be recorded, others 
simply rely on the opinion of the individual to record what they think is important. 
Some are hand written, in a blank note book or onto pre-printed forms whilst others 
are entered onto computer files. Checks-lists are sometimes used, where items are 
ticked on completion or instrument readings are recorded. In some cases no written 
records are kept and the handover is purely verbal. 
Obviously a verbal handover with no written records can not provide any data. Hand 
written records can provide data but it is very difficult to extract. Computer files can 
store large amounts of information and "key-word searching" allows easy access. 
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7.2.3 Control of Handovers. 
Handovers are a critical part of safe operation of process plant and should be 
controlled by management. There is no industry standard so all companies have 
developed their own procedures. Some have determined best practice methods and 
implemented them at all sites. Others have allowed systems to evolve without any 
clear management of this situation and it is not uncommon for different plants on the 
same site to use different procedures. 
It is impossible to be totally prescriptive when instructing on how handovers are to be 
conducted. The quality of handovers, and associated records depends to a large extent 
on the individuals' experience and training. Training courses have been developed for 
report writing, although these are generally aimed at senior members of staff who do 
not work shifts! None of the companies asked had developed training courses 
specifically for performing handovers although some do include it in their quality 
system. Audits were performed and personnel were to be coached if improvement was 
required. 
7.2.4 Contents of Written Records Used at Shift Handover. 
A distinction is usually made between a logbook and a handover report although the 
terminology varies. The definitions commonly used are: 
• Logbook: a detailed record of events, entered as soon as possible after they have 
occurred by the person responsible for the activities in question. It is used at 
handover as a historical record of what has happened in the previous shift. 
• Handover report: written to cover the present status of the plant, the on-going 
work and operations, personnel matters and issues which could have an effect on 
the relief's job responsibilities. It highlights particular concerns, unusual and non-
routine operations and possible activities in the near future. 
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From the company procedures examined, the following information has been 
identified that is asked for or expected. 
• Operations: major activities and events occurring during the shift, operational 
status at handover, safety systems inhibits and isolations used and their current 
status, items raised during the shift requiring action and abnormal or unusual 
conditions experienced. 
Safety: information about memos, notices and procedures received and details of 
significant incidents. 
• Equipment and maintenance: details of equipment breakdowns occurring during 
shift, occurrence of planned maintenance and the status of all ongoing work, 
priorities for scheduled work and details of any permits to work issued. Materials 
ordered and received. 
• Construction projects: the status of all ongoing work, details of any problems 
experienced and notice of forthcoming work including its influence on operations 
such as shutdowns. 
Personnel: manning levels and information about individuals that may affect their 
ability to work. 
• Management: details of procedures, standing instructions and memos received 
including changes and revisions. Information about areas of special interests or 
concern. 
• General: details of visits from vendors, regulators, VIP's occurring and planned. 
7.3 What Information do People Aim to Record 
For Use At Handover? 
Although none of the published reports or company procedures specifically covered 
human factors data collection it is clear that much of the information recorded for use 
at handover concerns human activity. This includes the performance of routine and 
non-routine tasks, conditions of work, and problems and failures experienced. To 
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determine if the potential for human factors data provision existed in practice two 
studies were carried out on an off-shore oil production platform. 
As mentioned in Section 7.2.1, off-shore operations require comprehensive handover 
procedures because of their shift patterns. In addition the public inquiry of the Piper 
Alpha disaster [Cullen 19901 had been particularly critical of handover procedures in 
the North Sea. Most companies have since made major improvements. In this study 
nearly every person working on the platform had to complete some type of logbook, 
end of shift and end of tour report. This is more than most companies, especially on-
shore, so this study was considered to be a good indication of the ultimate potential of 
information used at handover to provide data for use in human factors studies. 
7.3.1 The Result of Interviews Conducted With the People Who 
Complete Logbooks and Handover Reports. 
Personnel from every main department on the platform were interviewed. They were 
asked about the logbooks and handover reports they wrote and what information they 
generally included. The results from the interviews are shown below and Figure 7.1 is 
a diagrammatic representation about how information passes around personnel on and 
off the platform. 
The Off-shore Installation Manager (OIM) was ultimately responsible for the 
safety of the platform and had to complete the official Health and Safety Executive 
(HSE) log. This included details of all incidents, visits by HSE inspectors and safety 
exercises carried out. They compiled a daily "executive summary" summarising 
major activities based on the Superintendents' reports. These were in turn summarised 
to produce a tour handover report. 
Process Operators were each responsible for a particular part of the plant. 
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affected their area of responsibility. Each entry in the logbook included the time of 
occurrence. 
Control Room Operators were responsible for completing the platform's "official 
logbook." All significant events occurring on that platform, other platforms in the 
area, the export pipelines and the on-shore refinery were recorded along with the time 
of their occurrence. A separate log sheet was used to record the use of safety system 
inhibits and overrides. At midnight a "production report" was written listing 
production rates and totals for the previous 24 hours. 
Permit Controllers maintained a list of all permits to work issued. A daily report was 
issued to the platform management listing all current permits and their status. A 
logbook was kept in which details of unusual aspects of the work carried were 
recorded. 
Laboratory Supervisors were required to record the results of all routine tests 
carried out. Details of unusual events and extraordinary tests were recorded in a 
logbook. A tour handover report was written based on a review of the logbook. 
Operations Supervisors wrote an end of shift report which was a summary of the 
relevant contents of the Control Room official log. It included an overview of 
operations during the shift, equipment status and maintenance progress, details of 
equipment shut-downs and start-ups performed and any problems encountered, and 
any extraordinary events or maintenance. Their tour handover report included details 
of all major activities, a review of all active permits to work and priorities for future 
work. 
Operations Superintendents wrote a daily summary based on the contents of the 
Control Room official log, the Operations Supervisor's report and the inhibit and 
override log kept by the Control Room Operators. A more detailed production report 
was also written, based on that written by the Control Room Operators, including a 
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summary of events that had affected production to explain unusual features of the 
figures. Their tour handover report was a summary of all major events and an 
assessment of likely activity in the near future. 
Maintenance Technicians working in a particular trade (electrical, mechanical and 
instruments) kept a log of all work carried out during a shift. The Senior Technician 
for each trade wrote a daily report of all completed and ongoing work. These were 
also used at tour handover. 
Maintenance Superintendents wrote a daily summary covering the general details 
and status of all significant maintenance work being carried out. At the beginning of 
their tour they started the tour handover report and added to it whenever a stage of 
work was completed or a significant event occurred. 
Construction Project Engineers worked for contracted companies. A daily progress 
report of all work undertaken was an important part of the contract between the 
operating and contracted companies. A weekly report was written for the companies' 
management and was used at tour handover. A logbook was used to record 
information received from the construction foremen concerning ongoing work, 
outstanding permits to work, problems experienced and unusual features of the work. 
Construction Project Superintendents worked for the operating company but had to 
co-operate closely with contractors. A daily summary of work progress was written 
with a more detailed version included in a logbook. The logbook was used at tour 
handover. 
Drilling "Toolpushers" also worked for a contract company. A very detailed report 
of all activities performed during the day was written and distributed widely 
throughout the company as an indication of how well work was progressing, 
conditions experienced in the reservoir and their effect on production. 
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Drilling Supervisors worked for the operating company. A shift log and a daily 
report were the operating company's view of how the work performed by the 
Toolpushers was progressing. A tour handover report explained the status of ongoing 
work and likely activities in the near future. 
Safety Operators wrote a shift log including a regular weather report, records of 
inspections, audits and checks of permit to work, other routine jobs performed, 
unusual conditions experienced and the operators' general observations about 
activities and conditions on the platform. A shift handover report summarised details 
of ongoing work and conditions that may have been important to the Safety Operator 
on the next shift. A tour handover report included details of any new memos and 
directives received. 
Safety Supervisors did not write their own shift logs but relied on those provided by 
Safety Operators which they reviewed and extracted details about incidents occurring, 
defects and problems experienced, safety drills and training exercises carried out, for 
a daily summary. Each day an incident summary was written and sent to the on-shore 
management. If no incidents had occurred a "nil" report was sent. A tour handover 
report summarised all incidents, significant problems and events. 
Radio Operators were responsible for monitoring and controlling a 500 metre zone 
around the platform. They kept a detailed log, with times of occurrence, of personnel 
working "over the side," vessels entering and leaving the zone, "man over board" 
drills, status of flares, use of pyrotechnics, defective equipment in the radio room, 
general plant alarms, locations of essential personnel and weather conditions. A tour 
handover book detailed all memos and directives received, other important 
information and personal comments. 
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Summary. 
This study suggests that people were aiming to record a large amount of information 
about their work and other events that have affected them during their shifts and tours. 
This included unusual features, conditions of work, problems encountered, 
instructions issued, information received, checks and audits carried out and work 
schedules. The logbooks and handover reports also provide an opportunity for people 
to record their observations and opinions, including details of likely events in the 
future. 
To determine if this apparent potential to provide human factors data could be realised 
in practice another study was carried out to determine what information is actually 
recorded in logbooks and handover reports. 
7.4 A Study of the Information of Recorded for 
Use at Handover. 
This study involved collecting all the information that had been recorded, for use at 
handovers, on the platform for a seven day period in the recent past. Each department 
was visited and copies of all the logbooks and handover reports from that period were 
taken. This resulted in a very large stack of paper (weighing 3 1 /2  kg) which was 
carefully examined to determine what information had actually been recorded about 
events occurring during the period of interest. This was then assessed for its 
pertinence to human factors studies. 
Four categories of event records were identified that may be useful for providing 
human factors data. These were records of human errors, incidents, routine tasks 
performed and the solutions to problems. Each are summarised below. 
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7.4.1 Human Errors Recorded. 
Much of the emphasis in human factors studies is on human error. In particular 
information is required about error rates and types, and the factors that make errors 
more likely. This study found ten events, recorded in the logbooks and handover 
reports, that included a human error. These are summarised below. 
Valve Mistakenly Left Closed. 
The Gas Unit Operator's logbook recorded much activity concerned with the gas 
turbines. Several attempts had been made to start 'B' machine which was returning 
from maintenance. These attempts involved adjusting, and in some cases, shutting 
down 'A' machine. 
The Instrument Technician's logbook explained how, after a total power failure on the 
platform, the 'A' machine failed to start. Hydraulic and fuel gas pressures were 
adjusted in an attempt to satisfy the instrument logic and allow the start-up but with 
no success. In the end a bypass valve was found to be fully closed. When opened one 
turn the machine operated successfully. 
It is not clear, from the records, whether the bypass valve should normally be left 
open, and it had been shut for some reason whilst the 'B' machine was being tested, or 
if it should had been opened as part of the start-up routine. Whatever the reason, the 
consequence was that a critical part of production equipment was unavailable at a 
time when it was desperately required because of the problems caused by the power 
failure. 
Valve "Inadvertently" Closed. 
The Instrument Technician's logbook recorded that they were called to open a valve 
that an operator had "inadvertently closed." The Operator's logbook described work 
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carried out on the item of equipment requiring it to be isolated for tests. It is not clear 
why the valve should not have been closed but it was obviously an error. The 
consequences included a delay in returning the equipment to service and an avoidable 
use of the Technician's time. 
Gas Leak From Newly Fitted Gasket. 
The Control Room log and Operations Supervisor's shift handover report both 
described exploratory work on an item of equipment aimed at determining the 
problems experienced with an orifice plate. This involved dismantling the orifice plate 
carrier. However before the problem could be dealt with the equipment was required 
for service. It was re-commissioned during which a "slight" gas leak was experienced 
which triggered a gas alarm. A new gasket was fitted and the equipment was 
successfully re-commissioned. 
An error had been made during the reassembly of the orifice carrier. The consequence 
in this case was a delay in returning the equipment to service however any 
hydrocarbon release on an oil platform has a serious potential. 
Part Missing From Replacement Component. 
Continuing from the problem with the orifice plate mentioned above the Platform 
Executive summary recorded that the damaged orifice plate had been removed. There 
was a delay, however, in fitting the replacement because it had arrived without its 
rubber seal. 
The seal arrived the next day and the Mechanical Technician's logbook recorded that 
the orifice plate was fitted and the equipment returned to service. 
The simple operation to replace the orifice plate eventually took four days to 
complete. This required the equipment to be taken off-line and reinstated a number of 
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times, each time requiring extensive isolation and "tagging," (each recorded in the 
Permit Controllers logbook). The fact that the rubber seal was not sent as required 
meant that the equipment had to go through this process at least one, unnecessary, 
extra time. 
Incomplete Reassembly After Maintenance. 
The Operations Supervisor's tour handover report records that a gas turbine had to be 
replaced because it was burning a large amount of oil. Whilst fitting the replacement a 
number of oil and hydraulic fluid leaks were experienced. 
On one occasion, after an attempted start, a large pool of oil was found on the floor 
around the compressor. The Mechanical Technician's logbook recorded that a permit 
was raised to investigate the source of the leak. This involved removing the casing 
around the turbine and its gear box. The record stated "found 1/8 inch plug missing on 
bottom of gear box." A new plug was fitted and no more oil leaks were experienced. 
This event was also recorded in the Control Room log, Operations Supervisor's shift 
handover log and Permit Controller's log. 
This event occurred because the fitting of a small, yet important, component had been 
overlooked. The gear box oil had to be drained when the compressor was removed. 
Obviously the plug should have been refitted, either as soon as the gear box was 
empty or when it was refilled. Again the consequence was the avoidable use of 
Technician's time and a waste of oil. There was also the potential for damaging the 
gear box by operating it without lubrication. 
Equipment Arrives Incomplete. 
The Instruments Technician's and Mechanical Technician's logbooks record that the 
replacement gas turbine, mentioned above, "arrived minus its anti-icing LT harness." 
The harness from the old machine had to be fitted instead. The Instruments 
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Technician's tour handover report added that "on-shore was informed and they 
suspect it was left at {the vendors} after its overhaul." 
This event represents errors on the part of the vendor and the people who dispatched 
the machine to the platform. Again it resulted in the avoidable use of technician's 
time. If the harness could not have been fitted on the platform the whole machine 
would have had to be sent back to the vendors, incurring great cost and seriously 
delaying the return of the machine to service. 
Failure to Complete Modifications. 
The Oil Operator's logbook records isolating a pump and its associated production 
wells to allow pipe work modifications. For three days after this the pump operated on 
manual. 
The Instruments Technician's logbook recorded that the pump was found to be 
inoperable on automatic control. On investigation it was found that the pipe work for 
the pump had been changed but the control system had not. A permit was raised to 
rectify the fault. 
This is an error in conducting plant modifications. The consequences in this case were 
minor but represent a failure in the management of a plant change. Such failures have 
caused major accidents in the past [Sanders 1993]. 
Error in Job Description. 
A dive support vessel had been contracted to perform valve checks on a sub-sea well 
template operated from the platform. The Operations Supervisor's shift handover 
report recorded problems in finding one of the valves. It was eventually discovered 
that this was caused by a mistake in the job instructions. 
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Dive support vessels are very expensive to hire so extending the time it was required 
was highly undesirable. The error was committed by the people organising work and 
issuing instructions. Such errors can have severe consequences if they lead to 
mistakes in critical pieces of work. 
Missing Drawing When Required for Maintenance. 
The Control Room Log listed a series of problems experienced with some equipment 
that tripped a number of times during one day. The Operator's logbook added that 
they had reset trips a number of times to allow the equipment to operate. 
When the equipment would not reset the Instrument Technician searched for the 
piping and instrument diagram as an aid to diagnose the problem. The Technician's 
logbook recorded that there was a problem finding a "drawing showing recent 
modifications." A copy was eventually found, the problem was identified and repair 
work was organised. The Operations Supervisor's shift handover report recorded that 
"maintenance are trying to source information. They don't have an up to date 
drawing." 
An error had occurred in this situation so that either an up-to-date drawing had not 
been sent to the platform's Maintenance department or it had been mislaid. The 
consequences in this case were limited to unnecessary time spent searching for the 
drawing. The potential problems of such a situation include delay in repairing critical 
equipment or incorrect action taken because a useful source of up-to-date information 
was not available. 
Data Lost From Computer Disk. 
The disk in question was part of the metering system on the main oil export pipe-line. 
It was used to calculate the company's tax liabilities and, as the pipe line was shared 
between a number of companies, recorded the oil flow from each platform. 
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The Operations Superintendent's tour handover report recorded that a disk drive 
required replacement and during this operation the stored production figures were 
corrupted. The Operations Supervisor's shift handover report added that the onshore 
management had been contacted and were sorting out the problem. The Control 
Room log recorded that other platforms linked to the system had been informed. 
The technician carrying out this operation appears to have made an error that, 
although recoverable, had potentially expensive consequences and affected a number 
of platforms. 
Summary. 
Records of ten human errors in seven days may not appear to be much, however, as 
the recording systems had not been developed to collect such information, it seems 
likely that these records represent only a proportion of those that are actually 
committed. What these records clearly show is that human errors occur more often 
than incident reports would suggest. 
The records do not only indicate the number of human errors that occur. Information 
is included about who makes errors, the types of error committed, the activity in the 
time leading up to and during the task where the error was committed, the 
consequences experienced, and the recovery actions. It is interesting to note, however, 
that most of the errors were recorded by the people who discovered, rather than 
committed, them. 
7.4.2 Incidents Recorded. 
In theory all incidents should have been reported under company incident reporting 
systems. In practice incidents with minor consequences are often not reported because 
the effort required to complete a report is greater than the perceived possible benefit. 
However, as an incident is any event that causes, or has the potential to cause, loss 
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some of the events recorded for use at handover can be considered as incidents. In this 
study 15 events were recorded that were actually incidents, according to the above 
definition, in addition to those involving human errors as covered in Section 7.4.1. 
Three categories of incident have been identified. There were three unplanned 
hydrocarbon releases, four failures of chemical treatment systems, four critical 
equipment trips and four other incidents that did not fit into these categories. Each is 
described below. 
Unplanned Hydrocarbon Releases. 
Any hydrocarbon release is environmentally significant. Some also have safety 
implications. 
A routine operation involving flushing some equipment resulted in a small oil slick 
appearing on the surface of the sea. No likely causes were indicated. 
• In another case it was reported that a small slick had been present throughout the 
day. No event was identified as causing this incident and the magnitude of the 
release was not recorded. 
A wing valve on a production well was found to be leaking gas. If the leak had 
been severe, or it had not been discovered in time, there was a fire or explosion 
potential. 
Failure of Chemical Treatment Systems. 
Fluids are often treated with chemicals to prevent problems with fouling and 
corrosion. Incidents where these systems failed are shown below. The nature of the 
systems mean that there are unlikely to be immediate consequences although they 
may contribute to future equipment failures with potentially serious consequences. 
• Three dosing pumps failed simultaneously, suggesting a "common cause failure," 
although none was identified. 
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A different set of dosing pumps lost their prime. Again there was no indication 
about how this occurred. 
• Twice it was reported that different chemical treatment systems were found to have 
tripped. Again no causes were recorded and there was no indication about the 
duration of the failure. 
Critical Equipment Failures. 
Certain items of equipment perform vital roles and are considered as critical. Any 
situation where they fail to perform correctly has potentially serious consequences. 
• The platform had two generators, one on-line and one on stand-by at all times. The 
on-line one tripped and although in this case the stand-by started, this is not always 
the case. Loss of power is a very serious problems so any generator trip is 
accompanied by much action by platform personnel and is definitely a serious 
event and should be considered as an incident. 
• One of the gas compressors continually tripped whilst attempts were made to bring 
another on-line. Gas is injected into the reservoir to allow good oil recovery. This 
event reduced the gas pressure which had a direct effect on production. 
• One of the gas compressors failed to start when required. This again reduced the 
gas pressure. 
• An emergency shut down valve failed to shut during a test. Although such a failure 
would never cause an accident, these valves are important devices for accident 
mitigation. 
Other Incidents. 
These incidents did not fit into the previous categories. 
• A pressure override switch was found to be broken which prevented the operation 
of the a piece of equipment. A temporary repair was made until spares could be 
found. The cause of the switch failure was not identified. This could be an 
important event as many accidents have been caused by similar, inappropriate 
"quick fixes" [Sanders 19931. 
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A pump was found to be operating at a very high temperature. The problem 
seemed to clear after a while so it was not considered further. No analysis was 
made to determine if the pump could have been damaged or even caused a fire. 
Damage to a pig receiver door was discovered during a pigging operation. There 
was no record of how the damage had occurred or why it had not been discovered 
earlier. 
A pressure gauge line became blocked. This caused false readings on an 
instrument. Such a situation can be difficult to detect and can have serious 
consequences if it allows equipment to operate at an unsafe condition. 
Summary. 
All incidents, whether caused by human error or not, are significant when considering 
human factors. They represent a failures of systems that, even if they do not cause 
accidents independently, will contribute to them. Incidents, even where no 
consequence is experienced, are generally accompanied by disruption, uncertainties 
and stress which are liable to affect human performance. They also require action, to 
return systems to a safe state, distracting people from their other tasks and 
responsibilities. These factors make the chance, and possible severity, of human error 
greater. 
In total, including those described in Section 7.4.1 as human errors, 25 incidents, 
recorded in logbooks and handover reports, have been identified. None of these had 
been reported within in the company's incident reporting system so these records are 
the only proof that the events actually took place. 
It is important to understand why these incidents had not been reported. The incidents 
all displayed one, or more, of the following characteristics: 
immediate consequences were very low, 
the link between events and incidents was not clear, 
situations appeared to correct themselves, 
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at the time, the priority was to return the system to normal rather than investigating 
the incident causes. 
These incidents were considered as insignificant because of the minor consequences 
and difficulty in identifying exactly what had happened. The trouble is that, as no 
report was made, these events will not be assessed to determine their potential 
consequences or root causes. 
It is difficult to foresee whether such events will ever be reported as incidents unless 
the perceived benefits of reporting are great enough. It is important, however, to at 
least record these incidents. This study suggests that information recorded for use at 
handover may also provide a mechanism for keeping these records. 
7.4.3 Routine Tasks. 
Routine tasks are those involving simple operations and low risk. They are performed 
often by people who are familiar with the methods involved. Detailed written 
procedures rarely exist and, if they do, they are unlikely to be consulted. The result is 
that, although they occupy a large proportion of people's time at work, information 
about routine tasks is difficult to obtain. 
This study resulted in a list of routine tasks that are recorded in logbooks and 
handover reports. It is shown in Appendix 6. The following uses for the information 
recorded have been identified. 
Human Reliability Assessment. 
The basic equation for calculating reliability is: 
Reliability = 1 - 	number of failues per year 
number of successful attempts per year 
Hence to quantify human reliability data is required for both failure and success rates. 
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Failure rates may be provided by incident reports. However routine tasks generally 
involve low risk, the consequence of failure is minor and it is unlikely that they will be 
reported, however, Section 7.4.1 and Section 7.4.2 have shown that logbooks and 
handover reports were used to record human errors and incidents so were able to 
provide failure rate data. 
The success rates of routine tasks are particularly difficult to obtain. Work schedules 
and plans are generally considered as a guide to the frequency with which a routine 
task should be performed, and as such are not a very accurate indication of what 
happens in reality. The contents of Appendix 5 shows that successful attempts at 
routine tasks were comprehensively recorded in logbooks and handover reports. 
Calculating System Availability. 
Many of the routine tasks identified were associated with routine inspection, 
preventative maintenance and equipment performance checks. These tasks are 
scheduled to maximise system availability which depends on equipment reliability, 
test intervals and test duration, as shown in Figure 7.2 





Duration 	 Duration 
 
Figure 7.2 System Availability 
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Accurate data is required about actual task frequency and duration. In theory this 
information should be available from work schedules and procedures specifying how 
long a task should take to complete. These sources of information, however, are often 
inaccurate. Work does not progress according to plan because of time pressures, 
personnel absence and the occurrence of other events. Routine tasks are usually given 
low priority so are likely to be postponed or even cancelled. 
Predicting task duration is difficult. It depends on who is performing the task, 
activities occurring in parallel and problems experienced. The time a system is 
unavailable may not actually depend on the time a task takes to complete but rather 
the time a system is off-line. There can be significant delays between preparing for a 
task and actually starting it, and between finishing a task and reinstating a system. 
This study has highlighted that systems are sometimes overridden for reasons other 
than work directly associated with it. This is of particular concern for control and 
safety systems but this is often done to prevent spurious alarms and to allow certain 
operations to be carried out that are not within the system's operational envelope. 
Summary. 
The contents of logbooks and handover reports have been found to include extensive 
information about routine tasks. This information includes: 
task frequency and duration, 
• success and failure rate, 
• task scheduling. 
The accuracy of these records is likely to be greater than most other sources of 
information as they are based on what actually happened, rather than what should, or 
is assumed, to have happened. They can be used to provide estimates of numerical 
human factors data or to validate assessments using other sources of data. 
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7.4.4 Dealing With Problems. 
Despite the increased use of more sophisticated technology on process plants, people 
are still employed to operate the equipment. This is mainly because people have the 
ability to adapt to a wide range of conditions and specifically they can solve problems. 
The danger is, however, that adaptation and problem solving occur in an uncontrolled 
manner. 
The way people deal with the problems they encounter during their work indicates 
how well they understand the systems for which they are responsible and the risks 
associated with their tasks. It is important to know about any action that has been 
taken. Records of nine events, where unusual problems required improvised solutions, 
have been found in the logbooks and handover reports studied. The details are 
summarised below. 
Successful Solution Discovered. 
Successful solutions to problems may indicate where best practice and procedures 
need to be updated. If they are not documented they may become standard practice for 
some, and not others leading to unexpected situations, or they become standard 
practice resulting in true problems being hidden. Examples of successful solutions 
were: 
An alarm would not reset because pressure was trapped in the system. Releasing 
the pressure solved the problem. 
• A production well would only flow when held at a low pressure. 
• Another production well appeared to die but when left untouched, oil flow would 
return. 
• Fuel gas pressure to a turbine had to be reduced before it would start. 
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Solutions Requiring Improvisation. 
In some cases the ideal solution to a problem was unavailable and an improvised 
solution had to be found. If a problem appears to go away, and the method used is not 
documented, it may be assumed that a permanent repair has been performed. The true 
situation may be that the solution should only be temporary until a better one can be 
performed. 
A replacement part was not available but a similar one was retrieved from a nearby 
platform that seemed to solve the problem. 
A valve actuator was sticking but when manipulated manually it was freed and 
appeared to work normally again. 
A leak was fixed by replacing a gasket with a plastic sealing compound. 
Assumption of Problem Cause. 
In two cases the cause of problems were suspected but could not be proved. It is 
important that assumptions are documented to explain why a particular action was 
taken. This allows information to be collected to show that assumptions were, or were 
not, correct to determine if any actions taken actually were successful. 
A pool of oil had developed; it was assumed to be coming from a non-critical item 
but access was difficult so proving this was not possible. 
Methanol was injected into equipment because a buildup of hydrates was suspected 
of causing problems. 
Summary. 
Records of the solutions attempted to problems and their success or failure is useful to 
show where people make appropriate assumptions and perform correct actions. They 
provide information about working practices and may be useful in updating written 
procedures. 
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7.5 Conclusions. 
Handover between shifts, and tours off-shore, is a critical part of the day-to-day 
operation of most process plants. It allows people to start work promptly, in a safe and 
efficient manner, by updating their knowledge of plant conditions and circumstances 
to take account of the events that have taken place during their absence. 
Research on handover techniques, although scarce, shows that communication at 
handover is most effective through a combination of verbal discussion and written 
records. It is the written records, in the form of logbooks and handover reports, which 
have been examined here as a possible source of human factors data. 
Studies published, where equipment reliability has been calculated from information 
recorded in operations and maintenance logbooks, show that data can be elicited from 
information that has been recorded for use at handover. Some problems have been 
identified, however, mainly because such a use was never envisaged when the 
logbooks were produced. 
The approach of companies to their handover procedures is rather haphazard. There is 
no industry standard so each has developed their own, with variable results. These 
procedures attempt to define what information should be recorded, although this is 
often limited to general category headings such as operations, maintenance and safety. 
In practice it is unlikely that more detailed instructions will ever be too successful as 
there are no rules that specify what information will be useful at every handover. 
Training, however, is more likely to have an effect if it can improve people's 
understanding of the issues involved. This is an issue that seems to have been 
neglected by most companies when they developed their handover procedures. 
The first part of the study conducted on an off-shore platform resulted in a summary 
of what information people actually try to record for use at handover. There are 
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effectively two categories; event logs record, at the time of occurrence, the activities 
carried out by the person writing and details of the events that affect their areas of 
responsibility, and status reviews record completed, ongoing and planned activities at 
the time of handover. Much information is likely to be duplicated but the aim of the 
people interviewed suggests that a wealth of information should be available that 
could provide useful data about what people do, why they do it, factors that affect 
them and the organisation of their work, and the outcome of their activities. 
The second part of the study involved a search for information, actually recorded in 
logbooks and handover reports, that had particular relevance to human factors studies. 
Records of a number of human errors were found. Although the details were not 
comprehensive it was possible to determine which tasks had been performed 
incorrectly, what errors had occurred, and the consequences of those errors. This type 
of information should have a useful input to human reliability assessments. Other 
incidents were also recorded, indicating other failures within the system. They had not 
been reported, probably because of the minor consequences that had been 
experienced. 
The information used at handover was not only of interest because of the records of 
failure events. Successful attempts at routine tasks, and solutions to problems, gave a 
good insight into how people worked without failure, most of the time. With the 
emphasis of reporting systems generally remaining on failure events, such records 
provide information necessary for reliability studies that may allow human factors 
studies to include quantitative assessments. 
You do not have to spend long with shift workers on a process plant to realise how 
important handovers are to them. Closer examination reveals the critical nature of the 
information that has to be communicated. This chapter has shown that there is also 
great potential for this information to be used to provide human factors, and other 
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safety, data. Systems have to be developed that allow easy storage and access as 
handwritten records, which are the norm at present, do not. With the advancements in 
computer technology, event logging systems and databases that have been achieved in 
recent years developing these systems should not be a problem. 
Implementing such a system to provide data would be a major human factors exercise 
in itself. People would requiring training, not only to use the system, but also so that 
they are aware of what information should be recorded. They must also not feel 
threatened by the extended use of their records to what they, and their colleagues, 
have done. However the benefits of developing such a system could be widespread 
resulting in a very powerful communications network that may overcome the 
problems many companies experience in providing information, issuing instructions 
and receiving feedback. 
Chapter 8. 
Conclusions. 
Human error makes a significant contribution to most of the accidents that occur in 
the process industry. Preventing human error thus provides an effective way of 
improving safety and reducing loss. This requires an understanding of human factors 
and accident causation theory, and information about the factors that affect human 
behaviour within any system that is being assessed. This thesis has examined possible 
sources of information that could provide data based on actual plant experiences that 
could be used in human factors studies. 
People behave according to the decisions they make based on information they 
receive from their surroundings and retrieve from their memory concerning their 
previous experiences. For any task the likelihood of success depends on the nature of 
the task, the quality of information, the time available to make good decisions, and the 
opportunity to recover and learn from any errors committed. Any conditions or 
circumstances under which the task is performed that adversely affect the information 
collection and decision making process increase the chance of failure. Any data 
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collection system has to be able to identify not only failures that occur but also the 
factors that influence the chance of success or failure. 
The individuals "at the sharp end" of any process rarely have any control over the 
factors that affect their chance of success. The greatest influence is usually made by 
the management, organisation, systems and culture of the company they work for. 
Any data collection system needs to be able to identify where failures in these 
functions occurred and what influence they had on human behaviour. 
Accident reporting systems have been used for many years by companies in the 
process industry to record events resulting in loss. Most have collected a large number 
of reports that could provide some data for use in human factors studies. There are, 
however, three main problems; a lack of consideration for human factors when 
developing reporting systems, a general reduction in accident rates limiting the 
number of recent reports, and the inability to report on management and cultural 
failures that may have contributed to an accident. The first of these can be overcome 
by improved reporting systems and the second could be overcome if companies were 
prepared to share their reports. The third is a major obstacle as companies are not 
prepared to record information that may suggest that their management is 
incompetent or that employees are required to work in an error-inducing and 
unforgiving environment. 
Decreasing accident rates have led companies to take more interest in near misses 
which occur far more frequently than accidents. The usual approach has been to 
extend existing accident reporting systems to include near misses. The conclusion of 
this thesis is that such an approach is not likely to be very successful as, although 
people are able to complete reasonable reports about events that have taken place, 
describing events that might have happened is not so easy as there is no evidence for 
corroboration. A better approach may be to consider near miss reporting as a living 
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risk assessment aimed at collecting data for use in human factors, and other safety, 
studies. An initial assessment would be used to develop a task inventory which would 
include known facts and assumptions about the systems concerned. This could be 
used to identify critical areas. Information collected from near miss reports would 
either be used to prove facts, validate assumptions or identify discrepancies. Any 
discrepancies would highlight flaws in a company's knowledge of their systems 
suggesting where the management, organisation, systems or culture had failed to 
ensure all risks associated with human factors had been considered. Over time the 
task inventory would build a comprehensive picture of how a company functions and 
form a valuable source of data for use in human factors studies. 
Investigation provides an opportunity to analyse incidents in detail to determine all 
the causes. The plentiful resources, sweeping power and the freedom to publish all 
findings make the investigation reports of major accidents a good example of the 
potential for incident investigations to provide data for use in human factors studies. 
The inquiry reports examined all included much detail about the human errors that 
directly caused the accidents including the factors that made them likely or inevitable, 
factors that contributed to the likelihood or severity of consequences of the accidents, 
information that should have warned companies they had safety problems, and 
specific management failures that were the root causes of the human factors problems 
and the accidents themselves. The company investigation reports examined, on the 
other hand, also included details about the human errors that directly caused the 
incidents but companies were less able or willing to comment on contributory factors, 
the warning signs that were available or the management failures that meant these 
warnings went unheeded. Incident investigation has the potential to provide data for 
use in all aspects of human factors and other safety studies. Companies at the moment 
seem to be missing this opportunity. 
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Although incident reporting and investigation systems are an obvious source of 
information about failure events they are not the only ones. Log books and reports 
used to communicate information at handover have been examined and found to 
include details of unreported incidents, human errors and difficulties people have 
experienced. They also included information about successful events such as the 
completion of routine tasks and successful solutions to problems. They would be a 
good source of information about all aspects of operation that could provide much 
data for use in human factors studies. Such an approach to information collection has 
the benefit that log books and handover reports are in themselves useful and would 
require little modification or extra effort for individuals although storage and retrieval 
systems would have to be improved. This study also suggests that these information 
recording systems could be developed to form improved communication and incident 
reporting systems. 
The possible sources of data for use in human factors studies have been considered 
separately, mainly because that is how they tend to operate in practice. This thesis 
concludes, however, that an integrated approach would have a much greater value. 
This would best be achieved by considering what data is required, how other systems 
and external organisations limit what can be recorded and the best methods available 
for collecting and storing information. 
Risk assessment is the backbone of safety analysis in the process industry. It uses 
facts and assumptions to determine whether a system is safe enough and to identify 
how the best improvements can be made. For hardware, facts are generally well 
known, for human factors far more assumptions are required. Data collection systems 
for use in human factors studies should aim to prove any facts used "beyond 
reasonable doubt" and show that assumptions are correct "in all probability." 
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This thesis has shown that accident reporting systems are unable to speculate about 
the causes of accidents without corroboration from a full investigation as this may be 
taken as an admission of guilt. Accident reports should thus concentrate on collecting 
(evidence about) facts. Near miss reports on the other hand rely on hypothesis to 
suggest what might have happened, and are far less likely to be of interest to any 
organisation with an axe to grind. Once the facts have been collected the process of 
developing hypotheses should be supported, possibly through the development of task 
inventories. 
For both accident and near miss reporting systems the first priority should always be 
to collect as much evidence as possible as quickly as possible. The study of 
information used at handover has shown that these systems already result in much 
appropriate information being collected but little of it used after a handover has taken 
place. It would seem reasonable that these systems could be extended, with the use of 
computer networks and data bases, to cover the reporting of incidents. That way all 
people who may have made a possible contribution to the incident can record what 
they were doing before and during an incident. This would maximise the amount of 
information recorded and ensure that any investigation carried out would have a good 
foundation. 
No system can guarantee the success of data collection. Ultimately this depends on 
the people who have to use the system. They must understand what information needs 
to be recorded and feel free to record it without recriminations. Success would be 
promoted by training all people within a company in human factors and accident 
causation theory. The organisation would then have to ensure that everyone could 
make an appropriate contribution and the management would have to ensure that the 
culture encouraged this. 
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Appendix 1. 
Statistics Showing the Human 
Contribution to Accidents. 
AU Introduction. 
Most of these statistics tell a similar story: most accidents and incidents include a 
significant human contribution. Should anyone ever need to be convinced that this 
statement is true the number and variety of studies conducted, and summarised below, 
should show that the human contribution is fairly consistent and significant. 
A1.1.1 Human Error was 'The' Cause! 
Many of studies have been conducted to determine the proportion of incidents that are 
described as having been caused by human error, or other human actions. Some of the 
studies covered all incidents in all industries, others are more specific. 
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Incidents Across all Industries. 
Table Al. I is a summary of statistics, covering a wide range of different industries, 
for the proportion of accidents that are recorded as having be caused by human error. 
Statistic Event Description Reference 
50 - 90% Accident in a wide 
range of industries 
Human Failure [Kletz 1991b] 
Over 80% Accidental deaths Actions of 
individuals 
[Ferry 19881 





Person working on 
the site. 
[Azambre 19911 
80% Accidents Human performance 
problems  
[Lucas 19941 
70 - 90% System failures Human error [Dhillon 1990] 
20 - 90% System failures Human component [Dhillon 1990] 
At least 
60% 
System figures Direct involvement 
of humans 
[Williams 1994b] 
26% Accidents notified Primary cause 
operator error 
[Drogaris 19911 
Table Al.! A Review of Human Accident Cause Statistics. 
Chemical and Oil Industry. 
Statistics relating to the chemical, petrochemical and oil industry are shown in Table 
Al.2. 
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Statistic Event Description Reference 
80 - 90% Accidents Human Error [CCPS 19941 
Almost 90% Petrochemical accidents Unsafe acts [Meshkati 19911 
58% Refinery fire accidents Human error [CCPS 19941 





73% Boiler start-up 
explosions 
Human error [CCPS 19941 
67% Boiler on-line 
explosions  
Human error [CCPS 1994] 
30% All reported accidents Maintenance- 
related 
[Williams 1994a] 
22% Vessel failures Maintenance 
failures 
[Williams 1994a] 





Table A1.2 Process Industry Statistics. 
Nuclear Energy. 
Nuclear power generation is perceived by the public as a very high risk activity and so 
safety is a major concern. Thankfully accidents are rare but this means that data about 
the human involvement in them is scarce. Table Al .3 shows some of the data 
available that comes mainly from the various incident reporting systems that are 
maintained by regulatory bodies. 
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Statistic Event Description Reference 
50% Incident and Human error [Graveling et al 
accidents 19871 
82% Component defects The hUman elements [Dhillon 19901 
At least 92% Significant event Man made [Reason 1990b] 
reports 
Over 65% System failures Human error [Wells and Ryan 
1991] 
25% Failure events Directly caused by [Williams 1991] 
human error 
39% Swedish scrams Human [Bento 19881 
performance 
problems 
27% Licensee Event Human [Bento 1988] 
Reports performance 
problems 
Table A1.3 Nuclear Energy Statistics. 
Military. 
Generally the military organisations are considered to be different from industry, 
especially in the way personnel are treated. Table Al .4 is included to see if this makes 
any difference to incident causation. 
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Statistic Event Description Reference 
50% All incidents Attributed to human [Gravelling et a! 19871 
error 
20 - 53% Missile system Contributed to by [Dhillon 1990] 
failures human error 
39% Missile Caused by human [Dhillon 1990] 
malfunctions error 
Table A1.4 Military Statistics. 
Transport 
Transport of all types is totally dependent on human operators and pilots, drivers and 
various controllers including air traffic control. Table Al .5 shows how the errors 
people in these positions make, result in incidents. 
Statistic Event Description Reference 
88% Serious incidents Attributed to human [Ambalberti 19921 
in general aviation error 
70 - 75% Jet aircraft Attributed to flight [Greenberg and Small 
accidents crew error 19931 
80% Oil tanker Attributed to human [Price 1993] 
casualties error 
55% Reported in UK Human failings [Gravelling et al 1987] 
mining  
62% Spills from Human error is a [Dahlgren 1991] 
hazardous significant factor 
materials transport 
Over 90% Documented air Human operators [Dhillon 1990] 
traffic control 
system errors 
Table A1.5 Transport Statistics. 
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Others. 
Table A1.6 is a collection of miscellaneous data from various sources. 
Statistic Event Description Reference 
50 -70% Electronic Contributed to by [Dhillon 1990] 
equipment failures human error 
90% Structural failures Human error in [Williams 1994a] 
design and 
construction 
Over 20% Fossil fuel power Direct result of [Dhillon 19901 
plant failures human action 
25.8% Malfunctions in Wholly or partially [Dhillon 1990] 
maintenance due to human error 
events 
20% Defects in products Missed by inspectors [Dhillon 1990] 
16% Critical incidents Aircrew action [Dhillon 1990] 
made worse 
Table A1.6 Other Industry Statistics. 
A1.1.2 How do people fail? 
So far the only conclusion that can be made from the statistics quoted is that a large 
proportion of incidents, in all industries, involve the failure of people in some way. 
This shows that preventing human error is a useful way of improving safety. However 
this information does not provide us with any clues of how to achieve this. 
The following statistics are the results of more detailed studies of how people fail and 
how this causes accidents and other safety related incidents. Attempts have been made 
to determine the types of errors people make and to suggest possible underlying 
causes. 
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Swedish Nuclear Power Stations 
The figures shown in Table A1.7 are the result of a study of "scrams" and Licensee 
Events Reports (LERs), from Swedish nuclear power stations, in the period 1983 - 
1987 [Bento 19881. From the data collected 63 scrams (39%) and 352 (27%) LERs 
were assessed to have been caused by human performance problems. These have been 
broken down into the inappropriate action types that caused the incidents in question 
and are summarised in Table A1.7: 
Inappropriate 
Action Type Scram LERs 
Untimely Act 26% 5% 
Confusion 21% 18% 
Not applicable/other 19% 16% 




Table A1.7 The Causes of "Scrams." 
The figure shows that an incident is not only caused when someone makes a mistake 
but also that doing an action at the wrong time or doing nothing can result in an 
incident. 
The events summarised in Table A 1.7 have been further analysed to determine why 
the people involved may have made the errors they did. These underlying factors are 
described as "Root causes." 
This analysis highlights that the causes of error are not simple and this is shown by the 
fact that for 33 Scrams and 177 LER more than one root cause was identified. Table 
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Al. 8 shows the distribution of root causes between incidents separated into those with 











Human variability 37% 18% 30% 12% 
Workplace 
ergonomics 
13% 33% 15% 37% 
Procedures not 
followed 
23% 18% 13% 38% 
Training 7% 33% 4% 41% 
Task complexity 3% 36% 2% 7% 
Procedures 10% 
(context)  
21% 10% 35% 
Communications 3% 
(verbal)  
21% 2% 12% 
Change 
organisation 
0% 21% 9% 6% 
Work organisation 3% 9% 15% 44% 
Work schedule 0% 9% 0% 5% 
Work environment 0% 3% 0% 2% 
Table A1.8 The Root Causes of Scrams and LERs. 
Vessel and Pipework Failures. 
135 vessel failure incidents [Bellamy and Geyer 1992] and 921 pipework failure 
incidents [Bellamy et al 19891 were studied to determine what caused them. 
The contribution of human error to vessel failures was 24.5% but taking into account 
the human contribution to other failure types, including vehicle impact, overfilling, 
damage when moving, feeding the wrong materials and incorrect mixing, the total 
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human contribution was 32.8%. Table A1.9 shows the breakdown of the types of 
errors made. 
Statistic Cause 
71% error in (control) operation 
25.2% operating errors due to failed/no 
communication 
2.8% insufficient isolation 
0.9% inadequate cleaning of the vessel 
leaves reactive residue 
Table A1.9 The Causes of Vessel and Pipework Failures. 
The contribution of human error to pipework failure was 30.9%, but taking into 
account the human contribution to other failure types, including impact and incorrect 
equipment installation, the total human contribution was 41%. Table Al. 10  shows the 
breakdown of the types of errors made. 
Statistic Cause 
24% Pipework not cleared of contents 
before broken into 
19.9% Incorrect equipment status 
15.9% Wrong procedure/wrong sequence 
8.5% Insufficient isolation before 
maintenance 




2% Equipment not returned to correct 
status 
20.8% Unknown 
Table A1.1O The Types of Errors Made. 
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Further analysis determined what the origin of failure was. Table Al.1 1 shows these 





32% 34.6% Operation 
29.5% 26.7% Design 
22.2% 38.7 Maintenance 
Table A1.11 The Origin of Failure. 
Chemical Industry. 
284 incidents were analysed to determine the underlying causes [Hollnagel 19931. 
Table Al. 12 shows the results with a single cause being attributed to each incident. 
Statistic Cause 
19% Inadequate standard operating 
procedures 
15% Error in recognition or 
confirmation 
14% Error in judgement 
12% Poor inspection 
10% Inadequate directive 
10% Inadequate communication of 
operational information 
6% Operational error 
6% Unskilled operator 
2% Imperfect maintenance 
6% Other 
Table A1.12 Causes of Incidents in the Chemical Industry. 
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Offshore Oil 
Unintended shut-down of Norwegian North Sea Platforms during preventative 
maintenance were studied [Am Vatn 19931. Table Al. 13 is a summary of those caused 
by human error. 
Statistic Cause 
22% Insufficient bypass/ 
check-out routines 
23% Inaccuracy 
13% Communication failure 
5% Incomplete procedure 
text 
33% Other 
Table A1.13 The Causes of Shut-Downs on Oil Platforms. 
Worldwide Chemical Industry 
In the study of the Chemical Industry's 100 largest losses [Lees 19801 human error 
has accounted for accidents that have cost around $563 million. Table Al. 14 is a 
summary of the types of errors involved. 
Statistic Cause 
11.2% Incomplete knowledge of 
chemical properties 
3.5% Incomplete knowledge of 
system or process 
20.5% Poor equipment design 
or layout 
31% Maintenance 
6.9% 1 Operator error 
Table A1.14 Errors That Contributed to the 100 Largest Losses in the Chemical 
Industry. 
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Nuclear Power Stations. 
180 significant event reports in the period 1983/84 were analysed [Reason 1990b]. 
387 root causes were identified and these are summarised in Table Al. 15. 
Statistic Cause 
52% Human performance 
problems. 
33% Design deficiencies 
7% Manufacturing 
deficiencies 
3% External causes 
5% Other 
Table A1.15 Root Causes of Nuclear Power Incidents. 
This study continued to examine the causes of the human performance problems. The 
results are shown in Table A1.16. 
Statistic Cause 
43% Deficient procedures or 
documentation 
18% Lack of knowledge 
16% Failure to follow 
procedures 
10% Deficient planning or 
scheduling 
6% Miss-communication 
3% Deficient supervision 
2% Policy problems 
2% Other 
Table A1.16 Breakdown of Human Performance Problems. 
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Chemical Facilities 
A study of 190 accidents in chemical facilities appears in [CCPS 19941. The top four 
causes are shown in Table Al. 17. 
Statistic Cause 
34% Insufficient knowledge 
32% Design error 
24% Procedure error 
16% Personnel errors 
Table A1.17 Main Causes of Chemical Facility Accidents. 
Petrochemical and Refinery Units 
A study of accidents in petrochemical and refinery units [CCPS 1994] gave causes as 
shown in Table A1.18. 
Statistic Cause 
41% Equipment and design 
failures 
41% Personnel and 
maintenance failures 
11% Inadequate procedures 
5% Inadequate inspection 
2% Other 
Table A1.18 Causes of Accidents at Oil and Petrochemical Units 
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Refinery 
In a study of accidents at Japanese oil refineries [CCPS 1994], human error accounted 
for 58% of the accidents as shown in Table A1.19. 
Statistic Cause 
12% Improper management 
12% Improper design 
10% Improper materials 
11% Mis-operation 
19% Improper inspection 
9% Improper repair 
27% Other error 
Table A1.19 Causes of Accidents at a Japanese Oil Refinery. 
Major Accidents. 
97 accidents have been notified to the European Major Accident Reporting System 
[Drogaris 1991]. For 25 of these the primary cause was operator error. Of these 19 
were related to plant operation. Table A1.20 summarises the underlying causes that 
have been identified, many of the accidents having more than one. 
Statistic Cause 
21% Lack of safety culture 
68% Insufficient/unclear 
procedures 
58% Operational procedures 
5% Maintenance procedure 
16% Other managerial! 
organisational 
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Statistic Cause 
26% Insufficient supervision 
21% Insufficient training 
68% Related to design 
deficiencies 
79% Design inadequacy 
26% Short cuts 
Table A1.20 Underlying Causes of Accidents. 
Appendix 2. 
Multiple-Choice Questions and Answers 
Used on Accident Report Forms. 
A2.1 Introduction. 
Many of the accident report forms provided for the survey of accident reporting 
systems described in Chapter 4 included questions with multiple-choice responses. 
The person completing the report was required to indicate which response or 
responses best described the situation that was involved in the accident. Below is a list 
of all the questions, with their responses. 
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A2.1.1 Actual Activity Leading to the Incident. 
climbing/descending handling hazardous digging 
materials 
diving loading/unloading draining/flushing 
driving material handling erecting/dismantling 
scaffolding 
handling chemicals mooring using hand tools 
lifting/crane operations sampling using power tools 
manual lifting using machinery walking 
mechanical lifting using portable tools/ working at height 
equipment 
operating plant welding/burning 
A2.1.2 System state. 
exercise 	 start up 	 high activity 
low activity unplanned shut down 	normal 
planned shut down 	training 	 plant upset 
A2.1.3 Operation. 
administration modifications catering 
cleaning storage commissioning 
construction maintenance deck operations 
diving production domestic 
drilling/workover transport inspecting 
laboratory 
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A2.1.4 Broad Incident type. 
air transport 
electrical 
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A2.1.6 Nature of Injury/Illness. 
abrasion amputation break/fracture bruise 
burn chemical burn chemical injury concussion 
crush cuts decompression dislocation 
electrical burn electric shock exposure foreign bodies 
hearing loss hernia inflammation loss of 
consciousness 
lung disease multiple poisoning puncture 
respiratory scald skin disease sprain/strain 
superficial cuts 




















Appendix 2. Multiple Choice Questions and Answers 
	 IDJ 















































Appendix 2. Multiple Choice Questions and Answers 
	 RM 





lack of skill 
stress 






inadequate mental ability 
lack of knowledge 
safety training 
technical training 
A2.1.11 Basic Cause Job Factors. 
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A2.1.12 Root Cause Equipment Related. 




housekeeping 	 operation 	 manufacture 
installation maintenance/inspection 
A2.1.13 Immediate Causes. 
failure in communication 
failure to observe 
failure to use personal 
protective equipment 
properly 
failure to warn 
improper manual 
handling 
improper position for task 
operating equipment 
without authority 
working on live 
equipment 
servicing equipment in 
operation 




working at unsafe speed 





failure to make plant safe 
before working 
failure to secure 




misuse of tools/ 
equipment 
removing or defeating 
safety devices 
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A2.1.14 Immediate Causes: Substandard Conditions. 
congestion or restricted 
action 
fire and explosion 
hazards 
high or low temperature 
exposures 
inadequate access/egress 
inadequate guards or 
barriers 







conditions, gas, dust, 




inadequate or excess 
illumination 




poor floor conditions 
substance/article on floor 
noise exposure 
poor house keeping, 
disorder 
work environment 
A2.1.15 Incident Procedure Related. 
inadequate 	incorrect 	not clear 	not followed 
A2.1.16 Incident Permit-to-Work Related. 
inadequate 	not raised 	preparation 	violated 
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A2.1.17 Management of Control. 
personal communication programme monitoring personal protective 
equipment 
changes procedure for 
equipment and software 
control of defects 








management of safety 
materials quality control 
operations procedure 









incident report systems 
maintenance procedure 
management of training 
off-the-job safety 
organisational rules 
recruitment, selection and 
development 
safety critical equipment 
task analysis and 
procedures 







training of skill level 
requirements 
permit to work system 
A2.1.18 Recommendation to Avoid Recurrence. 
change isolation 
procedure 








key system compliance 
provide PPE 
redesign equipment 
review permit system 
training-safety talk 
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A2.1.19 Corrective Action by Direct Supervision. 
give adequate or complete 
job instruction 
provide sufficient or 
better PPE 
provide safe plant 
facilities or equipment 
enforce rules, standards 
or instructions closely 
provide correct or safe 
tools or equipment 
review correct inspection 
procedure 
review and correct job 
planning 
regulate pace of job 
A2.1.20 Corrective Action by Counselling and/or Placement. 
change employee's 
duties to be more 
compatible with abilities 
counsel employee on 
methods used at work 
provide adequate 
training for employee 
reprimand or discipline 
counsel employee to pay 
more attention 
Appendix 3. 
Study of Accident Potential. 
A3. 1 Introduction. 
The study of near miss reporting described in Chapter 5 included a study of how well 
people were able to describe the accident potential of an incident. A section was 
added to a company's accident report form with the questions: 
• Do you think the consequences of this accident could have been potentially worse? 
• If yes, what additional injuries could have been caused? 
• What additional property damage could have been caused? 
• What factors prevent this accident from realising its potential? 
A3.2 Results. 
Below is a list of the responses to the above questions for incidents where it was 
considered the accident potential was worse than that experienced. In some cases the 
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details have been altered to protect the identity of the company supplying the 
information. 
Trapped finger between pipes in an untidy pile because of poor general 
housekeeping. 
The finger could have been amputated if it had been caught in a sharp edge. 
Luck prevented it from being worse. 
Person fainted, fell over and cut arm. 
Possible head injury. 
Luck prevented more serious injury. 
Strained back when lifting. 
• The back injury could have been worse, 
• The equipment being lifted could have been damaged. 
• Luck prevented the incident from being worse. 
• Need to remove this manual handling from this maintenance task. 
Leg got stuck between grating and top ring of ladder. 
• If leg had slipped further down a more serious injury could have been sustained to 
upper leg. 
• Awareness and reaction of the employee prevented more serious injury. 
• Modification made and all similar situation to be checked as all have the same 
potential. 
Diesel spilt on floor whilst removing tank level transmitter the self sealing valve also 
came undone. 
• Operator could have been overcome with fumes. 
• Basement could have been flooded with oil. 
Appendix 3. Study of Accident Potential 
• The operator was able to screw the valve and transmitter back in place to stop the 
flow. 
• A modification is to be made although the instructions were not followed that 
states the valve should be held in place whilst unscrewing the transmitter. 
Trapped finger between handle and unsuitable wing nuts. 
Lacerations could have been a great deal more severe. 
Employee was being careful as someone else had been injured before. 
• A temporary notice was to be put up warning of danger until modifications to 
wingnuts and force required to move handle have been made. 
Jammed finger as in accident above. 
Could have broken the finger. 
Luck prevented it from being worse. 
• Modifications required to wingnuts (original ones worked fine) and force required 
to move handle. 
Person injured whilst operating valve in restricted area. 
Injury could have been worse. 
Luck prevented worse injury. 
The valve is often used so an extension to the spindle is to be fitted. 
Head injury occurred when a tool rolled off a monorail puncturing his helmet. 
• Severe head injury or fatality. 
• Safety helmet helped lesson the injury. 
• Better access for parking tool required. Also end stop on tool was missing or had 
never been fitted. 
Slipped off ladder. 
• Could have fractured ankle. 
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The fact that the person was only low on the ladder minimised the injuries. 
The lower rungs were smooth so non-slip surface to be fitted. 
Hit head on wall mounted electrical box when sweeping floor. 
Could have injured eye. 
Missed eye because person was looking down at the time. 
• The boxes are at head height for easy operation of equipment. Moving would likely 
cause worse problems in the future. Warning tape was applied to highlight danger. 
Bruise and gash to side of head when stood up from bending down and hit head on 
cable support steelwork. 
Could have struck eye. 
Injury minimised because wearing hard hat and safety glasses. 
Supports shortened where at all possible, warning tape applied to all. 
Injured arm and shoulder when slipped on oil and put arm out to save themselves. 
Could have received a head injury. 
Luck prevented this. 
The oil spill should have been cleaned up earlier. 
Foot injury when tried to lift a heavy shield gate when it suddenly moved. 
Could have crushed the foot. 
• Luck prevented this. 
• Manual handling is required because the gate blocked access and needed to be 
moved 
Bashed shin on crane cross member travel stop. 
• Could have lead to a fall from great height. 
• Luck prevented this. 
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Warning tape applied, cross members to be removed when not in use. 
Caught finger on door handle as it fell. 
Could have lost the finger. 
Luck prevented this. 
• Bracket had been fitted after similar incident, finger caught between this and 
handle. Bracket replaced with a single stop bolt. 
Caught glove on hand drill. 
Could have broken wrist. 
Air driven machine was small enough power to allow operator to stop it easily. 
Protruding pin caught glove has now been removed. 
Bashed shin when put foot through hole and struck edge. 
Could have fallen further with leg stuck in hole leading to more serious injury. 
Person maintained some balance and could recover themselves. 
• Temporary blanks to be fitted over holes when performing this routine task, near 
misses had been experienced before. 
Box toppled over with someone inside when clearing metal from it. 
Could have caused serious crush injury or broken limbs. 
• Luck prevented this. 
• Non routine operation using an inappropriate box and no procedures available. 
Valve blown out when undone because pressure not vented. 
• Could have been contaminated 
• Person was standing to the side. 
• Instructions were incomplete. 
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Stepped down hole. 
Could have broken leg or arm. 
Another person was present to hold on to. 
• Hole often uncovered for long time, cover weighs 3 tonne, a temporary cover made 
for those tasks. 
Splashed with residue cyclohexamine liquid from pump housing. 
Could have caused severe burns to face. 
Only minimum amount of liquid left in the housing. 
• PVC suit should have been worn according to COSHH. Assessment was not 
included with work order. 
Caught arm between door and door jam due to excessive air pressure. 
Could have broken bones and damage to door which would affect segregation. 
• The person's size and strength allowed them to control the door without more 
severe injury. 
• Sign to be put up but not good enough. Modifications required although occasional 
problem due to wind direction. 
Person caught in eye when another person turned the rod they were holding. 
Could have caused more damage to the eye. 
Man moved head away as accident occurred minimising the injury. 
• Two people had to work in a confined space, they were also under time pressure at 
the end of shift. 
Skin reddened due to welding with boiler suit open. 
• Could have caused more severe burn. 
The exposure time was limited preventing further injury. 
• If the suit had been buttoned up it would have given full protection. 
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Struck eye when turnstile equipment reversed. 
Concussion, laceration, loss of eye. 
Agility of person allowed them to move out of the way. 
Several incidents have occurred, the equipment will be serviced. 
Fell forward when missed last step during emergency exercise. 
Could have fractured limb. 
Able to recover as it was the last step. 
Wearing emergency equipment at time and fatigue may have contributed. 
Used fluorescent tubes standing against wall, blew over. 
Broken glass could have caused lacerations and eye injuries. 
Luck prevented this. 
Should have been in appropriate box. 
Turnstile stuck when in use (again). 
• Could have caused eye injury or mouth (dependent on height, wearing safety 
glasses etc.), potential to cause fracture. 
• Luck prevented this. 
Appendix 4 
Incident Investigations Techniques. 
A4.1 Introduction. 
A4.1.1 US. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Incident 
Investigation Methodology. 
Reportable events that occur at nuclear power stations are usually investigated by 
specialist teams. The commission have developed a methodology which these teams 
use [West et al 1991]. There are six tasks within the methodology. 
• Determine sequence of events. 
• Interview plant personnel who were involved or had knowledge of the events. 
• Evaluate personnel performance during the event. 
• Review documentation relevant to the event. 
• Evaluate the command, control and communication aspects of the event. 
• Root cause analysis and evaluation in an effort to determine what correctable 
human factors may have contributed to the event. 
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A4.1.2 ILCI Incident Investigation Technique. 
As part of their Modern Safety Management training course [D]W 1993] ILCI 
include instructions about how to investigate incidents. The technique is based around 
the ILCI incident causation model and there are six steps to be followed. 
Respond to the emergency promptly and positively. 
Collect pertinent information about the incident. 
Analyse all significant causes based on the "dominoes" in the ILCI incident 
causation model. 
• Develop and take remedial actions. 
• Review the findings and recommendations. 
• Follow through on the effectiveness of the actions. 
A4.1.3 Events and Causal Factors (E&CF) Charting. 
E&CF allows a sequence of events and associated conditions to be represented 
graphically on a chart [Paradies et al 19921. The chart is then assessed by experts 
who identify the causal factors [Armstrong et al 1988]. 
Events are happenings that occur during some sequence of activity. They are 
represented by rectangular boxes on the chart. 
Conditions are circumstances pertinent to the situation that affected the events. 
They are represented by ovals of the chart. 
Causal factors are the events and conditions that are considered to have actually 
caused the accident. 
An example of an E&CF chart is shown in Figure A4.1 for a reactor trip at a nuclear 
power station caused by an operator error [Paradies et al 19921. 
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Operator 1 	Operator 	Technician System 'A' System 	assigned begins to 	RX 	found on-line.  to line up 	Pe01S bleed pressure
valve __W 	 System 'B' bypassed 	valves for at test 
found isolated for testing test 	 I connection 
Mr 
operator 
understood 	- - -: 	 I 	 because of improper valve line up, 
request : pressure transient on system 'B' 
causes low pressure signal providing 2 
of 3 trip signals which causes tn operator had 
jexpermiencepeng )- - 
task on system 'C'( isolates wrong 
sysn 
valve 3412-B 	 valve 3412-A left 
shut, required .. 	open, required 
position - open 	
: 
position - shut 
valve 3413-B 	 valve 3413-A 
open, required . 	shut, required 
position - shut 	 position - open 
Figure A4.1 Example of an E&CF Chart. 
A4.1.4 Sequentially Timed Events Plotting (STEP). 
STEP is another method of graphically representing the events involved in an 
incident. In this case each event is described according to the actors and actions 
involved [Hendrick and Benner 1987]. 
An actor is a person or thing that influenced the incident process. 
An action is something done by an actor. 
An event is one actor performing one action. 
The STEP analysis starts from the end state of all objects involved in the incident. 
Their state at the beginning of the incident is then described. Between these points 
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evidence collected during the investigation is used to identify events which explain 
how any changes in state came about. 
An example of a STEP analysis is shown in Figure A4.2. This is a simplified version 
of the events involved in an accident where a road tanker containing Propylene 








ammonia Driver 1 	Ieignore 
overloads weighbridge chooses 





Tank  I 	Tank 	I I 	Tank 
I 	I 	cracks overheats M ruptures 
- I Propylene 	Propylene Propylene Ll leaks flash fire jPropylei released 	explosi ___ 
Figure A4.2 Example of a STEP Worksheet. 
Where changes in state have occurred but no evidence of particular events has been 
found a logic tree is used in an exercise known as "BackSTEP" to describe the events 
must have occurred at the stage in the sequence where there is a gap in knowledge 
[Hendrick and Benner 19871. 
There are three basic rules that guide an investigation using STEP. 
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Everything is at steady state until something or someone acts on it to change it. 
• Each actor has to be somewhere, doing something during the incident. 
• Incidents are not linear and events happen simultaneously. 
A4.1.5 Causal Tree Method (CTM). 
CTM is a simplified form of fault tree analysis developed by Rhone-Poulenc to aid 
incident investigation. The investigators collect all their evidence and list the facts 
they know. Starting from the incident outcome they ask what events were necessary to 
cause it. They then ask if the facts they have are sufficient to explain what happened, 
if not they have to search for more facts. The process then continues back along the 
incident sequence until all events have been explained [CCPS 19921. An example is 
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loading overloaded 	exit 
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Figure A4.3 Example of CTM [CCPS 1992] 
210 persc 
killed 
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A4.1.6 The Management Oversight and Risk Tree (MORT). 
MORT is a logic tree that has been developed to guide investigators to identify the 
underlying causes of incidents. These are assumed to occur because of basic job 
oversights and omissions, and failure of management systems [Ferry 1988]. Factors 
are identified as a cause of the accident if their quality was "less than adequate" 
(LTA). The top levels of the tree are shown in Figure A4.4. 
Loss I 	I Future 
OR gates 	 Event I undesired 
AND gates 	
- 	event? 
;;I Oversights  and omissions 
Specific 	 Management 
control system factors 
factors LTA 	 LTA 
Accident 	 Amelioration 
I\ 	 LTA 
Potentially harmful Barriers and Vulnerable Events and 
energy flow or  controls LTA people or energy flows 
environmental object leading to 
condition incident 
Implementation 1 I 	Risk 
Policy  
I 
LTA 	I assessment 
LTA 	 LTA 
Figure A4.4 The Top Levels of MORT. 
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The full tree has approximately 100 problem areas represented by rectangular boxes 
and 1500 possible root causes represented by circular boxes. The tree was developed 
from case studies and human factors research [Ferry 1988]. 
Analysis of the incident is carried out by following the appropriate paths down the 
tree. The investigators work through all branches of the tree and record all the root 
causes identified. 
A4.1.7 Root Cause Analysis (RCA) 
RCA is used to identify and code the root causes of causal factors which the 
investigators have identified, often from an E&CF chart. The US Nuclear Power 
industry have developed a root cause tree to guide investigators through this process. 
The tree has a number of levels which range from low detail at the top to high detail at 
the bottom. The levels are: 
• primary difficulty source, 
• area of responsibility, 
• major root cause category, 
• near root cause, 
• root cause. 
For equipment problems there is an extra level below the area of responsibility 
described as "equipment problem category." The top levels of this tree are shown in 
Figure A4.5 [Armstrong et al 19881. 
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Causal factor 
Equipment Operational 	Technical 	Support 	Natural 	Sabotage 	Other 




reliability I LdepmentJ [or fabricationJ 
HealthliLaboratoryll Power 1 1 Other 
protection [departmentJ [dePartmentJ 1epartment 
department 
Primary difficulty source 
Area of responsibility 
Figure A4.5 The Top Levels of the RCA Tree. 
The investigators follow the tree down for each causal factor until they reach the 
bottom of the tree which leads them to a root cause. More than one root cause can be 
identified for each causal factor. 
A4.1.8 Technique Operations Review (TOR). 
TOR provides a list of operational errors to be considered. These are: 
• training, 
• responsibility, 
• decision and direction, 
• supervision, 
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• work groups, 
• control, 
• personal traits, 
• management. 
The investigators consider these and determine which are appropriate to the incident 
in question. For each operational error there is a list of between six and nine phrases 
that further describe possible causes of accidents. Each cause is numbered and 
includes a list of the numbers of other causes that should be considered. The 
investigators follow through the sequence of causes and identify those which were 
involved in the incident. 
TOR analysis focuses on failures in system operation. The aim is to encourage 
managers to consider underlying causes of incidents [Ferry 1988] 
A4.1.9 Investigating incident "Layers." 
Kletz suggests that each event identified during an incident investigation should be 
examined to determine what recommendations could be made to prevent or mitigate 
future accidents. These recommendations can be on any of three layers: 
immediate technical recommendations, 
recommend action that would remove a particular hazard 
recommend changes that would improve the management system. 
Figure A4.6 shows an example of a fire in a drain that occurred when seized bolts 
were removed with welding equipment. The investigation found that a flammability 
test of the atmosphere in the drain had been carried out two hours previous to the 
cutting operation. The drains were then covered and a flammable atmosphere 
developed. Sparks from the welding equipment burnt through the plastic sheets 
covering the drains and caused the fire. 
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Recommendations 
1st Layer 2nd Layer 3rd Layer 




during welding  
.Cover drains with flame 
resistant sheets 
Test above sheet not 
below 
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wrong sheets 
Provide better access 
I. 
Use high temperature 
lubricants 
Event 
Drain catches fire 
Hole burnt in sheet 
by spark 
Drain tested. No 
flammable gas. 
Drain covered with 
plastic sheet 
Decision made to 
burn off bolts 
Pump bolts 
seized 
Figure A4.6 Investigating Incident Layers [Hollywell and Whittingham 19941 
Appendix 5 
Major Accident Inquiry Reports. 
A5.1 Introduction. 
Companies do not like to publicise the details of their incident investigations. When 
the consequences have been serious, however, external agencies become involved and 
the reports of any investigation carried out are usually published. This section is a 
summary of five published investigation reports which have been reviewed to 
determine what type of information is recorded. Two are the result of public inquiries 
and the other three were published by industry regulators. Each inquiry report 
included details of the technical causes of the incidents. For this thesis, however, the 
focus remains on the human factors, management and systems causes. 
A5.1.1 Piper Alpha. 
The Piper Alpha oil production platform experienced a major fire and explosion that 
resulted in the death of 167 people and the total destruction of the platform. The 
public inquiry spent 13 months determining the sequence of events most likely to 
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have caused the accident. It was concluded that a condensate pump, "pump A," whose 
safety valve had been removed for testing was de-isolated and brought into service 
when "pump B" tripped. The blank flange which had been fitted in place of the safety 
valve was not leak tight. Gas escaped causing a small explosion. This caused an oil 
fire leading to further large gas explosions which destroyed the platform. A main 
feature of this inquiry was the lack of physical evidence and few surviving witnesses. 
"Pump A" Safety Valve Removal. 
A contractor was employed to test the safety valves on the platform. It was established 
that he was experienced at this operation and would normally have fitted the blank 
flange leak-tight. In this case the pump was also due for maintenance. This would 
have involved dismantling pipework and the duration of that work would have been 
much longer than the valve testing. A blank valve would still have been fitted to 
protect against dirt but would not have to be gas tight. This is probably why the 
contractor only secured the flange finger tight. He was not aware, however, that the 
pump maintenance had been cancelled. 
"Pump B" Trip. 
Operation at the time of the accident was unusual. The inquiry established that the 
company were aware that the process conditions were likely to lead to hydrate 
formation in the condensate system. No preventative action had been taken and this is 
considered to be the most likely cause of the "pump B" failure. 
Starting "Pump A". 
"Pump A" had been left electrically isolated but the operator on night shift was not 
aware of the ongoing work and there was no other indication that the safety valve had 
been removed at the pump control site. The "pump B" trip could have resulted in a 
platform shutdown if a condensate pump could not be brought into service within 
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about 30 minutes. The inquiry established that the operator who deisolated and started 
the pump would never have done this if he had known the safety valve had been 
removed. De-isolating the pump was a simple operation and under the circumstances 
was a reasonable action to take. 
The Emergency Response. 
Normal procedure on the platform was to put the fire water pump control onto manual 
when divers were in the water, as was the case at the time of the initial fire. This meant 
fire water was not available and the fire was able to spread rapidly. 
The nature of the fire made a conventional escape, via helicopter or life boat, 
impossible. No-one on the platform took command of the situation so no alternative 
escape plan was formulated. 
Previous Incidents Experienced on the Platform. 
A previous fatality had highlighted problems with handover and permit-to-work 
systems. Management had sent memos but no real action had been taken. 
The deluge system was tested every three months. Problems were commonly 
experienced, especially with blockages, and although improvements had been 
suggested, no action had been taken. 
A previous incident involving evacuation from the platform had shown that in poor 
weather conditions there would be many problems. Again no action was taken as 
management believed all conceivable emergencies could be controlled if evacuation 
was not possible. 
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Management Failures. 
The inquiry clearly identified where management failed to ensure the safety of the 
platform. They had set reasonable policies but never checked that they worked in 
practice. This was especially true of the permit-to-work system which had been 
assumed to work properly as few reports of major problems had been received. 
None of the management seemed to "own" safety problems, such as those concerned 
with the deluge system and emergency training. When action was required to make 
safety improvements no one took responsibility to ensure this was done. 
Recommendations. 
The inquiry made a number of recommendations aimed at improving the safety of all 
off-shore operations. The key to these was that each platform should prepare a "safety 
case." This was a document that listed all risks associated with operation and the 
controls in place to ensure these risks were as low as reasonably possible. In 
particular: 
Offshore platforms should be self-sufficient in the event of an emergency for long 
enough to allow a return to a safe state or a full evacuation. 
• Companies should ensure good safety becomes an integral part of their operation 
by developing safety management systems and actively monitoring safety 
performance. 
• The operation of each platform should be such that inventories of hazardous 
materials are minimised. 
• Senior personnel should be selected according to their leadership abilities, 
especially during emergencies. 
• Permit-to work systems are critical to safety and should be better organised. 
• A data base should be maintained to record all hydrocarbon releases throughout the 
industry. 
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A5.1.2 Allied Colloids. 
A storage facility caught fire when an oxidising agent came into contact with a 
flammable material. £4.5 million of damage was caused, 33 people required hospital 
treatment and fire water runoff caused severe pollution. The HSE spent 270 staff days 
investigating the accident. 
Poor Segregation of Chemicals. 
The store where the fire started was designated for oxidising agents only (known as 
the oxy-store). Drums of flammable compounds were also stored there because they 
had been mis-classified. The warehouse staff had access to chemical data sheets, 
although they were of poor quality, but the staff had not received any training that 
highlighted the importance of segregating chemicals with different properties. 
Oxidising Agent Drum Failure. 
A drum of oxidising agent failed because a heating system in the oxy-store had been 
switched on. This heating system should have been disconnected several years 
previously. Instead its thermostat had simply been turned down to prevent it starting. 
The control system for the heating system was next to one for a similar system in 
another part of the store. On the day of the fire a technician had accidentally started 
the wrong system 
Oxy-Store Fire Protection. 
The oxy-store had a double set of fire doors designed to prevent the spread of fire. In 
practice one set of doors was always left open effectively halving the fire resistant 
capabilities. 
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Alarms and sprinklers should have been fitted in the oxy-store but never had been. 
Fire fighting was further hampered by an inadequate water supply. This is a problem 
that had been foreseen but never rectified. 
The Logistics Department. 
The responsibility for the chemical stores was given to a recently formed logistics 
department. None of the staff in this department had any training concerning the 
hazardous nature of the chemicals they were responsible for. 
Previous Incidents. 
The chemicals involved in the fire had been involved in many previous fires, within 
and outside the company. In one a fire had resulted from a similar drum failure caused 
by a heating system. Segregation of the chemicals was regularly monitored and, on a 
number of occasions, serious deficiencies had been identified. Changes to the 
management of the store had not, however, been made. 
Management Failures. 
The store had been originally been designed by an administrator with no chemical 
background. His design had been unsatisfactory. Modifications had been made during 
construction to include a separate oxy-store but the actual design of the building was 
never documented. 
The company did not have a clear safety management policy. The responsibilities of 
the directors and their job descriptions did not include any details about safety 
performance. 
Recommendations. 
The investigation report made a number of recommendations. 
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Companies should ensure all guidance concerning storage of chemicals are 
followed at all times. 
Safety policies must be reappraised following any significant management re-
organisation, ensuring non-production departments are not neglected. 
The safety policy should set targets against which performance should be regularly 
monitored and audited. 
The allocation of maintenance priorities should include an assessment of safety 
critically. 
Adequate training should be given to all employees with good records kept for 
each individual. 
In the event of an incident public emergency services should be called immediately 
if there is any chance of escalation. 
Companies should be aware of possible situations that may cause pollution or toxic 
release. 
A5.1.3 Hickson and Welch. 
A large jet fire erupted from a vessel when heat was applied to aid the removal of 
residue containing dinitrotoluenes and nitrocresols. This resulted in 5 deaths and 
severe damage to a control room and office block. The HSE spent 270 staff days 
investigating the accident. 
The Requirement for Vessel Cleaning. 
The vessel had not been cleaned since it was installed many years earlier. A new mode 
of operation lead to a large build-up of sludge so cleaning became necessary. No 
procedure was developed for this operation, although they existed for similar vessels. 
The method used was decided when an appropriate-looking implement, a metal rake, 
was found on the site. 
Applying Heat to Vessel. 
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Difficulty was experienced when removing the contents of the vessel. To help, the 
residue was heated with an internal heating coil to soften it. Although instructions 
were given that the temperature in the vessel should not exceed 90 °C the steam 
control system was faulty and the position of the thermometer meant that it was not 
able to indicate the actual temperature of the residue. 
Escaping From the Fire. 
The position of the control room and means of escape had not been considered. These 
contributed to the problems the operators who died had in escaping from the building. 
A person in the office was overcome by smoke and died. A supposedly safe escape 
route had been compromised by building work. 
Previous Incidents. 
The explosive properties of nitrotoluenes are well known and they have been involved 
in many fires and explosions including a similar one at another of the company's sites. 
The possibility that such substances become unstable when held for a time at quite 
reasonable temperatures should have been considered during this operation. 
Management. 
Reorganisation of the company had removed one layer from the company 
management. After this the area managers found they were under considerable 
pressure. A number of complaints had been made but no action had been taken. 
A new system of Team Leaders was introduced two weeks before the accident. This 
had led to a person who had not worked on this particular plant for 10 years taking 
responsibility for the job and organising the permits-to-work. 
The new service for the vessel was considered dangerous by some technologists but 
management had been slow to react to the possible risk. During the cleaning operation 
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a sample of the sludge had been taken but the area manager had not looked at it. He 
made his decisions assuming the sludge was a thermally stable tar. 
Recommendations. 
The investigation report listed a number of recommendations. 
Care should always be taken when dealing with potentially energetic substances 
and samples should be taken before work commences. 
All non-routine operations should be subject to risk assessment at an appropriate 
level of management and covered under safe systems of work. 
The nature and limitations of control systems should be known by all who interact 
with them. 
Companies should consider the effect of any re-organisation of their workforce and 
ensure people who are authorised to issue permits-to-work have sufficient 
knowledge of the plant involved. 
The design and location of all buildings near plant should be considered carefully. 
Companies should regularly monitor and audit their compliance with all safety 
performance standards. 
A5.1.4 Clapham Junction. 
Three trains collided because of a wiring error which occurred during the installation 
of a new signalling system. 35 people died and nearly 500 were injured. A public 
inquiry was set up and spent 56 days interviewing 122 witnesses and studying 13,000 
pages of documents. Some difficulty was experienced because people on the scene of 
the accident had not been aware of the need to preserve evidence. 
Wiring Fault. 
Old wiring was being replaced by new. It was not possible to remove the old wires so 
it was essential that the ends were cut back, secured and insulated. These precautions 
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had not been taken and on return to service a connection was made between old wires 
and the new system leading to an incorrect signal showing to the train drivers under 
certain conditions. 
The technician who carried out the work was experienced and had a good work 
record. It was found, however, that he had never been properly trained to carry out 
such work. This meant he habitually took short cuts. In this case he also made some 
uncharacteristic errors, probably because of fatigue from working seven days per 
week whilst this project was being completed. 
Work Supervision. 
The faulty wiring had been carried out during a weekend which was voluntary 
overtime for those who were prepared to work. During week days particular teams 
worked together. At the weekend this was not the case. This should have meant that 
weekend work was much better supervised. On the day in question the supervisor 
present knew the technician was good at his job and left him to complete the work 
alone. 
There was evidence that supervision was generally of poor standard. In particular the 
technician who had committed the error in wiring had always been praised for the 
quality of his work whereas in practice he had always followed less than best practice 
which should have been apparent if supervisors had actually checked his work. 
Failure To Test Wiring. 
A Testing Engineer was present when the wiring work was carried out and he should 
have found the faults. He did test the signals were operational but did not inspect the 
wiring although this was part of the safety testing routine. Again the person in 
question had never received appropriate training. 
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The Part Played by Company Reorganisation. 
In an effort to reduce administration costs the company management had undergone a 
thorough reorganisation. It was a cumbersome process that seriously affected 
employee morale. People, including the Testing Engineer, had been transferred to jobs 
they did not want. Individual and team responsibilities had not been properly 
redefined and where changes to work arrangements were required because of reduced 
manpower, such as the weekend work involved with this project, they had not been 
made. 
The reorganisation aimed to make the company more business-orientated. 
Expenditure had to be justified against cost and benefit. Improvements to safety rarely 
had obvious commercial benefits and were given low priority. 
Previous Incidents. 
A number of potentially serious incidents had occurred because of signal wiring 
faults. The causes had been identified as poor design and inadequate testing. The only 
action taken had been the disciplining of supervisors. Problems with training had also 
been identified but no action had been taken. The main reason for lack of action was a 
failure of management to realise the potential risk of signal failures. 
Management Failures. 
Over many years the management had failed to communicate to the workforce the 
required standard for installation and testing of signalling equipment. For this 
particular project no manager had overall responsibility, instead it was shared. This 
meant that much of it was organised by a person who volunteered to do it although he 
did not have appropriate experience to fully appreciate what was involved. In 
particular there was no control over weekend work, although that was the time when 
the most critical work was carried out. 
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Recommendations. 
The inquiry report included a number of recommendations. 
Technicians should receive better training and the contents of training courses 
should be reviewed regularly. 
Work should be better planned to prevent unnecessary pressure on the workforce. 
One person should take overall control of a project and ensure instructions are 
distributed properly. 
• Incident reporting and investigation should be improved to ensure lessons are 
learnt. 
• Company reorganisation should be backed up by appropriate resources. 
• Outside consultants should perform regular audits. 
• Systems should be developed to ensure priorities for funding include 
considerations for safety. 
A5.1.5 Herald of Free Enterprise. 
The Herald of Free Enterprise capsized because it went to sea with its bow doors 
open. 138 people died and many were injured. A public inquiry was set up to 
investigate. 
Leaving the Bow Doors Open. 
It was the Assistant Bosun's responsibility to close the bow doors before the ship left 
port. He did perform his duties on arrival at Zeebrugge but then went to his cabin to 
sleep. He had not heard the call that was his cue to close the doors. 
The Bosun should have supervised his assistant. Although he was aware that the bow 
doors were open when the ship was preparing to leave he did not consider it his 
responsibility to close them. 
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Leaving Port With the Bow Doors Open. 
The Master authorised the ship to leave port. From the bridge there was no way of 
knowing if the bow doors were open or closed. The practice followed did not involve 
checking the doors were closed, instead it was assumed they were unless a problem 
had been reported. 
Ship's Draught. 
The ship had been designed for a different port. The loading procedure at Zeebrugge 
required the filling of the ballast tanks at the front of the ship to lower it so that the 
loading ramp would reach. The ballast pumps had a low capacity so it took a long 
time to pump out the tanks. In addition the draught-measuring instruments did not 
work so there was no way of knowing if the ships draught was actually safe when it 
left port. These factors meant that the ship had left port with an unsuitable draught 
that in this case contributed to the disaster by allowing even more water to enter the 
bow doors. 
Previous Incidents. 
There had been several cases of people missing the tannoy calls that informed the 
crew they should commence their departure duties. In particular a number of ferries 
belonging to the company had previously left port with their bow doors open. Some 
new rules had been written following these incidents. Not all masters were aware of 
them and they had generally been ignored. 
Management Failures. 
The inquiry report states that the most important errors were made by the people 
working within the company's management. They had put considerable pressure on 
the Masters of ferries to sail on time, they issued instructions that were unclear and 
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showed a lack of thought for safety and they were unqualified in nautical matters but 
failed to listen to complaints made by Masters who were. 
This particular ferry was being used on a route that was unusual to the crew. It 
required one less officer to be on board and at departure the duties of the missing 
officer had not been redistributed and were not always carried out. 
Lessons Learnt. 
The inquiry lists a number of lessons of the disaster. Some required urgent attention 
whilst others needed to be addressed with further consideration and research. 
Fail safe lights should be fitted to all ferried that indicate the bow doors are open 
and closed-circuit television should be used as a backup system. 
• New instruments are required to ensure accurate measurements of draughts can be 
taken and a practical method of checking that records are being kept should be 
implemented. 
• Management should ensure they have an effective method of disseminating 
information including an incident reporting systems that covers all hazardous 
events. 
Every member of every ferry must be sure of their duties and responsibilities. 
• Although overloading was not shown to be a contributory factor in this disaster the 
inquiry had found that it was sometimes a problem and action should be taken to 
avoid it in the future. 
Appendix 6. 
Routine Tasks Recorded in Information 
Used at Handover. 
A6.1 Introduction. 
Log books and handover reports surveyed and summarised in Chapter 7 included 
many references to routine tasks. These tasks involve simple operations and are 
performed regularly so that procedures are rarely followed and hence information 
about their performance is often difficult to collect. 
Reference to routine tasks were found mainly in Process Operator and Maintenance 
Technician log books. Typical records are listed below. They use language understood 
on the platform although for this exercise the precise meanings are not important. The 
nature of the tasks means that most entries are made when it is completed although 
particularly long processes may be recorded as ongoing at handover. Where items of 
equipment are started up or valves are opened, a later record usually shows that the 
action has been reversed, so that equipment is shut down and valves are closed. 
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A6.1.1 Operations Supervisor Shift Log. 
• pipeline pig receiver lined-up for transfer, 
• production well flow sent to test seperator, 
• test seperator sand-washed, 
• production well batched, 
• halon protection system de-isolated, 
• compressors changed to temperature control, 
• production well chokes adjusted, 
• Merpros degassed and back-flushed, 
• foam pump function checks completed, 
• compressors sand-washed, 
• water injection system treated with biocide, 
• valve integrity checks completed, 
• firewater pumps function checked, 
• well tubing equalised with gas lift 
• well subjected to wireline testing, 
• compressor blown down to atmospheric flare, 
• flanges spaded for maintenance, 
• compressor light off checks completed, 
• compressor water wash completed, 
• well riser flare changed, 
• equipment isolated and tagged for maintenance, 
• lubrication oil sent to centrifuge, 
• foam pump 6 month preventative maintenance completed, 
• heavy lift performed, 
• fiscal meter proving completed, 
• well samples taken and sent to lab. 
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A6.1.2 Control Room Operator Official Log. 
• generator changed to water curtain control, 
• foam pump efficiency checks completed, 
• halon protection system isolated and reinstated, 
• separators sand-washed, 
• fiscal meter proving completed, 
• water injection system treated with biocide, 
• fire pumps function checked, 
• generators operating in load sharing mode, 
• production well cross over valve opened, 
• production well manifold valve shut and opened, 
• freshwater pumps changed from lead to lag, 
• pump micro-log checks completed, 
• lubrication oil reservoirs topped up, 
• compressors water washed, 
• lifeboat drill performed, 
• emergency muster drill performed, 
• compressors on governor, 
• production wells flow to test seperator then returned to production seperator, 
• methanol injected to control valve, 
• fuel gas supply isolated and vented, 
• compressor loaded up, 
• generators on bars, 
• generator fuel changed from oil to gas, 
• chlorinator trip checks completed, 
• foam pump vibration monitoring completed, 
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• gas injection put into service, 
• production well chokes opened, 
• pressure across tubing well tubing equalised, 
• well casing vented through group seperator, 
• pipeline pig receiver lined up, 
• pig removed with wax, 
• pig receiver bypassed and drained, 
• pig launched into pipeline, 
• Merpros back-flushed and vented, 
• skimmer weired over and sand-washed 
• class 0 overrides used, 
• general alarm overrides used. 
A6.1.3 Water Operator Log Book. 
• chemical treatment tanks filled, 
• chemical treatment tanks dipped, 
• new drums of chemical treatment arrived, 
• deck foreman of empty drums, 
• oxygen scavenger calibration pot removed, cleaned and replaced, 
• injection water system treated with biocide, 
• water injection pumps isolated for maintenance, 
• chemical injection quill removed, drilled out and replaced, 
• oxygen scavenger rate increased, 
• pump lubrication oil added, 
• deaeration tower pressure checks completed, 
• gas lift sent to reservoir, 
• production well lined up to separators, 
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• Merpros back flushed, 
• separators sand-washed, 
• skimmer skimmed, 
• production well chokes adjusted, 
• flares in operation, 
• fiscal meter proving completed, 
• well depressurised through group seperator, 
• tubing depressurised to low pressure flare via test seperator, 
• gas lift line blown down, 
• isolations put in place for wireline testing, 
• sump pump on auto-control, 
• main oil line pump bears flushed, 
• gas and oil lines depressurised for heavy lift. 
A6.1.4 Satellite Field Operator Log Book. 
• Ferranti tank circulated for one hour, 
• pipeline pig receiver lined up, 
• pig removed with wax 
• separator sand-washed, 
• Emergency Shutdown Valve hydraulic pressure adjusted, 
• fiscal meter proving completed, 
• fire pumps function checked, 
• fire system nitrogen bottled replaced, 
• demulsifier topped up, 
• corrosion inhibitor topped up, 
• production well chokes adjusted, 
• tubing cross over valve opened, 
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• pig receiver bypassed and drained, 
• Emergency Shutdown Valves function checked, 
• wells lined up to utility line for sampling, 
• fire pump monthly function checks and micro-log completed, 
• separators sand-washed, 
A6.1.5 Gas Operator Log Book. 
• generator Detroit diesel day tanks topped up, 
• ZOK added to tanks, 
• turbo oil and terresso 32 added to compressor, 
• halon isolations used, 
• foam pump efficiency checks completed, 
• fire water pumps efficiency checks completed, 
• generators on load sharing, 
• generator fuel changed from oil to gas, 
• chlorinator trip checks completed, 
• compressor water wash completed, 
• generators using water curtain, 
• compressor on governor and loaded up, 
• foam pump isolated for preventative maintenance, 
• foam pump microlog test completed. 
A6.1.6 Instrument Senior Technician Log. 
• weekly checks completed, 
• 6 month preventative maintenance completed, 
• corrosion monitors and 02 analysers checked, 
• deluge flow rate checks completed. 
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A6.1.7 Mechanical Technicians Shift Log. 
• lifeboat 12 month engine checks completed, 
• week 43 breathing apparatus checks completed, 
• condition monitoring completed on satellite field utility fans, fresh water pump gas 
compressor, water injection booster pumps and vacuum tower pumps, 
• crane preventative maintenance completed, 
• HVAC daily checks completed, 
• filters replaced, 
• foam pump 6 month preventative maintenance completed, 
• weekly breathing apparatus checks completed, 
• lifeboat preventative maintenance completed. 
A6.1.8 Electrical Technicians Shift Log. 
• lifeboat 12 month preventative maintenance completed, 
• cathodic protection preventative maintenance completed, 
• fire and gas detectors disconnected, 
• routine function checks completed, 
• hypochiorite weekly trip checks completed, 
• lighting weekly checks completed, 
• fire and gas weekly checks completed, 
• emergency equipment survey completed, 
• saver sets and local panel weekly checks completed, 
• platform battery monthly preventative maintenance completed, 
• heli-deck weekly checks completed, 
• accommodation daily checks completed, 
• foam pump 24 month preventative maintenance completed, 
• routine micro-logs completed, 
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foam pump running checks completed, 
isolations performed as required, 
12 month preventative maintenance completed. 
